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PREFACE
This is the first volume of a two-volume report covering work
performed in the period between June, 1978, and April, 1981, on a
project entitled "Definition and Analysis of Systems Data Communication
Structures." This project was sponsored by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia.
The Technical Contract Monitor was Mr. J. Larry Spencer.
This vnlume is primarily concerned with communication method-
ology, while the second volume treats communication issues at the
aircraft system level.
The authors would like to express their gratitude to the
personnel of NASA Langley who, along with Mr. Spencer, have made
significant technical contributions to this work, especially Messrs.
Brian Lupton and Nicholas Murray. Thanks are due also to Mr. Billy Dove,
whose foresight and confidence made this project possible.
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16. Abstract
This two volume report addresses the problem of data and power distribution in
advanced transport aircraft in support of the NASAEnergy Efficient Transport
Program. Advanced aircraft design concepts are employing active control techniques
to achieve significant increases in aircraft performance and energy efficiency. The
concepts depend, however, on the availability of control mechanisms, with their
supporting communication and power systems, that can perform flight-crucial
functions continuously. Traditional methods are likely to be inadequate for these
requirements, The objective of this study is to develop the technology that will
meet the challenge.
Volume I addressesseveralspecifictechnologyissues. Candidatedata
communicationtechniquesare identified,includingdedicatedlinks, local buses,
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
i.i Background
Airplane flight depends on the distribution of power and the
communication of information within the vehicle. As aircraft systems
increase in complexity for reasons of performance and safety, so also
must the supportingdata and power systems. The proliferation of
signal and power wires carries penalties of excessive weight, installa-
tion cost, circuit cost, and certain forms of vulnerability. Alterna-
tives, such as multiplex systems and remote power control, seem to
address the proliferation problem, while presenting hazards of their
own.
&
Human eyes, hands, and muscles were the original principal
information and power elements in airplanes, and are still important,
• though not always sufficient. They are increasingly supplemented by
hydraulic, electric, and electronic means. Pilots and passengers rely
on hidden systems vulnerable to flaws and stress. The more sophisti-
cated the systems become, the more fragile they seem to be. How, then,
shall power distribution and data communication be handled in airplanes
projected for the future in which lapses of correct control may not
exceed several milliseconds in duration? On one hand, the prolifera-
tion engendered by extrapolation of present practice seems a reasonable
price to pay for the preservation of the technology evolved by the air-
craft industry over several decades of time. On the other hand, it is
not clear that such extrapolations could ever meet present and future
safety requirements in future airplanes that depend on constant auto-
matic control for their moment-to-moment survival. It rather appears
that multiplexing and remote power control will be the less hazardous
approaches in cases where comprehensive redundancy is used to achieve
extreme levels of reliability in complex systems.
The issues involved in on-board data communication and power
distribution are of major importance in the development of technology
for future commercial transportairplanes, where energy efficiency is
an overriding goal, subject to various requirements of performance,
economy, and safety. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
is responsible for a research program entitled "Aircraft for Energy
Efficiency - Energy-Efficient Transport," or ACEE-EET. One of the
facets of this program, called ACT, Active Controls Technology, under-
takes to develop the necessary tools with which to design full-time
flight-crucial* controls. The scope of ACT extends to all aspects of
control systems, including sensors, actuators, algorithms, computers,
and, as described in this report, data communication and power distri-
bution.
This report documents an investigation sponsored under ACT by
the NASA Langley Research Center, primarily focussing on data communica-
tion structures, and secondarily treating power distribution structures.
The title of the project is Systems Data Communications Structures.
1.2 Objectives of the Study
In brief, the objectives of the study can be summarized as
follows:
i. Identify a common set of requirements
2. Define candidate data communication structures o
3. Define candidate power distribution structures
4. Develop design theory and analysis tools as required
5. Generate tradeoff data
6. Investigate circuit technology issues.
i. Because much of the study is concerned with comparisons among
various methods, a common set of requirements was generated
to be used as a baseline for such comparisons. Some of the
requirements are firm. Many are more or less casual extra-
polations of present practice. Others are predicated on
assumptions stemming from the Active Control Transport
research program at NASA. These requirements are described
in Volume 2 of this report.
*Flight crucial - the highest level of criticality: loss of function
is catastrophic.
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2. The candidate data communication structures can be classified
into relatively few categories, i.e. dedicated, broadcast, and
two-way multiplex. Each has its variants, depending on tech-
nology and function. The airplane data communication structures
of today all consist of a variety of substructures with the
result that systems are quite inhomogeneous. The evolutionary
trend appears to be toward increasingly homogeneous systems and
data communication structures.
3. Candidates for power distribution include various ways of utiliz-
ing remote-controlled electric circuit breakers and/or current
limiting devices. The object is to create a system that can
tolerate short circuits as well as open circuits. Hydraulic
power was not treated, since there seems to be no significant
alternative to present redundant hydraulic power distribution
structures, other than abandoning hydraulics in favor of
electrical actuators.
4. Design theory and analysis tool development was a requisite for
the comparative study of various architectures and techniques.
This was particularly so for networked forms of communication
and distribution, for which little or no prior theory existed.
5. Tradeoff data has been generated for a number of different data
communication structures that have suggested themselves for
various phases in the evolution toward fully flight-crucial
systems. It is presented in Volume 2.
6. Circuit technology issues underlie most of the evolutionary
trends of communication and distribution architectures. Also,
as technology itself evolves, the tradeoffs change. The purpose
of evaluating technology here is to support the identification
and evaluation of the various structures for which comparisons
are made.
1.3 Summary of Existing and Emerging Methods
Most data communication on commercial transport airplanes today
is accomplished using dedicated wires, one wire per signal, with
additional wires where a signal has multiple destinations. Most of the
signals involved are discrete or analog, including signals from DC
analog devices, linear variable differential transformers (LVDT's),
synchros, and frequency analog devices.
Some of today's airplanes have used digital broadcast buses
(ARINC 429), and this form of communication promises to be substantially
more prevalent in the near future. Experience so far has been that the
noise tolerance is much greater than that of analog signal transmission.
Contemporary power distribution is hierarchical, using redundant
main buses plus a variety of subsidiary buses. Breakers are central-
ized in cockpits with a few exceptions. Protection is afforded by
breakers and bus shedding. Batteries are used to provide essential
power when generation capacity is lost, but they are viewed as hazardous
cargo, and are used in as small numbers and sizes as possible. Problems
arise from failures of generators, diodes, breakers, and so forth, as
well as from wiring hazards.
Wiring is cabled for ease of installation and mechanical support.
Its location and routing is one of the lowest priority considerations
in airframe design, subject only to safety and validation considerations.
For the most part this presents no problem, but there are occasional
spots where wiring becomes awkward, such as in the wings and tail, and
at the instrument panels. The major cost factors are installation,
termination, and connectors. Cables are partitioned into sections for
installation. Each break in the cable requires terminations and a con-
nector pair. More breaks mean easier installation, but higher termina-
tion and connector costs. Wiring can be thought of as costing about
one dollar per conductor-foot on the average. Total wire lengths for
jet transports run from about a hundred thousand feet to somewhat
under a million feet.
Wiring hazards exist in many forms. Most of the problems stem
from environmental stress. Vibration is a major problem in certain
locations such as engines, control surfaces, and landing gear. Damage
can result from flexure, insulation cold flow, and/or abrasion.
(Strengthening insulation can sometimes result in increasing abrasion
damage, rather than decreasing it.) Corrosion from chemicals and
moisture in the atmosphere is another hazard. Others are handling and
repair, high temperature, and manufacturing defects.
In addition to the hazards listed above, airplanes are exposed
to a number of hazards that can cause failure in a number of places at
the same time. One such hazard is lightning strike. Another is
damage, such as may result from engine burst, bird strikes, structural
failure, or terrorism. These events are relatively rare, but not so
rare as to be classified as being "highly improbable."
Airplanes are designed to tolerate the effects of these hazards
insofar as they can reasonably be tolerated. Philosophies of function-
al separation and channel separation are applied, with special treat-
ment accorded to certain paths, signals, and functions.
The present generation of airplanes, such as the Boeing 767, are
incorporating the new ARINC 700 series of standard avionics, which rely
heavily on digital communication, notably the ARINC 429 broadcast bus.
Digital transmission has intrinsic properties making multiplex use of
transmission facilities little or no more costly than simplex use. Thus
broadcast buses have the property of reducing the number of signal
paths needed as compared with non-multiplex analog systems. Further
reduction can be made by multidrop runs to multiple destinations,
although there are limits to how much this can be done. Except for
the use of digital broadcast buses, the data communication and power
distribution in present generation airplanes is very little different
from those of prior generations.
In the case of military aircraft, efforts have been made to
establish a new data communication standard employing a form of multi-
plex transmission rather more ambitious than that of broadcast buses.
The foremost example of such a standard is the MIL-STD-1553 multiplex
bus, now in its B revision. This standard has evolved from a number
of earlier versions proposed by different design teams, one of which
was used to control electric power distribution in the B-I airplane
(E-MUX). This is a two-way form of busing. Each bus has numerous
transmitters and receivers. Broadcast buses, by contrast, have one
transmitter with multiple receivers. Two-way buses save substantially
on wire as compared with broadcast buses, but they are vulnerable to a
greater variety of hazards, and have not yet been used for any flight-
critical functions. Variants of two-way buses may, however, be
considered as candidates for future airplanes in flight-crucial roles.
Military aircraft power distribution systems have also been the
subject of recent research and development. Remote solid-state
breakers can be controlled by digital commands communicated over multi-
plex systems. Direct current is proposed to replace alternating
current for generation and distribution.
Looking more to the future, one can anticipate increasing dis-
tribution and dispersion of electronics for purposes of multiplexed
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data communication and remotely-controlled power distribution. Sensors
and effectors are tending to become "smart," that is, to incorporate
embedded digital computer control. This, along with the lure of fiber
optics, creates an environment in which miniature electronics will crop
up in diverse places. This will increase the burdens to be borne by
data communication and power distribution, but it can also provide the
tools with which to support them.
1.4 Summary of the Problem
Redundant flight control systems in some contemporary transport
aircraft are given full authority for the order of 10-2 hours during
autoland. Active control technology for future control-configured fly-
by-wire airplanes will require full authority capability for ten hours,
some three orders of magnitude beyond current practice. Those orders
of magnitude may be achieved with moderate redundancy levels only if
malfunctions can be contained, and hence prevented from propagating
unchecked through the system. Surviving elements must then be able to
be accessed, configured, and applied to the control function.
The problems of containing malfunctions and maintaining access
to surviving elements fall heavily upon the structures which carry
data signals and power among the various dispersed elements of the
system. One might tend to think of redundant computers, sensors, and
effectors as being the only significant constituents of fault-tolerant
flight control systems, and perhaps think of system interconnections
in the same light as ordinary componentry and packaging. In fact,
however, system interconnection must be one of the principal architec-
tural considerations in fault-tolerant systems. As such it presents
serious challenges to system architecture and technology alike.
The objective of this program was to study interconnection
technology for integrated, fault-tolerant aircraft electronic systems,
encompassing flight control, guidance, and navigation, as well as
flight management, monitoring, surveillance, and support. The study
hypothesized an evolutionary development, through several aircraft
generations, toward a full-time flight-crucial system with no external
backup.
The motivation for a full-time flight-crucial system is simply
that this affords the maximum latitude for the airplane architecture
to capitalize on active control. The question is not whether full-time
active control is necessary. It is rather a question of what benefit
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it could be if it were made possible. Fuel economy can be served in
several ways through control-configured vehicle (CCV) design. Other
potential economies exist in traffic control routing strategies which
depend on precise guidance. Workload relief and comprehensive contin-
gency management capability have the potential to enhance safety. The
list could grow indefinitely, some items requiring flight-crucial
control, others requiring full-authority command, and still others
requiring wholly-integrated management. In most or all of these cases,
the prevention of system malfunction would be critical or crucial.
The motivation for assuming the absence of external backup
forces the assumption of stringent requirements, and therefore leads
one to seek the limits in fault-tolerant technology. It does not imply
the belief that this is the inevitable outcome. It has its legitimate
basis, however, in the sense that present-day system techniques do not
extrapolate to a full-time flight-crucial capability, and that all
contingencies for Which a backup might be employed must be addressed
by the redundant primary system.
The interconnection structure of an airplane must take account
of the fact that certain sensors and effectors must be located in
specific dispersed places, where the environment may well be extremely
inhospitable. Contemporary systems address this problem by concentrat-
ing electronics in equipment bays in the fuselage, and locating mostly
passive devices elsewhere. The interconnections between electronics
and sensor/effector components is by some combination of dedicated
wire, hydraulic, and pneumatic paths. Present systems are not full-
time flight-crucial; and, accordingly, redundant channels are located
in separate boxes in a common bay. In flight-crucial systems, damage
tolerance considerations will probably require that separate redundant
elements be located so that a single damage event will not destroy
more than one such element. These systems are therefore visualized as
being partitioned so as to occupy different bays for the sake of damage
tolerance as well as for communication economy.
Data communication between one electronic element and another
can usually be accomplished economically through the use of multiplex
buses. Between an electronic element and a passive device, however,
dedicated interconnections are required. Insofar as wire length and
weight are concerned, it would be preferable to locate electronics near
to passive devices to minimize dedicated paths at the expense of multi-
plex paths. That is, it takes less wire to disperse electronics than
it does to concentrate it. If wire length were the only consideration,
all systems would henceforth be dispersed.
The extreme case of dispersion for damage tolerance and wire
economy at the Same time is a hypothetical ',fullydispersed" system,
in which each sensor and each effector contains one or more embedded
electronic "microbays," housing the dedicated information and power
handling devices for the specific sensor or effector component. A
future transport airplane could contain the order of one hundred or
more such "microbays." Aside from the revolutionary notions involved,
the principal design risk stems from the possibility of high failure
rates, and therefore high maintenance costs, occasioned by the hostile
environments of many microbays. This is, nevertheless, an appropriate,
albeit extreme, case for our study.
In between the contemporary and the extreme cases lie a number
of alternatives ranging from two or three bays to a quasi-dispersed
approach with intermediate environmental conditions. In each of these
cases, the "bay" would have the function of providing a containment
boundary for externally-induced malfunctions such as damage. In most
of these cases, the bay must be designed to degrade gracefully when
its contents, i.e. "boxes," sustain random failures. The fewer "bays"
there are, the more this is true. In a two-bay structure, for example,
there must be a highly dependable set of containment boundaries
internal to each bay, since it will benecessary to tolerate some two
to four random box faults without losing the services of "innocent"
boxes in that bay. Only in the fully-dispersed extreme may the "bay"
(a "microbay" in this case) be abandoned after a single random failure.
The data communication and power distribution requirements are
primarily to provide "continuous" service in and between bays, and to
and from all dispersed elements outside of bays. Service must be
available despite the existence of any probable fault condition, and
lapses in service due to recovery actions must be brief enough so as
not to impinge on active control. A probable fault condition, for
purposes of this argument, can be thought of as any fault condition
whose probability exceeds 10-9 in any hour for a flight of ten hours,
corresponding to an emerging FAA guideline.
The kinds of faults that must be considered are of three main
classes: random faults in response to normal flaws and stresses,
induced faults in response to environmental phenomena, and design
lapses in hardware, firmware, and software. The manifestations, or
msymptoms, of such faults may be intermittent or permanent. They may
produce inconsistencies that implicate innocent entities. They may
effect more than one entity at a time owing to correlation or lack of
containment. They may also have no manifestation at all, which is
known as fault latency. A latent fault is not necessarily harmless,
because it can possibly team up with a subsequent fault to exceed the
system's capacity to recover.
Communication and power are areas where it is particularly dif-
ficult to contain faults, owing to the widespread sharing of resources
in these areas. Dedicated data communication links go far in the
direction of fault containment, but they still present a large cross-
section to damage hazards. Multiplex data communication, instead,
presents opportunities for malfeasant modules to interfere with data
transmissions among unfailed modules as well as presenting a large
cross-section to damage. Power systems are vulnerable to over-current
or over-voltage, such as may be caused by lightning-induced surges,
as well as to short circuits.
Active-control airplanes require redundancy plus a certain
degree of basic complexity. The result is potentially complex in terms
w
of hardware and software unless the principle of simplicity can be
adhered to. For one thing, the redundancy management of the system
should be carried out transparent to, and independent of, the flight
control. Otherwise the flight control program becomes burdened with
many contingencies, to the extent that it jeopardizes the possibility
of validation. For another, if the system is reconfigurable in any
sense, it must be designed so as to be able to pass the configuration
authority safely from one controller to another. These two considera-
tions, i.e. transparency and multi-controller capability, can have
important impacts on the design of communication and power structures.
Finally, since communication and power structures are interde-
pendent with system structures, this study has encompassed avionics
architecture at a fairly high level in addition to techniques for
signal and power transmission. There is an interplay between the
level of technology and the placement of system elements. As airplanes
evolve toward fully flight-crucial active control, they are apt to
evolve toward dispersed, multiplexed communication structures and
remotely managed power structures.
1.5 Baseline Assumptions for the Study
The foilowing assumptions are among those made for most or all
of the study.
i. Evolution to the Active-Control Transport Airplane
Although data communication may take on more nearly crucial
roles in near-term airplanes, it is unlikely that a single system will
be granted a full-time flight-crucial role for some time. The near-
term problem and the far-term problem are linked by evolution, and are
both within the scope of the study.
2. Single System with Redundant Members
To ass'_neseparate, independent primary and backup systems is
to evade the issue of redundancy management. Although backups may in
fact be employed in actual systems, the primary system's specification
should address the full safety requirement. The time required by a
pilot to deliberate and switch is too great to be reliable for an
active-control airplane.
3. Highly-Integrated System
One of the problems that needs to be dealt with in redundancy
management is that of graceful takeover of command. When sensors and
effectors fail, alternative sensors and effectors must be accessible
to the controller. Traditionally, one failure has implied the loss of
an entire redundant channel, which amounts to one quarter, one third,
or one half of the subsystem concerned. This approach has been vali-
dated for the autoland case of 10-2 hour duration, but does not extend
to the 10-hour flight-crucial case, where multiple faults must be
assumed. Increasing the number of channels would be untenable from a
cost standpoint. Instead, systems will have to rely on reconfiguration.
This implies that all system elements are able to communicate with one
another, in contrast to the channelized approach, where pains are
taken to prevent interaction between channels except at carefully
designated points, such as actuators.
The realization of such an integrated approach calls for a
multiplex form of data communication between reconfigurable elements.
Not to do so would impose a requirement for each signal to be separately
interfaced to each of the several control sites, with high cabling and
interfacing costs. Multiplex data communication is vulnerable to a
broader class of faults than dedicated communication, however. Special
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measures can and must be taken to contain the effects of faults for
system survival.
Dedicated communication is not entirely supplanted in multiplex
systems, though it may be more or less important according to the
specific system architecture. For example, servo amplifiers may
receive multiplexed inputs from flight control computers while having
dedicated links to actuator valves and LVDT signals.
4. Fault-Tolerant Computer Control
The reconfiguration of a distributed redundant control system
presents an awkward problem for computer hardware and software. Fault-
tolerant computers, such as those currently being developed by the
NASA Langley Research Center [i,2,3], afford a graceful means of hand-
ling the problem of multiple control sites in a multiplex environment.
By assuming the existence of a fault-tolerant computer, it is possible
to avoid the pitfalls of tailoring the data communications system to
the problems of computer redundancy management as opposed to the
broader needs of the system.
5. Maintenance Postponement Requirements
Airlines consider it undesirable for an airplane to be nondis-
patchable due to single faults. A redundant system should therefore
be dispatchable despite the existence of faulty elements. If the
function of the system is full-time flight-critical, it should be able
to tolerate multiple faults, so that the airplane can continue its
normal schedule until it arrives at a convenient maintenance base.
This can place important constraints on system design, especially for
intercontinental carriers. Thus this requirement should be interpreted
with an eye toward reasonableness.
6. Damage Probability at a Single Specific Spot
May Be Negligible
The probability of damage somewhere aboard an airplane is not
negligible, nor is the probability that some part of the communication
system or the power system will be affected by damage. The probability
of damage to a fault-tolerant computer centrally located in an interior
avionics bay will, however, be considered to be negligible.
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CHAPTER 2
DATA TRANSMISSION TECHNIQUES
2.1 Factors Underlying System Interconnection Concepts
2.1.1 Traditional Levels of Connections and Interconnections
Systems are generally divided up into functional subsystems
which are then further broken down into smaller functional units which
are made up of electronic components. Some of these components are
themselves quite complex, such as a large scale intergrated circuit or
a hybrid circuit.
With each level of the system there is associated at least one
means of electrical interconnection. For example, a module might be
made up of a printed circuit board, which interconnects simple and
complex components which are connected by soldering to it. A group
of printed circuit cards might be inserted into connectors to a wire
wrap field which interconnects them. Thus a system is made up of
levels of interconnections, and these levels are connected to their
neighbor levels by means of other connections. Table 2.1.1-1 shows
an example of how four levels of system interconnections might be
accompl_shed.
The connections at the first ievel are simply the ohmic contacts
between the evaporated aluminum conductor and the silicon device.
The connections at the second level are solder joints between the
components and the printed circuit card. (Actually these connections
may be more complex, e.g. a packaged semiconductor may have internal
wire bonds which are also connections). At the third level, the
connections would be solder joints and connector contacts. At the
fourth level, they would be wire wraps and connector crimps.
There are some important comparisons to be made about levels
of interconnect in a system. Perhaps foremost is the considerable
difference in cost of the interconnections and connections at dif-
ferent levels. Table 2.1.1-2 shows a range of costs for various inter-
connection levels. Second is reliability. A level-four cable
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TABLE 2.1.i-i
LEVELS OF SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONSAND CONNECTIONS
INTERCONNECT INTERCONNECT TO MAKE WITH INTERCONNECTIONS "AND CONNEC-
LEVEL TIONS
1 Silicon LSI Evaporated and Ohmic con-
Components Patterned Aluminum tact to
components
in chip
2 LSI & other Circuit Multilayer printed Solder
less complex module circuit board
components
3 Circuit Sub- Wire wrap field Module
systems connectors
4 Subsystems System Cable Cable
connectors
TABLE 2.1.1-2
INDIVIDUAL INTERCONNECTION COST AS A FUNCTION OF THE LEVEL OF
INTERCONNECTION
INTERCONNECTION LEVEL COST PER INTERCONNECTION
Level 1 $ .00001 - $ .0001
Level 2 .01 - .i0
Level 3 .i0 - 1.00
Level 4 1.00 - i0.00 or more
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connection may be connected to a line driver, so that this signal must
pass through all the levels of interconnection in the system. This is
inevitably a less reliable signal path than one that passes through
only the first one, two, or three levels of interconnection. Another
area of comparison is in the size and weight of higher level intercon-
nections, which increases dramatically at higher levels.
In order to reduce cost, weight, and size, and to improve relia-
bility, all reasonable efforts need to be made to reduce the number of
higher level interconnections in the system.
The interconnections in a system for which the circuits have
been specified cannot be reduced in number. However, the number of
interconnections which are made at higher levels can be reduced by
various means:
i. Increasing the number of components in a module can
reduce the number of connections between modules.
2. Combining subsystems in the same box will substitute
level-three interconnections for level-four inter-
connections.
t
3. Improved partitioning can minimize connections between
modules and between subsystems.
In addition, the system designer can often help by changes in
the design such as multiplexing signals. He can also select more
highly integrated silicon components, which has the effect of making
more of the interconnections in the system at the lowest level.
The incentive for minimizing higher level interconnections
in a system becomes even more acute in systems which have considerable
redundancy. ThUs minimization of higher level interconnections
becomes an architectural consideration. The telephone industry has
always tried to minimize the number of long communication lines as a
means of cost reduction. The ability to build transmitters and
receivers with silicon integrated circuits for less money and with
increasing reliability makes multiplexing techniques a valuable alter-
native for short distances as well as long.
The achievement of a highly reliable communication system
requires techniques which reduce the fourth level of interconnections
in the system and yet increase the number of optional paths in the
system.
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2.1.2 Distance Considerations
The cost of level-four interconnections as shown in Table
2.1.1-2 is unbounded as long as the communication distance is unbounded.
_en short distances are involved, the cost is dominated by connectors
and interface circuits, and the predominant tradeoffs concern serial vs.
parallel transmission formats. Bandwidth is seldom a problem over
short distances, since channels can usually be added, up to a point, at
low cost. Long distance might be defined for practical purposes as a
case where channel capacity is expensive. In the _ inertial measure-
ment unit, for example, the information path from the inner sphere to
the outer sphere is expensive, though the physical distance is only a
fraction of an inch. Disregarding such anomalies, we can reasonably
cite distance as the significant parameter affecting channel cost. In
the case of high channel cost, bandwidth becomes a treasured resource,
and system designers tend to incorporate complex circuitry to maximize
bandwidth utilization, thereby minimizing cost, at least as they
perceive it.
The transport airplane is a microcosm in which both "short" and
"long" distances exist. It is necessary to consider various topologies,
protocols, and formats, plus tradeoffs of interface complexity with
numbers of channels.
Within a single bay, numerous level-four connections exist among
boxes, where the distance is short. Given the state of the art in box
connectors and back planes, it hardly matters whether the number of box
connections is ten or a hundred, other than, perhaps, the cost of inter-
face circuit boards. If no damage environment or reconfiguration
requirement existed, there would be little incentive for multiplexing
or for high-bandwidth channels inside a single bay (intra-bay).
Going between a bay and a remote sensor or effector, distances
can be substantial, so that an incentive exists, in principle, to use
multiplexing insofar as it is feasible. In practice to date, however,
the remote environment is relatively harsh, so that dedicated wire is
preferred over multiplex-demultiplex electronics. The macnitude of
the multiplexing incentive can be appreciated by considering
the 800,000-odd conductor-feet and 4000-odd connector pairs in the
Boeing 747. Multiplexing has much to offer in the future, and in all
probability, advantage will be taken of it for long runs; but the
environmental problem must be dealt with first.
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Connections between bays are in the medium-to-long category,
with numeroussignals involved. No harsh environmental problem exists
in this case, so that multiplexing is reasonable, and is, in fact,
already used, as in ARINC 429 broadcast buses. The magnitude of the
distance involved is such that it is reasonable to run several buses of
moderate(100 Kilobaud)bandwidth, as opposed to a single bus of high
bandwidth. It hardly matters, then, whether the number of broadcast
buses leaving a bay is one or ten, other than, perhaps, the cost of the
bus interfaces. Truly long-distance psychology applies if a single bus
is conceived to serve the entire airplane. The cost of the single
channel with suitable redundancy is high enough so that it does seem
to matter considerably whether one channel or two are used. High band-
width therefore becomes a dominant force of the design.
Digital communication makes practical the concept of "store-and-
forward," in which signals migrate from source to destination via way-
points where the format, protocol, technology, or almost any other
communication parameter may change. Because of the real-time character
of avionic systems, one parameter that must not be altered indefinitely
is time latency. Store-and-forward is tantamount to the creation of
connection levels higher than the fourth. Hierarchical multiplexed
systems are based on the notion of store-and-forward, with a limited
number of remote multiplex-demultiplex centers interconnected by a
serial channel, where each center translates between the multiplex
signal form and one or several local forms.
2.1.3 Bandwidth Considerations
Probably the highest bandwidth channel in an airplane is the
parallel internal bus of a computer, which can communicate the order
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of 10 bits per second over distances of the order of 1/10 meter. A
single bit line of the bus communicates the order of 107 bits per
second at TTL logic levels. Transmission errors are virtually non-
existent.
Longer signal distances present problems of reflections, atten-
uation, and interference, the solutions to which tend to reduce the
effective channel bandwidth. Reflections emanate from improper termin-
ations and channel impedance changes which are almost impossible to
avoid in the extreme. Access to buses can be a particular problem
owing to the necessity to place acccess ports at a nonzero distance
from the bus.
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Attenuation stems from impedance mismatches, as well as series
resistance, which may even be inserted purposefully for short circuit
protection. The uneven application of attenuation can cause different
transmissions on the same bus line to be detected with different ampli-
tudes at one port, while the situation at another port may be different
from the first. Bus receivers must be designed with automatic gain
control to cope with the resultant dynamic ranges of the signals they
see.
Interference protection requires secure signalpaths such as
twisted shielded pair or coaxial cable. The attenuation due to inter-
facing with such cable must be compensated by gain, which tends to
erode bandwidth.
2.1.4 Cost Factors
The dedicated wire cables in transport aircraft today are
expensive to acquire, install, test, and fly. The fixed cost is of
the order of hundreds of thousands of dollars per airplane, while the
variable cost is elusive. It is equivalent to a few passenger seats
in weight, and reflects a maintenance cost due to the replacement of a
percent or more of the wiring each year.
Multiplex channels weigh less, and use less wire and fewer
connectors. Installation costs will depend on the natUre of the
installation. Testing is likely to be inexpensive. Interfaces may be
expensive, however, for the sake of bandwidth, although advanced inte-
grated circuitry technology makes it possible to build multiplex
interfaces within the cost, space, volume, and reliability constraints
implied in an aircraft system.
Maintenance will be expensive to the extent that the more
vulnerable wiring (e.g. wiring in wheel wells, on landing gear,
engines, and in wings and tail) is "special," in the sense that
coaxial cable and twisted shielded pair are special, requiring extra-
ordinary care. Experience with coaxial cable in entertainment multi-
plex systems has been that the multiplex system has a greater life-
cycle cost than dedicated wire systems did. This may be due to the
fact that a great many connectors are involved in these systems, and
that the seat environment for connectors and electronics can be
hostile. Early experience with MIL-STD-1553 serial multiplex bus
systems, however, has been favorable.
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It should be noted that whereas multiplexing has the potential
to save cost, experience shows that it will not automatically do so.
2.1.5 Toplogical Considerations
Communication system requirements are not fully characterized
by distance, bandwidth, and number of signals' It matters where the
signals originate and terminate. A natural hierarchy has requirements
that differ from those of, say, a telephone system, in which each of N
subscribers has random access to all of the (N-l) other subscribers.
In the hierarchy, messages are channeled, and batch transmission
techniques (e.g. multiplex) can be used.
Transport airplanes are less like telephone systems than they
are hierarchical, but a great many things happen in parallel, so that
a simple hierarchical model is inadequate. The greater the degree of
functional integration, the more this is true. Section 2.1.8 discusses
this subject further. In highly integrated systems, sensor information
is pooled among functions, and function outputs may be shared among
other functions, as well. This situation is supportable in a hierarch-
ical system structure, but only if communication bandwidth resources
are plentiful. The more dispersed the system is, the more costly this
may be.
2.1.6 Technology Factors
The urgency to push bandwidth in long channels stresses technol-
ogy in various ways. Power gain is one source of stress. It requires
more signal power to transmit at higher bandwidth in a given channel.
Power gain requires "real estate" in.semiconductors, board area, heat
exchange, power supplies, and rack space. It also tends to mean more
connections at a higher level, since high-power circuits are not
amenable to large-scale integration. It means more sources of concen-
trated high temperature, as well.
A more sinister form of stress occasioned by bandwidth enhance-
ment is in the statistical error rate of the channel. The occurrence
of an error always compromises a system. Coding or replicated redun-
dancy may be required in order to contain the effects of the error, in
which the system is burdened with extra equipment, with its extra
failure rate and its extra overheads, including redundany management.
A particularly burdensome impact of errors is felt whenever system
recovery is not transparent to applications software.
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High bandwidth transmission channels tend to be vulnerable to
component aging and damage. This is another consequence of reducing
comfortable tolerances to gain useful bandwidth.
2.1.7 Reliability Considerations
Reliability in the generic sense of the word denotes longevity
of some sort, all forms of which are desirable. It is not possible,
however, to enhance all longevity forms simultaneously. Therefore it
is important to know the consequences and costs of the various forms.
A simplified way to think of the subject is that airplanes operate in
cycles: flights, days, and overhaul periods; and different forms of
longevity apply to each.
During the flight of an active-control transport, a body of
critical equipment must have an extremely remote probability of failing
with any catastrophic consequences. Those failures that do occur must
be detectable, and their effects containable, to a very high proba-
bility. Lapses of communication or of power should not exceed times
of the order of milliseconds. This implies adequate redundancy of a
kind amenable to in-flight requirements Zor essentially continuous
control.
On the ground, the airplane sits at a gate between flight legs
with a short turnaround time between arrival and departure. The
penalty for delay and/or cancellation can be substantial, although in
no wise comparable to the penalty for catastrophic in-flight failure.
Economic viability requires that the need for at-gate maintenance
during the day be encountered seldom, and then that the maintenance
action be simple, such as swapping a common LRU. It is important that
smaller airports not need to be stocked heavily with spares. Forgive-
ness exists, however, in that a design tradeoff must be made between
dispatch probability and acquisition cost, so that occasionalviolations
are expected of the rule that no maintenance be made during daily
stopovers.
Overnight maintenance of LRU's of any kind may be considered
normal,"provided that the total number of maintenance actions is con-
sistent with industry expectations, communication and power links
embedded in the airframe structure may not be repairable in an over-
night time frame, however, and therefore should be repaired only at
the time of overhaul. Again, exceptions are anticipated on a
statistical basis, according to design tradeoffs.
19
2.I.S Highly Integrated Avionics System Considerations
An unintegrated avionics system can be defined as the aggrega-
tion of elements (sensors, processors, and effectors) which mechanize
a particular set of flight-related functions (e.g., navigation, flight
control, displays, and controls). Associated with each of these
functions is a particular subset of the system elements. If these
functions are mechanized as autonomous subsystems, then the subsets
are made disjoint, and the interconnectivity problem at the system
level is reduced to the interconnection of relatively few numbers of
relatively large aggregates of functionally related elements.
In a highly integrated avionics system, on the other hand, the
subsets of system elements associated with the various avionics system
functions need no longer be disjoint. Indeed, in the terminology of
set theory, integration represents an effort to ensure that the total
set is as small as possible by allowing the various subsets to inter-
sect or share elements whenever possible. Thus, the problem becomes
one of interconnecting relatively numerous small aggregates of system
elements.
The interconnectivity problem at the system level for a highly
integrated avionics system is thus seen to be fundamentally different
from the interconnectivity problem in systems consisting largely of
autonomous subsystems. This difference creates new requirements to be
met by the communication structure. It is from the reduction in size
and component numbers, the total set size, that potential advantages
flow.
What are these advantages? First, a significant reduction in
weight, volume, and power consumption of avionics systems can be
achieved through the multifunctional use of system elements. Multi-
functional use consists of using a single set of sensors to satisfy
a number of different requirements for a particular kind of measure-
ment, of using a pool of shared information-processing resources to
satisfy diverse processing requirements, or of using a small number of
effectors in combination to effect a wide variety of control modes.
Second, since the addition of a single component may in effect add
redundancy to several functions, making each more reliable, it is
possible to purchase increased reliability economically. Both of these
advantages are potent in terms of satisfying pressing requirements for
reduced size and weight, and for substantial increases in reliability.
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_at new requirements are placed on the communications structure?
Foremost among these new requirements are those demanding ultra-relia-
bility, high bandwidth, and support of many data sources and sinks.
Why is ultra-high reliability now required where it was not
before? Previous unintegrated systems employed autonomous subsystems.
Even where individual subsystems might be flight-critical, care was
taken to minimize or eliminate the flight-safety implications of sub-
system-to-subsystem communication failures. While some data were
exchanged, which allowed subsystems to optimize their performance,
degraded modes or contingency control within the subsystems provided
safe control alternatives, even if inter-subsystem communications were
to fail. In short, most previous designs were'working toward relia-
bility goals, logistics costs, and operational convenience and availa-
bility goals.
In contrast, failure of the communications within an integrated
system has immediate safety implications. Collapse of the communica-
tion structure could lead to the loss of the aircraft.
Why must the integrated avionics communications system handle
increased data traffic? Previous communications systems designed to
handle inter-subsystem data traffic did not see any of the subsystem
internal data traffic. For example, the high-bandwidth traffic between
the inertial instruments and the navigation computer is not visible
external to that subsystem. In a fully integrated system, each of the
inertial instruments is a shared resource, and the data traffic between
them and the navigation autopilot must be supported. Some of the data
traffic within the new avionics architecture is from one source to one
target; some is from many sources to a single target; and some is from
one source to many targets. Depending on the exact volume and nature
of each of these data exchanges, the new architecture must provide
dedicated paths, two-way buses, broadcast buses and a quasi-hierarch--
ical aggregate of all of these elements. Additionally, it must provide
the necessary redundancy and robustness so that the communication
structure can survive the random faults, data-terminal failures, and
physical damage that cannot be purged from its environment. It must
provide all of this with adequate reliability and minimum complexity
and flexibility.
Finally, it is clear that when the integrated avionics system
is compared to more conventional designs, the numbers of communicating
data terminals have increased greatly. Thus, the communication system
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is dealing with a multiplexing problem made more complex by an
increased number of data sources and sinks. In effect, the integration
of the avionics system, through multifunction use of elements and pool-
ing of resources, allows significant reductions in numbers of sensors,
displays, processors, actuators, etc. These reductions come at the
expense of higher connectivity and reliability requirements for data
communications. The tradeoff is highly favorable for the integrated
system because of significant recent advances in electronic technology,
which have enormously reduced the cost/capability ratio of the required
data-communications facilities.
2.2 Introduction to Signal Transmission Methods
Signal transmission, within the context of this study, is
required for the following types of locations:
• Within a complex component, e.g. a fault-tolerant computer
Within a bay to interconnect boxes
Between bays
• From bays to passive sensors or effectors, e.g., LVDT's,
solenoids
From bays to active effectors, e.g. displays
From active sensors to bays.
Some of the signals involved will be less than flight-crucial.
Our purpose here, however, is properly served by ignoring these.
Equivalently, we may assume for the present that all of these signals
are flight-crucial. This implies requirements on the system as a
whole, as follows:
Continuity of service
Transparency
. Maintenance postponement
• Graceful degradation
Migration of authority.
The first requirement is for "continuous" availability, where
the quotation marks signify that lapses may occur for periods of the
order of a few milliseconds without necessarily impairing system
operation. Second is a requirement for "transparency" in redundancy
management, where neither the crew nor the application software is
fully responsible for malfunction recovery owing to time-scale and
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ecomplexity problems. Third is a requirement for sufficient redundancy
to allow the postponement of maintenance to a convenient time and
place. Fourth, no random or induced malfunction of any one element may
totally impair the system. This may be said to be a requirement for
graceful degradation. Fifth, and finally, as regards the signal trans-
mission media, it must be possible to support the migration of author-
ity and responsibility among the various bays and boxes in response to
malfunction-induced reconfigurations.
The various signal propagation methods can be distinguished by
several attributes. One is the degree to which a given interconnec-
tion is dedicated to a single signal, a single component, or a single
function. A second is the degree to which a single link is localized,
as opposed to being system-wide as in a data highway. This second
attribute might be mistaken for a repetition of the first, but is
necessary to distinguish the case where local links collaborate to
form a nondedicated network. A third attribute concerns the degree of
bidirectional path capability. This is called "simplex" for a one-way
link, "half-duplex" for alternate use of one channel in each of two
directions, and "full-duplex" for dual channel simultaneous bidirec_
. tional capability. A fourth attribute concerns the degree to which
redundancy may be realized by non-replicative means, such as by
encoding information or finding an alternate path in a mesh. A fifth
" attribute is the degree to which the method can interface directly with
passive devices without the use of an active electronic interface.
The sixth and final attribute is the degree to which the method is
compatible with fiber optics.
This study has essentially confined itself to seven methods as
follows:
i. Dedicated links, one signal per channel
2. Dedicated serial bus, point-to-point multiplex
3. Parallel or serial local bus
4. Broadcast bus, one-way multiplex bus
5. Standard multiplex bus such as MIL-STD-1553
6. Variants of standard multiplex buses
7. Mesh network, point-to-point links carrying
general data traffic
The principal uses and attributes of these methods are summarized in
Table 2.2-1, which is the basis for the following preliminary discus-
sion of the seven methods.
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TABLE2.2-1
SUMMARYOFATTRIBUTESOF COI_UNICATZONMETHODS
A. i_TRA-BAY B. INi_-"BAY C. BAY TO PASSIVE D. _CTIVE E.YYPt'_OF--DE'DIC--A_F._TN_" G.BI_C'T-ION H. REDUNDANCY I. FIBEROPTICS
SENSOROR EFFECTOR ELEMENT POTENTIAL
I. DedicatedLinks Poor.Proliferationof Poor.Heavyand bulky Excellent.The only Poor.inefficientuse Separatechannel Pointto point No By replication,as For discretes,con-
connectors& interfaces, plusproliferationof validmethodfor of channelcapacity, for each signal or meltidrop muchas several-fold celvably,where
connectors& interfaces,passiveelements. Heavy. insome signals, polnt-to-polnt.
2. DedicatedSerial Fairto good.Lesspro- Good toexcellent. Poor.Not appllcable Good toexcellent. One serialchannelfor Point-to-polnt No implicitin module- Good.Point-to-point
Bus (point-to- llferationof connect- Reducesweightand to passiveelements. Efficient. eachdistinctsource- to-modulestructure, application.
point) ors and interfaces, bulk. destinationmodule
pair.
3. ParallelLocal Excellent.Highband- Poor.Not applicable Poor.See 3B , Poor.See 3D - Sharedby all mOdules Meltidrop Yes By replication. Poor.Parallelbus.
BuS (multidrop) width,simpleprotocols, outsideof bay. See 2C . in a bay
possibleerrorcorrec-
tion.
4. SerialLocalBus Good.Modestbandwidth. Poor.See 3B f Poor.See 3B . PoorSee 3B . Sharedby a11 modules Multldrop Yes By replicatlon. Poorto fair.Serial
(multidrop) mediumcomplexity. See 2C _ in a bay. bus.
S. BroadcastBus Fair.Muchllkededi- Good.See SA + Poor.See 2C t Good.See5A . One or moreserial Multidrepwith one No Implicitin source Fairto good if
catedserialbus above, channelsfor each source, modulededication receiversare few.
but permitsmultiple sourcemodule, structure,
receivers.Moreeconom-
icalbut morevulnerable.
6. MultiplexBus Fairto good.Like Good toexcellent. Poor.See 2C f Good toexcellent. Sharedby all Multidropwith rer_te Yes By replication Poorto fair.Serial
(MIL-STD-1553) seriallocalbus but Fairlyefficient. See 6B . signals, couplers, bus.
morecomplex, somewhatvulnerable.
7. Augmentedmulti- Fair togood,See 6A f Goodto excellent. Poor,See 2C f Excellent.See 7B. Sharedby all Multidropwith remote Yes By replication Poorto fair.Serial
plexBus Less efficientbut signals couplers, bus.
lessvulnerable.
8. MeshNetwork Fairto good.See 6A f Good toexcellent. Poor.See 2C t Excellent.See 8B * Sharedby a11 signals Point-to-pofnt Yes Implicitinmesh Good.Point-to-point
S11ghtlylesseffic- and/ormultipath
lentthanmultiplex options
bus. Lessvulnerable.
DamageTolerant.
2.2.1 Dedicated Links, One Signal Per Channel
Dedicated linkage with one signal per channel has an important
role wherever time-shared use of a channel is impractical. The method
is conceptually simple, and its interfaces are usually simple also.
One disadvantage in conventional dedicated systems is that the cost
and weight due to links and interfaces can be excessive when the
number of signals is large. In fault-tolerant systems, the disadvan-
tages are especially severe with respect to graceful degradation with
damage and the ability to accommodate reconfiguration. This is largely
because of the large volume of signals with different sources and
destinations.
Dedicated links in many instances can be eliminated through the
use of multiplexing. In other instances, however, it is preferable to
pay the cost of separate channels and interfaces. Control surface
actuation is one such instance. When secondary actuators are local to
control surfaces, dedicated wires carry electrical signals between
these actuators and the servo amplifier boxes located in one or more
bays remote from the actuators. The typical signals are either analog,
representing LVDT positions and electro-hydraulic valves, or discrete,
controlling shut-off valve solenoids. Another possibility for control
surfaces would be to integrate the secondary actuator with the servo
and use a hydraulic or mechanical link from the remote secondary to
the primary actuator. Thus the dedicated link methods is not
restricted to electrical phenomena. Pneumatic links are commonly used
between pressure ports and air data computers.
Apart from its ability to carry signals to or from passive
devices, dedicated linkage is classified here as generally being a
poor choice compared to other methods that support time-shared communi-
cation. Redundancy must be implemented via full replication of the
medium. Fiber optics is not applicable here other than to light-
producing or light-actuated devices, none of which are being considered
in this study. The only fiber optics links considered here have
active devices at both ends, and belong tothe second category.
2.2.2 Dedicated Serial Bus, Point-To-Point _ultiplex
The second dedicated channel category differs from the first in
that multiple signals sharing a common source/destination pair are
routed over the same channel. This precludes any use of passive
interfaces, and for all practical purposes requires digital transmis-
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mion. Because of its efficient handling of multiple signal traffic,
it is a reasonable candidate for traffic external to bays wherever
multiple signals are involved. It can also be used within a bay be-
tween boxes. The use of multiplexing in this point-to-point medium
makes fiber optics an excellent potential candidate technology for
simplex (one-way) transmissions.
2.2.3 Local Bus
One of the contextual assumptions for this study is that it may
be necessary for the system to withstand a completely damaged bay. It
may therefore not be necessary, and perhaps not feasible, to make bays
internally damage-tolerant. A serial or parallel local multiplex bus
affords a very efficient intra-bay medium. It is usually not recom-
mendable, however, for busing external to bays, owing to the excessive
cost of damage-tolerant constructs using such buses as building blocks.
A local bus is a multidrop half-duplex medium, i.e. it is
neither local to a single source-destination pair, nor dedicated to a
limited function. This medium is one in which a degree of redundancy
can be added by incorporation of code bits on extra channels, resulting
in a moderate degree of fault tolerance which in some cases might be
sufficient for its application. This depends on the allowable random
failure rate for a single bay, which depends in turn on the number of
bays, among other things.
Fiber optics implementations of such a medium are possible in
principle, but their expense would not be warranted for an intra-bay
application.
2.2.4 Broadcast Bus
A broadcast bus is a serial bus, in which multiple receiving
parties can receive data from a single transmitter. This is no longer
a local medium, but it is dedicated to the functional scope of the lone
transmitter. The single-transmitter definition excludes bi-directional
use of a single channel.
Fiber optics is a possible means of implementing a broadcast bus,
although it would probably resemble closely a multiplicity of point-to-
point links.
When broadcast buses are used in redundant systems, fault inde-o
pendence of the receivers may not be safely assumed. If a signal is
to be routed to multiple destinations where receipt by at least one
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destination is critical, then multiple dedicated serial buses are used.
Moreover, special care must be taken that these buses do not short to
one another in an undetectable way, since they would present a latent
system hazard.
Broadcast buses are of special interest in this study, since
they represent contemporary technology, are standardized for aircraft
use, e.g. through ARINC 429, have performed well in early applications,
and will have interface circuits implemented in large scale integrated
form. They have important roles in contemporary designs, including
the Boeing 757 and 767.
2.2.5 Standard Multiplex Bus
Standard multiplex buses, as exemplified by MIL-STD-1553B and
its prior versions, are based on the concept of a single shared channel
like the parallel bus discussed above. In this case, however, the
physical distances are such as to place important constraints on the
electrical realization. Transformer coupling, complex interfaces, and
a non-negligible error rate testify to the design challenges that have
to be overcome. The maximum number of parties served is 31.
Fiber optics realizations have been demonstrated on the bench,
but are apparently not yet deployable owing to severe design, manufac-
turing, and installation problems. The problems are less severe where
fewer parties are served.
A bus of this type is damage-vulnerable, so that any realistic
system application would require replicated buses, installed in such a
way as to remain far enough apart so that a single damage event is
unlikely to affect more than one. The 1553 standard includes the
necessary provisions to couple remotely into the buses. Dual redun-
dancy is the most prevalent redundancy form in 1553 applications so
far, but in a flight-critical application the likely form would be
triplex or quadruplex.
This form of multiplex bus is vulnerable to a single party
which fails to observe proper system "etiquette."
2.2.6 variants of Standard Multiplex Buses
Various departures from the 1553 standard form have been pro-
posed, primarily to overcome the physical limitations and vulnera-
bilities of 1553.
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Hierarchical complexes of standard buses can in principle serve
an unlimited number of parties. There are two drawbacks, however.
The response delays will be substantially larger, and redundancy can
become substantially more complex. Both of these problems can be
solved, but require departures from the standard.
One departure from the standard, the French GINA bus [4] uses
two channels for each transmission, one of which handles simplex
commands from the control unit; the other channel is half duplex, and
carries data.
A generic problem with any half-duplex multiplexing medium is
the inability to deliver commands to remote interfaces when the sole
channel is obscured by noise. Power switching of remote terminals has
been proposed as a solution, which will indeed solve part of the
problem if a trustworthy form of power control is -included. A less
tenuous solution, however, requires the ability to exert control on a
party's transmission at a point external to the party itself. A full-
duplex command-response bus with "smart" independent interfaces to
every party would potentially be able to reduce single-event vulnera-
bility to a very low level.
Redundancy in an augmented multiplex bus might be implemented
in various ways depending on the types of variations employed. A
hierarchical complex might not require outright replication, whereas
a full-duplex variation probably would.
2.2.7 Mesh Networks
Mesh networks are multiplexing constructs which employ point-to-
point serial full-duplex links to communicate among a group of parties.
Each party, or '_node",has a direct connection of this kind to three
or more other parties, forming a mesh-like pattern if properly done.
Each node is capable of repeating incoming data, i.e. transmitting it
to one or more of the other nodes. The ARPAnet is a mesh network
which transmits "packets" consisting of many words according to an
adaptive routing algorithm that may send successive packets over
different routes. A delay occurs at each node.
The mesh network conceived by T.B. Smith, [5] on the other hand,
sets up paths which remain stable over relatively long periods, _
supporting bus-like protocols with negligible delay at each node. The
Smith net has intrinsic redundancy which is capable of protecting
against faults and damage by aliowing reconfiguration despite one or
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more noisy nodes.
2.3 Dedicated Links
The remaining sections of this chapter enlarge on the introduc-
tory comments just completed concerning the various methods of data
communication.
Dedicated links have been the conventional carriers of data
communication since its inception, principally in the form of analog
data and discrete signals. Growth in system sophistication has been
acompanied by proliferation of dedicated links to the order of ten
thousand per aircraft. The ARINC packaging standards provide for up
to several hundred pins per box. Wiring occupies enough volume so
that in certain places, such as wings, tail, instrument panels, and
wheel wells, there is often scarcely enough room to contain it all,
much less to provide comfortable spatial separation for redundant
signals.
Figure 2.3-1 illustrates the concept of dedicated links carrying
dedicated signals in a fictitious system employing dual controllers,
eight sensors, and four effectors (e.g., actuators). Each sensor and
each effector are shown as having four signals. It is immaterial here
as to which direction a given signal flows. Figure 2.3-2 indicates
" that any given sensor or effector may involve bidirectional information
flow.
By multiplexing the signals that share a common source-destina-
tion pair, the system of Figure 2.3-1 is changed to resemble Figure
2.3-3, in which the figure is drawn assuming that two-way multiplexing
is used. This represents the irreducible minimum configuration of
dedicated links, where the former figure represented the maximal
configuration.
Aside from their familiarity, dedicated links have two main
advantages over more general multiplex forms. The first is that they
provide ample bandwidth without stressing technology. Their cost is
largely in wire volume rather than in sophisticated electronics. The
second is that the malfunction of any one link can not deprive the
system of more than the one or few signals it carries.
The principal disadvantage of dedicated links is their cost,
particularly the maximal configuration. In a sense, they pay heavily
for their advantages cited above. There are other disadvantages,
however;
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Figure 2.3-3. Dedicated Links Per Source-Destination Pair.
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One such disadvantage is that the controller is specific to the
configuration, rather than being universal. The addition of new
signals and/or source-destination pairs requires new hardware, wire
runs, connector changes, and/or new links. Meanwhile, the controller
is burdened with a large, awkward array of interfaces.
Another disadvantage is that even though the propagation of mal-
function effects is bounded, all links and notably the longer ones,
have large exposures to both faults and damage, owing to the interfaces,
connectors, and wire runs. A credible damage event could sever enough
wires so that neither of two controllers could communicate with a
sufficient subset of the sensors and effectors to maintain flight in an
active-control transport.
2.4 Local Buses
In the category of "short distance" data transmission, a large
amount of data may be transmitted within a single bay. In general,
such intra-bay transmissions may be made at relatively low cost by
back-panel links. Dedicated back-panel links are inexpensive, but they
still suffer from being design-specific and awkward. Multiplexed com-
munication, on the other hand, can provide a graceful and general means
of effecting intra-bay data transfer.
" Both serial and parallel formats can be appropriate for intra-
bay communication. ARINC 429 multiplex broadcast busing is used now
for intra-bay traffic as well as inter-bay traffic, as is discussed in
the next section. The present discussion is primarily concerned with
two-way, half-duplex, multiplex busing for intra-bay communication.
Two-way busing differs from dedicated signals and broadcast
busing in that multiple transmitters are present in the same channel
as well as multiple receivers. Protocols become important as means
for resolving contention for trnasmission access to the bus.
As a general rule, local buses can afford multiple channels or
parallel transfer formats as means to accommodate high bandwidth. The
reason is that intra-bay transfers are relatively well-sheltered, both
electrically and damage-wise, which means that interfaces can be
simple and economical. Meanwhile the total wire volume does not grow
appreciably, because runs are short.
One interesting exception to the rule occurs in the design of
certain fault-tolerant computer systems, such as the FTMP computer [3].
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In the FTMP, the minimal serial bus set among processors comprises
twenty channels, two hundred transmitters, and two hundred receivers.
Clearly, the cost of parallel buses of, say, 16 bits would be prohibi-
tive, as it would involve 320 channels and 3200 transmitters and
receivers. Instead, the FTMP uses high-bandwidth channels of up to
eight million bits per second each.
The technology for local buses has matured in numerous instances,
including the DEC Unibus _ , the IEEE 488 instrument bus, and the
Intel Multibus _ Such buses are primarily used under control of a
single computer, although some of them are arranged so that they can
support multiple computers. Emerging standards will likely be
influential in the design of any local buses for aircraft.
In a redundant system application, it might be desirable to use
redundant buses and redundant controllers arranged so that any control-
ler is capable of controlling any or all of the buses. This kind of
arrangement suffers from a single-point failure mode, however, where
one controller fails in such a way as to interfere with traffic on all
of the buses. This could be tolerable in cases where the fault
propagation boundary is set at the level of the entire bay, i.e., loss
of the bay is tolerable provided that it is sufficiently improbable
that more than one bay is lost in flight.
In order to set the fault propagation boundary at a lower level,
no one controller would be able to transmit on all buses, which would
mean in most cases that there would be one bus per controller.
Two examples are shown in Figure 2.4-1. In both examples, the
subscriber components have redundant interfaces. In the top example,
an active failure of either Cl or C2 will fault the redundant bus.
In the bottom example, a passive or active failure in one controller
and one bus will fault the redundant bus. Each is immune to the other
failure. Depending on which of these failure modes has a higher
probability than the other, one of these two approaches will be pre-
ferred, unless the probabilities are both so low as to make the choice
irrelevant to safety.
2.5 Broadcast Buses
Broadcast buses are digital analogies to analog signal channels.
The transmitting terminal, instead of maintaining an analog voltage,
repetitively transmits a serial digital value. In either case, there
can be one or more listeners. The broadcast bus has advantages in that b
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Figure 2.4-1. Examples of Controller and Bus Arrangements.
the channel can be time-shared by multiplexing among several digital
signals. Each signal can be identified by any of several means. In
the ARINC 429 broadcast bus, each value is accompanied by an identifi-
cation tag to indicate to the receivers what signal value is being
sent. Protocol is almost non-existent. The sole transmitting terminal
simply emits data with identifier tags, much as a stock ticker system
emits market quotations to local receivers.
To the extent that data signals have multiple destinations,
broadcast buses are more economical than dedicated multiplex links.
More to the point, one-way dedicated multiplex links can be thought of
as broadcast buses with single receivers. (Two-way dedicated multi-
plex links are not equivalent to broadcast buses). Thus the economical
consideration_ of broadcast buses depend heavily on the data migration
patterns of the system. Meanwhile multiple destinations present a
potential system hazard, as may be seen in Figure 2.5-1. When all
effectors are linked by broadcast buses, a damage event at any one
of them that causes both inputs to short circuit will result in system
failure. A similar statement holds for either of the controllers, but
this may be considered to be far less likely, as there will be fewer
controllers, which are located in safer places. In any event, critical
effector signals require independent links rather than broadcast buses,
plus separate buffered interfaces so that electrical accidents on one
link will not affect another. It could conceivably be necessary for
similar treatment of critical sensor signals, but this would depend
on details of the particular system.
Most broadcast buses used to date have operated at a rate of
100K bits/sec or less. Bandwidth has not been a particular problem,
since the number of broadcast buses in the system may be on the order
of one hundred, no one of which carries an inordinate share of the data
load. The technology needed to support such low data rates is resona-
bly simple, since reflections do not present a significant problem.
Low data rates present a latent hazard possibility unless care is
taken to prevent the shorting together of two isolated links carrying
identical data. Should this happen, both links would appear to be
working correctly, whereas the intended isolation would be absent,
leaving the system vulnerable to a short circuit in one of the links.
2.6 Standard Multiplex Buses
In principle, it would be possible to eliminate most of the
linkages and interfaces in an airplane, using a single two-way channel
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Figure 2.5-1. Broadcast Buses.
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time-shared among all subscribers (i.e., all boxes). Each subscriber
would have a single interface to the bus. Of course, the bus would
have to be reliable enough and have a high enough bandwidth. In
practice, neither of these requirements is is readily achieved
consistent with the premise. Nevertheless the fundamental appeal of
the concept is strong enough to leave a good deal of room for compro-
mise.
The potential benefits of two-waymultiplexing stem from the
nature of the interface as well as from the minimal channel volume.
Since all boxes have a single bus interface, a high degree of standard-
ization can be maintained, promoting equipment commonality, lowering
design costs, and favoring competitive procurements. Again, realiza-
tion of the potential is difficult, but worth theeffort.
The sharing of a single two-way channel is a cooperative
endeavor. Any subscriber can potentially pollute the channel by
spurious transmissions. The only remedies for such a threat are either
to make subscribers purge themselves, or else to adopt secondary
control channels to override subscriber autonomy. One such approach
is to suspend electric power distribution to the individual subscribers,
one at a time, until the offending unit is found, and to leave its
power off. This approach requires that power distribution be properly
controlled, and not misused by a failed controller. This in itself
may require a second communication channel, which would violate the
single-channel premise.
Given proper cooperative behavior in a bus channel by all
subscribers, the channel can be shared by any of several algorithms
called "protocols." One type of protocol defines fixed time slots
assigned to the respective subscribers. Say there are S subscribers.
Then S consecutive time slots of individual duration T make up a frame
of duration ST. Each subscriber transmits during the time slot
assigned to it. Its slot number is wired in, and it counts slots from
a synchronization mark at the beginning of the frame. The channel
must either be synchronous, or else have a mark to denote each slot
boundary. A possible variation on this scheme would allow more slots
per frame, assigned on a basis of need. Another would permit variable
length slots. Protocols of this sort are called "time division,
multiple access" or TD_ protocols.
A second major category of protocols is called "command-
response," which operates on a speak-when-spoken-to basis.
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Unlike the TDMA category, command-response requires the definition of
a specific unit at any given time to be the system controller. The
controller identity might be passed from one subscriber to another like
a baton, or it might never change.
Another major protocol category is called contention. Whenever
the bus is not busy, any subscriber is eligible to bid for access to
the bus. Several variants of this method have been used. One variant
calls for the contender to begin its transmission directly, and to
detect possible interference from another contender using error detect-
ing codes. In case of interference, each contender waits a different
length of time before retrying. Alternatively, each contender can
wait a different time before beginning its transmission after the
previous transmission in order to lessen the probability of interfer-
ence in the first place. Another approach is to have each contender
synchronously transmit a priority word while listening to the bus. If
the contender hears a higher priority than its own, it drops out of
contention. Otherwise, it has won the contention.
All of the protocols for singletwo way buses share the attri-
bute that all communications are heard by all subscribers. There are
no private messages, as there may be in dedicated links and networks.
Potential fault and damage vulnerabilities include shorted buses and
terminals, open buses and termination impedances, and stuck or active
transmitters. One form of bus called a "lossy" bus was devised to
reduce some of these susceptibilities by placing series resistance in
the bus line at each terminal. This creates a dynamic range problem,
i.e. a problem for receivers of having to be able to decode signals of
diverse amplitudes over a substantial range, depending on the number
of terminals. _[eanwhile,by constructing the bus with multiple paths,
the channel canbe made immune to most open and short circuits and
stuck transmitters. It is not immune to active transmitters, however.
Perhaps the best-known example of a serial two-way multiplex
bus is the existing military bus standard, MIL-STD-1553B. This
standard, its predecessor A version, and the various applications of
1553, represent a well-accepted architectural framework. The 1553 bus
is a partially-lossy bus, but without multiple paths. This compromise
provides immunity to terminal shorts and opens but not bus shorts or
opens. At the same time the dynamic range requirement is only moder-
ately difficult to achieve. A stuck transmitter has roughly the same
effect as a shorted terminal. Active terminal faults are dealt with
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by incorporating watchdog timers on transmitters.
The 1553 standard calls for remote access to the bus using stubs
of up to approximately six meters (20 feet) in length. If short stubs
or no stubs were to be used, a single damage event could conceivably
sever both or all members of a redundant bus system. Transformers and
resistors are used to couple terminals to stubs and stubs to the bus
(with certain exceptions). There is a limit to the number of terminals
supportable by such a system. In 1553 it is defined to be 30. Figure
2.6-1 illustrates such a bus.
The protocol in 1553 addresses thirty terminals in a command-
response manner. The B revision allows migration of the controller,
while earlier versions do not.
This existing standard has shown itself to be reasonably
resilient to pressure from its various applications. Some of this
pressure has created confusion as to connectors, wave forms, specific
meaning of various mode and submode commands, and other growing-pain
incompatibilities that have diluted the benefits which might have been
expected from 1553. Nevertheless, the hybrid microcircuit and large-
scale integration (LSI) implementations have proceeded, and it is on
these developments that economic viability and practicality will be
based. The investments required to rival 1553 microcircuit and compon-
ent developments all but preclude the development of an unrelated com-
petitive standard for a similar architecture. The incompatibilities
will be solved in the 1553 applications, and many new applications will
be able to live reasonably comfortably within this agreed-upon archi-
tecture. However, the MIL-STD-1553 architecture is not infinitely
expandable or elastic, and there will arise new technological demands
which cannot be met. New solutions will have to be found.
The most significant shortcomings of 1553 within the context of
a fully integrated avionics system are its inability to interconnect
many data terminals, its vulnerability to physical damage, and an
inability to assure that a single terminal will not bring down all
attached buses due to erroneous transmissions.
The problem of being able to handle only a limited number of
terminals (fewer than 31) has its roots at two sources. First, the
twisted-pair, transmission, line-termination, and terminal-coupling
techniques chosen can not tolerate many more than 30 terminals.
Secondly, the protocol allows address space for no more than 31 remote
terminals.
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Figure 2.6-1. Multiplex Bus.
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4Historically, these limitations were the result of an architec-
tural concept that viewed remote terminals as fairly large unrelated
aggregations of sensors or actuators. Since each remote terminal
handled many sensors or actuators, the terminal limit did not seem to
constrain the system significantly.
To realize fully the advantages of integration, however, it is
important that the number of individual sensors or actuators handled
by a remote terminal be kept small. If this is not done, the failure
of a single remote terminal can result in the loss of an excessive
portion of the system's resources.
This problem has been partially attacked by the use of hierarch-
ical buses. In its most conventional application, several subsystems
might be joined by one 1553 bus (or dual bus), and within each sub-
system a 1553 bus (or dual bus) is used to interconnect subsystem
components. This solution parallels conventional architectures of
separate autonomous subsystems. However, it is sensitive to failure
modes which would make all the sensors or actuators of an entire sub-
bus unavailable, due to failure of the terminal connecting that sub-
bus to its supervisor bus. It also fails to address the case where it
is indeed desirable to organize many data terminals onto one bus.
This latter case more truly represents the natural organization of a
highly integrated system, where one sensor must be used by several
functions, rather than by just one subsystem.
It is possible by appropriate use of repeaters or bus buffers
to eliminate the electrical constraint on numbers of terminals which
can be interconnected, and still maintain functional compatibility
with 1553. It is not possible to eliminate the protocol constraint
without some modification to 1553.
The bus's vulnerability to damage is a result of the fact that
damage to any portion of the bus can disable the entire bus, and that
the bus is distributed widely, thus presenting a rather broad cross-
sectional area to potential damage. Since a bus with more than one
shorted stub is also likely to be disabled, this cross-sectional area
to damage must include the stubs and portions of the remote terminals.
This vulnerability provides a mechanism whereby fairly local damage
can impact distant equipment. Damage to the wing could disable
elevator control, for example. Any design which is truly flight-
critical must include damage- and fault-containment mechanisms of the
airframe structure itself.
o
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The final serious weakness of 1553 is the relatively ineffective
mechanism for preventing faulty terminals from talking out of turn and
disabling the bus. The preventive mechanisms which are included are
partly effective to the extent that this mode of failure is not likely
to be a serious maintenance, operational, or diagnostic problem. How-
ever, the uncovered failure modes which could result in a "babbling"
terminal are adequate to present a serious safety threat. Examples of
such failures have already appeared in the field; one in particular
resulted in the loss of an entire dual-bus system due to a single fault.
It is probably in this particular aspect of the 1553 design that the
difference between designing to maintenance and operational goals and
designing to flight-critical standards becomes most evident. The basic
reliability of the dual 1553 bus design is such that operational and
availability impacts on an aircraft due to data-interconnect malfunc-
tion should be minimal. The 1553 bus is sound, easily maintained, and
unlikely to cause aborted missions or other operational difficulties.
It represents a significant and dramatic improvement over previous
practice. However, when the effect of a communications failure is
magnified from an operational aggravation (such as an aborted mission)
° to a loss of aircraft, the reliability constraints are increased
significantly. Thus, while the cost of two mission-aborts per year per
fleet of aircraft is almost invisible in the maintenance and operational
° costs associated with the fleet, the loss of two aircraft per year is
highly visible, particularly if these losses are compounded with loss
of life.
The sources of this vulnerability are many. Some of the dual-
bus implementations are particularly vulnerable due to designed-in
single-point failures. The primary defense, the watchdog timer on bus
activity by a terminal, is ineffective against address decoder failures
in the terminal, which cause it to respond to either the wrong
address or to all commands. The interaction of
a faulty terminal with broadcast modes, or the interactions between
dual buses, present fairly simple mechanisms for disabling one or all
buses of a redundant 1553 bus system. All of these mechanisms have
likelihoods or probabilities associated with them which are insignifi-
cant if the only costs associated with them were maintenance actions
and operational costs, but which are much too large if flight safety
is involved.
These weaknesses can be overcome without breaking with function-
al compatibility with 1553. The same mechanisms used to overcome the
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bus vulnerability to damage are also effective in overcoming the bab-
bling terminal problem. A proposed solution is outlined in
Section 2.8.
Additional weaknesses of MIL-STD-1553, such as inadequate encod-
ing of the data and commands for error recovery and detection, are not
serious enough that they could not be designed around or coped with.
2.7 Variants of Multiplex Buses
Two-way multiplexing presents problems due to its continuous
channel, which couples all subscribers directly without the possi-
bility of intervening reconfiguration.
Hierarchical arrays of multiplex buses have been suggested as a
remedy. This provides a means of partitioning the communication
channel into smaller fragments, which would permit reconfiguration to
a certain degree. Figure 2.7-1 illustrates a redundant hierarchical
bus array, in which subordinate controllers act as subscribers, or
remote terminals, on the superior bus. This arrangement can increase
the number of subscribers served, and can enhance survivability, to
the extent that the loss of portions of the respective buses may be
tolerable. The role of the subordinate controllers (C') in this
scheme is simply to repeat messages from superior bus to subordinate
bus, and vice versa.
The subordinate controllers introduce a delay in the transmis-
sion of each message, however, that could well be intolerable. It
would at least intrude upon the standard protocols. In a single 1553
bus, for example, the controller expects a rapid response, within a
few microseconds, to a command. Here, the subordinate controllers, C',
would have to handle the response, perhaps buffering messages in either
direction. In this case, the C' units have to become "smart," and
either anticipate controller commands, or do repetitive reads and
writes to service their subscribers. The net effect would be to
loosen the reins of control. Messages would now need time tags to
remove ambiguities introduced by the extra latency of the hierarchy.
The C' units might alternatively operate without buffering,
simply amplifying signals in a bidirectional fashion, similar to
telephone repeater amplifiers. The hierarchical bus system then
becomes a network composed of bus segments as links and C' units as
nodes. This leaves unsolved the problem of subscribers that transmit
out of turn or incorrectly.
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Figure 2.7-1. HierarchicalMultiplexBuses.
A second variation on the standard bus helps to solve the
problem of uncontrolled babbling by an anomalous subscriber. This
variation exchanges the half-duplex two-way medium for a full-duplex
two-way medium, or else a hybrid arrangement still using two channels.
The arrangement permits the controller to issue commands despite the
pollution of the response channel by a subscriber. Commands thus
issued may be used to invoke majority inputs to local controllers with
which to selectively disable units until the culprit has been silenced.
Meanwhile, the controller is the only unit that is equipped to transmit
on the command channel.
A third variation uses subscribers as waypoints in a network or
chain composed of point-to-point links. One version of this method is
the mesh network, which is discussed in the next section and the next
chapter. Another well-known topology of this sort is the ring network,
in which a closed loop is formed. A typical ring network uses a
logical token, passed from one subscriber to the next on the chain, to
grant access to the communication channel. In order to prevent endless
circulation of a transmission and consequent spurious waveforms, a
subscriber holds the ring open while it is transmitting.
Rings may be designed with extra links so as to skip neighbors
when necessary, and/or to be bidirectional. The topology of ring
networks is strongly related to that of more generalized mesh networks
only its layout and operation are more tightly constrained.
2.8 Mesh Networks
Mesh networks are major variants of standard multiplex systems.
The topological principle of mesh networks is shown in Figure 2.8-1,
in which subscribers contain, or adjoin, repeater and switching
circuitry referred to as nodes, and where in this case each node has
three ports. Each port interfaces one end of a link. All links are
full-duplex, i.e. dual channel, so that commands can be sent to recon-
figure the network despite the presence of anomalous transmissions
from a subscriber or a node.
Meshes by definition consist of multiple circuit loops, which
can potentially cause the problem alluded to concerning ring networks,
where energy circulates to cause spurious waveforms. Therefore meshes, :
like rings, require restrictions on link connections in order to
operate successfully. In this regard, mesh networks differ from lossy
buses with multiple paths. The two may be topologically identical,
t
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cFigure 2,8-1. Mesh Network.
but operate in different ways. Mesh networks are software reconfigur-
able, where lossy buses are purely passive. Mesh networks can avoid "
the dynamic range problem cited earlier for lossy buses.
A well-known class of mesh networks is exemplified by ARPAnet,
a transcontinental data network. Nodes of this kind of network buffer
a quantity of data arriving at one port before deciding whether and
where to transmit it through another. The time latency thus introduced
is small by human interactive standards. This approach would be awk-
ward for a flight control system, however, where transmission latency
is less tolerable.
A family of mesh networks has been devised [5] in which
the ports of each node are switched on and off by messages from the
controller. The mesh is configured by this means in such a way that
there are no loops. Data is then repeated with minimal delay and no
buffering so that it arrives at all nodes nearly simultaneously, there-
by emulating a standard multiplex bus. The most recent generation of
this family is arranged so as to be compatible with subscribers using
1553 interfaces.
The architecture for this mesh network is a natural evolutionary
step beyond 1553 practices. The constituent parts are bus segments
(or links) and nodes which terminate and interconnect these links. A
virtual bus can be created by activating circuitry within nodes, which
effectively connects appropriate bus segments, one to another. This
circuitry is analogous to relay closures which could actually create
such a compound bus, but is implemented in solid-state devices. In its
simplest incarnation, a single bus could be created by appropriately
interconnecting multiple-bus segments to create one bus, which passes
through each node. Figure 2.8-2 illustrates such a configuration.
Active or utiliied links are shown by solid lines, and inactive links
are shown by dashed lines. Note that there are multiple options
available as to how such a bus might be constructed from the available
pieces, and that if damage or a fault should disable this bus, an
equivalent bus could be constructed bypassing the damaged link. Figure
2.8-3 illustrates such an alternate configuration.
It is from this basic ability to reconfigure the bus routing
that the high-survival characteristics of the network are derived.
Note that once a bus has been created, it does indeed operate exactly
as a true bus using standard bus protocols. Thus, there are no
operational overheads associated with the operation of the virtual bus
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Figure 2.8-2. Network With Virtual Bus Shown.
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Figure 2.8-3. Alternate Virtual Bus Structure.
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beyond those imposed by a standard bus and an initial setup or config-
uration procedure_
Damage containment and isolation of a remote terminal, which is
disabling the bus, is now simple. First, each node is designed so
that the interconnection circuitry provides isolation between bus seg-
ments. Electrical accidents are thereby blocked from propagating along
the bus. At worst, such an accident can destroy only the isolation
devices at the link terminations immediately surrounding the accident
site. The logical impact of an accident, which is to disable the bus,
can be overcome by reconfiguration. Because physical damage is con-
fined to the immediate locale of damage, the success of reconfiguration
is assured once the faulty components have been purged. Similarly a
babbling remote terminal can be excised from the bus. Remote terminals
can be attached at a node, or alternatively (but less desirably) along
a bus segment using a 1553 stub arrangement. To excise a babbling
terminal,, the node to which the terminal interfaces, or the bus seg-
ment to which it is attached, can be dropped from the virtual bus. The
system reconfigures around the faulty device.
The electrical constraint on numbers of terminals that can be
interconnected is also eliminated. Since each node now uses active
components to provide the electrical isolation between bus segments,
the signaling waveform is regenerated at each node. An almost limit-
less number of terminals can be added without degrading the signal.
This does not, of course, overcome protocol limits on the number of
terminals, such as occurs in 1553.
To better place this architecture in technical prespective, it
is interesting to observe that, except for the protocol limit on
numbers of terminals, such a network could be built using 1553
technology for link and node electronics. Existing computers with
nearly standard 1553 interfaces could be used to control the net, and
any 1553 remote terminals could be attached to the net. Node devices,
which are the unique new elements of the architecture, could be
fabricated by capitalizing on 1553 microcircuit components.
In addition to overcoming the three primary weaknesses of 1553,
inability to interconnect a large number of terminals, damage vulnera-
bility, and vulnerability to a babbling terminal, the network enhances
1553 performance in other ways. While these benefits are secondary
and not adequate to justify a change from standard 1553 practice, they
are nevertheless significant.
m
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First, unlike 1553 buses, it is possible for the virtual bus to
"Y" or branch. Since nodes are active devices, the reflections and
impedance mismatches, which preclude this in a standard 1553 bus, are
not relevant. Thus, a virtual bus can look like a tree, much as shown
in Figure 2.8-4. This considerably loosens topological and routing
constraints.
Secondly, multiple buses can be active simultaneously, and the
spare or inactive links constitute a shared redundancy pool, able to
repair failures in either or both buses. By using this multibus capa-
bility, it is possible to set up several buses, possibly partitioning
the system according to a natural hierarchy along with dedicated point-
to-point paths to link terminals with high-bandwidth requirements.
Redundancy is then available inexpensively in the form of a pool of
unused links. Figure 2.8-5 illustrates a sample configuration with an
active bus and an inactive bus, as well as a dedicated path between
nodes A and B. Figure 2.8-6 illustrates an alternative configuration
designed to overcome the local damage event which disabled node C.
Configuration control algorithms are quite simple for mainten-
ance of one bus, and become more complex for multiple buses of dif-
ferent criticalities. Configuration-control information or commands
are carried to the nodes over the links from a configuration control-
ler at one of the nodes. The linksbetween nodes are fully duplex,
and each node continually monitors incoming data on all its links for
configuration messages. Although the links are fully duplex (unlike
1553), the virtual bus normally operates as if it were half duplex
(like 1553). _en a node is commanded to interconnect bus segments,
it causes any data arriving on the incoming half of a link to be
repeated or retransmitted on the outgoing halves of the other inter-
connected links. Transmissions arriving on two arms of a "Y" inter-
connect are combined for retransmission on the third arm. Simultaneous
arrivals would produce erroneous bus data on that arm, similar to the
situation when two terminals on a bus are transmitting simultaneously.
All incoming links are monitored for configuration commands before the
data from that link are combined with the data from other links for
retransmission. This assures that a node can always correctly receive
any configuration commands if the bus fault isoutb0ard of the terminal
being addressed. The node immediately inboard of the fault can, there-
fore, receive the configuration commands necessary to disconnect the
fault from the virtual bus.
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Figure 2.8-4. Virtual Bus With "Y" Constructs.
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CHAPTER 3
MESH NETWORK DESIGN
The mesh network concept was introduced in the preceding chapter.
In this chapter, the elements of design and management of large networks
are identified and explored. The chapter begins with a reiteration of
the concept.
3.1 Review of the Network Concept
Mesh networks are a means of implementing system-wide multiplex-
ing channels using numerous interconnected channels of short dimension.
Figure 3.1-1 shows an example of a mesh network with six nodes, each
node serving a distinct subscriber. Two single-port controllers are
" shown, each of which is capable of managing the network in the absence
of interference from the other. Full-duplex links run point-to-point
between nodes. The number of links is half the number of link ports.
In this case, there are six nodes with three ports apiece, plus two
controllers with one port each, giving twenty link ports and ten links.
The network is designed to be configured by switch settings in
the nodes. Links may be active, i.e. interconnected with others at
the sites of the nodes where they join. Alternatively, they may be
idle, i.e. isolated. To establish the multiplex data channel, the
controller sends successive messages causing nodes to set switches
such that each node has a single link bringing messages outbound from
the controller. The other links interfacing with that node may each
be directed further outbound or be disconnected. Active links form a
tree that does not close on itself. Since each active link arrives at
a node with outbound messages, the number of active links is equal to
the number of nodes, irrespective of how the links are configured. The
remaining links are idle. In the example of Figure 3.1-1, there would
be six active, and four idle, links.
In the event of the failure of a link or a node, the network
can be reconfigured by its controller by means of messages sent in
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Figure 3.1-i. Network Example. "
sequence to various nodes. If more than one failure occurs, the net-
work may or may not be recoverable, depending on the number of failures
and the topology of the network. This chapter treats the various
design issues that bear on performance, economy, and safety of a mesh
data network.
The philosophy underlying mesh network design is along the lines
of self-defense. That is, the system does not depend on injured
parties to fail gracefully. Rather each surviving party is made able
to cope with problems forced upon it by its neighbors, whether the
neighbor be injured or whether it be passing along erroneous data from
another source. The network incorporates a substantial volume of
electronics used for repeating and switching. Its intrinsic redundancy
allows it to tolerate multiple failures, however. The degree of
tolerance is such that the reliability can be greater than that for a
standard multiplex bus, in spite of the fact that the network may use
more electronics than the bus. The failures that occur in a network
are more of a maintenance concern than a reliability or safety concern.
Networks rely heavily on active control for their survival, and
are therefore dependent on software algorithms. This fact is apt to
make their acceptance by the air transport industry slower than it
might otherwise be. Once active-control airplane designs are accepted,
however, this would not seem to be a factor. A more serious potential
problem in networks is that a moderate number of passive faults may be
able to split a network into two isolated fragments. This problem can
be minimized by proper network design.
The redundancy of the network is interwoven with nominal
elements, so that it can not be separately identified. The standard
multiplex bus, on the other hand, uses a separate replication for
redundancy. The bus does not need to reconfigure after a fault, as
the replication is already in place and operating. The network,
however, needs to reconfigure before it can resume active service. The
time required for reconfiguration and recovery is an important concern
for performance and safety. If reconfiguration can be accomplished in
ten milliseconds or so, there need be little concern. Time-critical
nodes can be located where they can bereached morequickly than non-
critical nodes.
If reconfiguration time is much longer than ten milliseconds,
then some form of error masking may have to be employed. Outright
triplication of the network and its nodes for error masking is a
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possibility that was envisioned when the network was first conceived.
This approach is almost certain to be overly expensive, however. A ~
less-expensive approach to masking would be to grow three or more
separate trees in the same network, such that no more than one-third
of the system would be affected by a single failure.
3.2 Network Management Principles
Given a properly-designed network, a controller has the task of
making the network emulate a branching bus, to the extent that it is
possible to do so with surviving protions of the network. Management
algorithms are needed for some or all of the following functions:
Grow
Regrow
Verify
• Test
Dispatch
Detect
Diagnose
Take-over
Operate
3.2.1 Grow
When the network is in an arbitrary state, as it is at system
turn-on, the controller must issue configuration commands before com-
munications can be supported. The only nodes that can be reached for
certain are the controller's immediate neighbors. The situation can
be visualized with the help of Figure 3.2.1-1. The figure shows one
port of a controller (rectangle) leading to one portion of a network.
The controller can transmit to node A via linkA-ll, which is half of a
full duplex link, i.e. A-II only carries data to the node and A-12 only
only carries data to the controller. Figure 3.2.1-2 shows node A in
greater detail, showing boxes GAI, GA2 and GA3, called "gateman"
circuits. Gateman circuits receive configuration commands arriving at
their respective ports. When the controller sends a configuration
command on A-II, the command is received by gateman GAI, irrespective
of what may be happening on A-12 or any of the remaining links. The
grow procedure calls for the controller to send a message to gateman
GAI to cause the configuration controller in node A to accept further
commands via port A-l, and to reply with acknowledgement and status•
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Figure 3.2.1-I. Portion of a Network.
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Figure 3.2.1-2. Gateman Circuits In Node A.
This done, the controller seeks to attach node B. It first commands
node A to activate the port directed at B, which is port A-2. This is
done by enabling repeaters from A-II to A-22 and from A-21 to A-12.
The controller can now reach gateman GBI directly, and commands node
B's attention via port BI.
Next, the controller will seek to attach node C in similar
fashion. It first enables repeaters from A-II to A-32 and from A-31
to A-12. Then it commands gateman GC2 to have node C listen to port
C2.
Note that both nodes B and C can now hear the controller and
vice versa, but B and C can not hear each other. If it is desired that
they do so, then the controller can enable repeaters from A-31 to A-22
and from A-21 to A-33 in node A. This is a system design option, and
is not necessary for all networks.
To continue the grow process, the controller attaches node D
via B2, node E via B3, node F via C3, and node H via CI, as shown in
Figure 3.2.1-3. The process continues in a similar way, attaching
neighbor nodes of nodes already attached. Asterisks in Figure 3.2.1-3
indicate "growth points," which are node ports that are in a position
to attach new nodes. Note in part (h) of the figure that nodes E and
F are growth points toward the same new node, node G. As shown in
part (i) of the figure, only one of the two is allowed to grow. The
growth point from node F is eliminated when the link from node E to
node G is established.
Since growth points define the periphery of the active tree,
the definition of the grow algorithm is easily expressed in terms of
growth points. A read-only file is maintained showing the physical
structure of the network by listing the identity of the neighbor node
and port for every node port in the system. Two variable-length
writable files are then defined. One is the growth-point list. The
other is the list of nodes that have been reached. The grow process
begins with only the controller port(s) in the growth-point list, and
a null list of reached nodes. The controller removes and reads the
top growth point from the list and identifies its neighbor node and
port. If the node has already been reached, as determined by the
reached-node list, the growth point port is disabled, and the next
growth point is taken from the growth-point list. If the neighbor node
had not been reached before, the controller tries to establish contact
with the neighbor node. If unsuccessful, the controller disables the
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Figure 3.2.1-3. Growth Process.
growth-point port, and takes the next growth point from the growth-point
list. The controller can also create a bad-port message at this time
for maintenance data. Assuming that contact was successful, however,
the identity of the new node is added to the reached-node list, and the
identities of the other ports on the new node are added to the growth
point list. The next growth point is then taken from the growth point
list. When there are no more growth points left on the list, the
growth is complete. This algorithm is shown in flow form in Figure
3.2.1-4.
The result of applying this algorithm to a regular hexagonal net
with three ports per node is shown in Figure 3.2.1-5. The algorithm
branches as much as is allowed by the network topology. This has the
beneficial effect of minimizing signal latency. Regular patterns, &
however, do not permit a great deal of branching.
The grow algorithm can be shown to connect every node for which
connection is possible. Imagine an unconnected node that is the
neighbor of a connected node. When the connected node was reached, the
port facing the unconnected node was identified and placed on the
growth-point list. Therefore, when the growth-point list is exhausted,
this port will have been tried. If no connection results, it will be
because the node is not connectable by that port due to a fault. If
the unconnected node is instead a neighbor of another unconnected node,
no connection is possible via their mutual link until and unless one
of the two nodes becomes connected.
The speed of the grow process is limited by two factors; compu-
tational speed and I/O bandwidth. The amount of memory required for
minimal tables, lists, and code is relatively modest, and need not
exceed 2K words or so. The computational speed bears on the time
required to access the tables and lists as required, and to formulate
the commands to be sent to the nodes. This is estimated to require
something on the order of a hundred operations on a typical computer.
On a computer with a speed of a million operations per second (i MOPS)
this would take a hundred microseconds per node, or ten milliseconds
for a network of one hundred nodes. This would be marginally accept-
able for recovery speed in an active-control transport if every fault
were to require a complete grow operation.
With respect to I/O operation, each node will require on the
order of 100 bits of I/O to command and verify its configuration. The
MIL-STD-1553 bit rate is under a million useful bits per second, so
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BEGIN
THE ONLY INITIAL GROWTH POINTS ARE CONTROLLER PORTS.
INITIALIZE THE REACHED-NODE LIST TO NULL.
-_ -_ IS GROWTH-POINT LIST EMPTY?
NO YES _ END
I
OVE AND READ A GROWTH POINT.D ITS NEIGHBOR NODE AND PORTS.
HAS NEIGHBOR NODE BEEN REACHED BEFORE?
YES NO
DISABLE THIS PORT
TRY TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH NEIGHBOR NODE.
SUCCESSFUL?J. \
NO YES
DISABLE THIS PORT
ADD EW NODE TO REACHED-NODE LISTADD OTHER PORTS ON NEW NODE TO GROWTH-POINT LIST.
Figure 3.2.1-4. Growth Algorithm.
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Figure 3.2.1-5. Growth Pattern.
that over a hundred microseconds of communication time are needed as
well as, say, a hundred microseconds of computation time. These times
would actually overlap to some extent, but an estimate of 200 micro-
seconds per node might be realistic. Again, this is for the initial
growth, and does not necessarily mean an unreasonable recovery time.
3.2.2 Regrow
When a faulty node or link is detected and diagnosed, its
removal from the system may create a disconnected region of arbitrary
size. If no record was kept of the growth pattern during the growth
process, the regrow will have to be complete, starting from the
controller. The process can be simplified, however, if complete
records are kept showing the tree structure. A linked list would be a
convenient representation. With such a list, the identities of the
nodes in the disconnected region can be found easily. At the same
time, the previously idle ports can be identified. These idle ports
correspond to idle ports in the connected region. These latter ports
may be place_ in an _nitial growth-point list, and the grow algorithm
run from this point.
If complete information is not kept, it is still possible to
simplify regrow if all unused growth points are identified during the
grow process and held in a list. This list can then be used as the
initial growth-point list for regrow, and will reduce the time needed
depending on the number of ports per node.
3.2.3 Verify
Verification of a growing network takes place incrementally as
the grow process takes place. If 1553 protocols are used, each node
sends back a status word when it has received its configuration command
from the controller. Receipt of a proper status word by the controller
does not, of course, guarantee that the node is completely valid. It
does provide a high degree of confidence, however, that the node and
all intervening nodes, ports, and links are operational. The ultimate
test criterion of the network, as for any communication system, is the
validity of the information transmitted during system operation between
the subscribers and the controller. During normal operation, .the sub-
scribers will probably all be accessed sufficiently often to verify the
network without further action. The information transmitted would
presumably be subjected to acceptance tests such as comparisons, echo
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checks, and/or consistencychecks. Such testing simultaneously
verifies the subscribersand the communicationsmedium.
3.2.4 Test
Verification has denoted the assurance that a grown tree is
operating correctly in a network. Test, by contrast, is a process
employed to assure that the idle portions of the network are either
functional or else previously known to have failed. The aim is to
avoid situations where expected redundancy is in factunavailable. The
principal objects of the test process are idle links and ports, i.e.
the links and ports not currently active in forming the communication
tree. The simplest method of test, conceptually, is to modify the
active tree in such a way as to replace active links with idle links.
If this is done systematically, all of the links and ports will be
rotated in and out of active service periodically.
Link rotation can be costly in terms of bandwidth in a large
network, particularly since each link needs to be tested in two
different directions so that each half-link can be proven to operate
. in both inboard and outboard senses. This is necessary in order to
exercise all gateman circuits. A so-called "modify" algorithm attempts
to select links for rotation so as to minimize the overall expense
(in some sense) of a test cycle. Smith [5] has defined one such
algorithm, making use of a tree map.
An alternative means of testing may be implemented whereby spe-
cial test messages can be sent over idle links. One such approach would
be to equip every node with a test message receiver. In order to
conduct a test of an idle link, the controller would send a message to
one ofthe link's two nodes commanding it to connect the link to that
node's test message receiver. The controller would next command the
other node to attach the other end of the link to the active tree. Now
a test message would be directed to the first node's test message
receiver, and a verification reply would be sent back. The link would
then be disconnected again and tested in the reverse direction.
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3.2.5 Dispatch
Before an airplane can be dispatched, it must be ascertained
that its equipment is sufficient in number and correct in function. -°
This is not to say that the vehicle must contain a fully operational
complement, because one of the system requirements is for maintenance
postponement. The complement must rather satisfy a minimum equipment
list, where it is understood that to be counted as "present," an
element must meet certain functional requirements.
In the case of a mesh network it is not easy to define a minimum
data communication equipment list that is truly minimal. It is dif-
ficult, as discussed in Section 3.3, to measure the connectivity of a
mesh network, and it is this connectivity that provides the redundancy
upon which flight safety depends.
A pragmatic approach in this case is to define a dispatch
criterion that is easy to measure. The ease of measurement is obtained
at a certain expense, i.e. dispatch may be denied to a flightworthy
system. The probability of such an undeserved denial, however, can be
kept quite low without greatly complicating the dispatch criterion.
Consider a dispatch criterion that requires there to be no more
than one fault in the network. This criterion is extremely easy to
apply, but it is apt to deny dispatch too often. Taking only nodes
into account, for a ten flight-hour day and a hundred nodes, one would
expect to have two failed nodes on the same airplane once every 100
days if the nodes have MTBF's of i0,000 hours. On the other hand, if
node MTBF's are 100,000 hours, the double-fault situation would occur
only once per 10,000 days, which would be negligible.
Consider now a less stringent dispatch criterion that allows
multiple faults. As long as the failed elements are independent of
one another, and as long as they do not violate the minimum equipment
list for subscribers, the safety would be no worse than for the single-
fail criterion. One problem is to define what is meant by "indepen-
dence." This definition becomes contingent on the specific network
geometry, including the number of ports per node, and the connection
topology. Suffice it to say, however, that for any specific network,
it is reasonable to define independence in terms of minimum distance
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among failed nodes. For certain regular topologies, such as a
Cartesian grid, for example, the measurement of distance can be made
trivial if the nodes are numbered and identified in a helpful fashion.
It would seem to be unlikely to have to tolerate more than
three or four failures, in which case the distance criterion could be
set at several nodes, say four, without creating more than a negligible
probability of false denial of dispatch. Any attempt to tolerate
higher numbers of failures would have to take into account the proba-
bility that numerous failures can sever a sizeable fragment from the
network.
3.2.6 Detect and Diagnose
Because the mesh network requires active reconfiguration in
order to tolerate faults, it is necessary to discover and locate
rapidly any faulty situation that poses a threat to the communication
system. In most cases, this is a trivial task, since most faults
cause gross failure symptoms, such as lack of response to a command,
incoherent "babble", or a violation of parity or framing constraints.
The most difficult kind of fault to detect would be one that
produces no obvious symptom. An example would be a node that fails
to connect its neighbor, yet answers coherently when the neighbor is
polled, sending spurious data. This kind of fault could be generalized
to the point where a single node postures as many nodes, to all of
which it is supposed to be connected. Although this kind of failure
mode can be rendered highly unlikely by proper design, it can not be
ignored.
The ultimate acceptance criterion of any communication system
is the reasonableness of the data it transmits. This will always
require that a flight-crucial system be designed so as to be distrust-
ful of sensor data received and effector data transmitted. Reasonable-
ness testing requires control techniques that produce estimates of
expected sensor behavior. When data that passes parity and framing
checks produces disagreement and confusion in the reasonableness tests,
notice can be served on the network controller to that effect.
This leads to the question of diagnosis. When a fault symptom
is strongly correlated with a particular node, the network can be
reconfigured so as to reach that node via a different port. This can
be accomplished by declaring a failed link and executing a regrow. If
the symptom disappears, the link remains declared as failed. If the
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symptom persists, additional links are declared failed until all ports
have been tried. Finally, the node will be cut off from the network,
and if the symptom disappears, the node will be declared failed.
If the symptoms do not correlate with a particular node, it may
be that a link or node fault is affecting a sizeable branch of the
active tree. If all of the grow data was kept, it would be possible to
interpret symptoms according to a map of the active tree. Suppose a
node fails close to the controller, but the first symptom comes from a
node far away, reached via the failed node. Attempts to reconfigure
the symptom node may produce more fault symptoms. If not, other
symptoms will arise in time. Now the diagnostic process would be
invoked, using the map, where an attempt would be made to verify the
active path from the controller to the nearest node for which a symptom
has been received. This process will locate the faulty node, and it
will be tested as in the preceding paragraph.
So far it has been tacitly assumed that the fault symptom is
passive and consistent. An active, or babbling, fault causes disrup-
tion of the entire connected portion of a network, making it necessary
to initiate a diagnostic process analogous to the grow process. The
first step in this process is for the controller to command its
immediate neighbor to disconnect its other ports one at a time, to see
when the fault disappears. If it does not disappear, then the guilty
node has been found. Otherwise, the process continues with successive
neighboring nodes until the faulty node is reached.
The diagnosis of an intermittent fault condition requires more
ambitious strategies than for consistent faults. The network must not
be kept disconnected while waiting for a fault symptom to occur.
Therefore all symptoms may be assumed to be obtained in a fully con-
nected state. Diagnostic information must be obtained purely on the
basis of changes in the active tree structure between symptom events.
Use can be made of multiple ports in controllers for this purpose.
By moving single nodes or clusters of nodes from one sub-tree to
another, decisions can be made regarding the location of a fault,
according to which controller port sees which symptom.
In order to simplify and standardize the diagnostic process, we
might assume that the network will be managed by a multiport controller,
and that normal growth will produce several independent active sub-
trees, one for each controller port. Symptoms, wherever or however
obtained, may be assumed to point to one sub-tree at a time.
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The controller would break up the suspect sub-tree and apportion its
nodes among its original sub-tree and the other sub-trees. It may
determine the culprit in the process of doing this. If not, the next
symptom would be awaited. Eventually, the culprit would be found by
successive fragmentation of the suspect sub-tree's node clusters. This
strategy requires an intelligent management algorithm that maintains a
map of all active trees and sub-trees. The same algorithm may also be
given the job of periodic reconfiguration for test purposes.
3.2.7 Take-Over
The assumption is made in this report that a single fault-toler'
ant computer will possess the entire configuration authority for the
airplane. This is not a necessary assumption, however, from the point
of view of network management. A network is amenable to management
from multiple distinct controllers, provided that they do not contend
for control at the same time, i.e. that they fail passive.
Multiple controllers can operate either in a standby replacement
mode or in a load-sharing mode. Algorithms required for multiple con-
troller operation are the standard management algorithms discussed in
this section, plus a reliable means for deciding when to assert control
on the basis of perceived activity on the part of the other controller.
The safety issue regarding control assertion is unsolved in general,
however, and will alwaysbe difficult to evaluate in specific systems.
3.2.8 Operation
The final function to be discussed in this section is normal
operation. A grown network has the logical attributes of a bus
designed for command-response protocols. Depending on details of
design, the subscribers may or may not be able to hear one another, but
in any event they can all hear the controller and vice versa.
A controller with multiple ports normally broadcasts its mes-
sages from all ports at the same time, though not necessarily synch-
ronously. Response from subscriber nodes are heard on a single port
only. The controller may use its knowledge of the active tree assign-
ments to access the response from the right pork. Alternatively, it
could form the logical o__rrof responses from all ports, or else poll the
ports one at a time, to obtain the response message.
In variant modes of operation, the different ports might operate
in parallel,depending on the nature of the controller. This would be ab
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possible means of operating a "channelized" system in which different
redundant sensor and effector channels are assigned to different con-
troller ports. Substantial throughput advantages are possible here.
3.3 Network Topology
The attributes of a network are dependent upon the manner in
which links join nodes. In particular, if a single link break separ-
ates the network into two disjoint fragments, then the reliability of
the network is bounded by the reliability of the one link and the two
nodes that it joins. One part of network design is to ensure that no
such narrow neck exists unknown to the designer. It might be imagined
that this poses no great problem, for a narrow neck would surely be
obvious upon inspection, or so it might be thought. Figure 3.3-1 is
offered as a means by which the reader can gauge the difficulty of
finding a narrow neck in a network. The cutting of a single link
separates this ten-node network into two five-node fragments. Trying
to find such a narrow neck in a network of one or two hundred nodes
would be vastly more difficult for a human to do by eye. It also turns
out that to do the job by computer is difficult, more so than one might
expect from the simple manner in which the problem can be defined; i.e.,
"where can the network be cut into two fragments with the fewest link
cuts?" Just how difficult this computation can be is discussed in
Chapter 6, where an algorithm is described for solving the problem.
In this section, it is taken for granted that an arbitrary network
topology is difficult to certify with respect to its connectivity.
(Connectivity is defined as a measure of the number of cuts required
to cleave the network in two.) This section is rather concerned with
methods for laying out regular networks for which the connectivity is
either obvious or easily found.
3.3.1 Connectivity
The connectivity of Figure 3.3-1 is equal to one, because the
elimination of one link, specifically the link between nodes 2 and 5,
separates the network into two five-node sub-networks. If the links
were to be rearranged as shown in Figure 3.3.1-1, the connectivity
would be equal to two. Clearly, the links from nodes 3 to 4 and 8 to
9 join two sub-networks together. A connectivity of three (with a one-
node fragment) is shown in Figure 3.3.1-2. In both of these last two
figures, the links have been arranged so as to minimize obscurity,
which was purposely not the case in Figure 3.1-1.
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Figure 3.3-1. ConnectivityExample.
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Figure 3.3.1-1, Network With Connectivity of Two.
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Figure 3.3.1-2. Network With Connectivity of Three.
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In Figure 3.3.1-2, the connectivity is three, because a single
node can be isolated by three link cuts. This is true for each of the
ten nodes. To isolate more than one node at a time, it is necessary to
make at least four cuts. This is a small example of a desirable
property in certain larger networks, i.e. the number of cut links
needed to isolate a group of nodes can be made to increase with the
size of the group, up to a certain point.
As is evident from the example of the network in Figure 3.3.1-2,
the connectivity of a network will never exceed the number of ports
per node, or, more specifically, the minimum number of ports per node
if different nodes have different numbers of ports. Connectivity in
the strictest sense is therefore of concern only when it is lower than,
rather than equal to, the minimum number of ports per node. As a
design criterion, it is reasonable to require that the connectivity be
equal to the minimum number of ports per node. Beyond this, other
geometrical criteria may be applicable. Whereas it is desirable that
the number of cuts to isolate a fragment increase with fragment size,
this will not necessarily happen. Figure 3.3.1-3 shows several
example fragments. Part (a) of the figure shows that four cuts will
" ordinarily be required to isolate two nodes. Parts (b) and (c) show
that the number of cuts required to isolate three and four nodes can
be five and six, respectvely, if no closures are made. If loop
closures are made, however, as in part (d), (e), and (f), the number of
cuts required to isolate will be less than before. The absence of
tight loops does not imply high connectivity for the network as a
whole, but it satisfies the second criterion wherein it becomes
difficult to sever large fragments.
3.3.2 Multiple Paths
Before continuing the discussion of link geometry, it is
appropriate to digress upon a point related to system bandwidth. The
remedy for insufficient bandwidth is to have multiple channels, assum-
ing that the single-channel bandwidth has been made as high as is
practical. The question is often raised in a network (as it is in
many other cases of system redundancy) as to whether idle linkage can
be used in such a way as to provide increased performance, i.e. band-
width, in the absence of faults. The answer is that, in principle,
more than one tree can exist at a time. Moreover, it is possible for
trees to intersect, so that subscribers can have access to more than
one tree at a time. The problem is that it may or may not be feasible
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Figure 3,3.1-3. Examples of Network Fragments.
to support a desired degree of flexibility within reasonable economic
bounds.
Suppose, for example, that two nodes communicate with one
another at a high rate. They can be joined by a dedicated link, as
shown in Figure 3.3.2-1 (a) in the form of a dashed line between nodes
C and E. If this link should fail, however, this path would have to be
replaced in such a way that the principal tree could still reach nodes
C and E. The solution might be similar to the one shown in part (b) of
the figure, where nodes F and H become waypoints without requiring
extra linkage. This is made possible by placing nodes F and H at
extremities of the tree as, for example, by reserving the growth points
needed to support the dotted path.
Figure 3.3.2-1 (b) is also suggestive of the possibility that
the extra path might be a bus joining all four of nodes C, E, F, and H.
This and numerous other things are possible, but they do put a
strain on resources, especially if the extra communication channels
cover large distances. Either sufficient dedicated links must be
provided between distant nodes, or else the alternative path possibili-
° ties must be made sufficiently rich to support all paths under the
appropriate fault hypotheses. Figure 3.3.2-2 shows in abstract form
how dedicated linkage can be used as the primary means to establish
multiple paths. In case of failure of the dedicated links, reliance is
placed on the ability to grow replacement paths. This fails to utilize
idle links for forming multiple paths, but it at least draws on idle
links for redundancy, sharing them with the primary path in this
regard.
If dedicated links are not used, then all paths must compete for
linkage even in the absence of faults. Figure 3.3.2-3 shows a hypothet-
ical node with Six ports. Three are used to form a branch in the
primary tree, two are used to form a waypoint in another path, and one
is left for substitution in the event of failure. This is not to say
that six ports per node are absolutely required for two-path operation,
but if distance and flexibility are desired in the absence of dedicated
paths, the number of ports per node may need to be significantly
greater than for a single-path network_
Before leaving the subject of multiple paths, it has not been
determined whether a grow algorithm exists for more than one path, that
is guaranteed to find a multiple path solution if one exists. The
single-path grow algorithm, of course, is guaranteed to find a tree to
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76
Figure 3.3.2-2. Dedicated Paths.
Figure 3.3.2-3. Six-Port Node.
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all reachable nodes. If paths can be ordered in terms of critiality,
then a pragmatic course would be to grow the most critical path first.
3.3.3 Regular Geometries
The network shown earlier in Figure 3.3.1-2 possesses the attri-
bute of regularity; that is, a symmetry exists such that every node is
connected in an identical fashion. If the network is rotated in any
direction, it looks the same. Regular geometries are advantageous in
that their connectivities can be made immediately obvious, by using
simple geometrical constructs.
For three-port nodes, a simple regular geometry in one dimension
is the one used in Figure 3.3.1-2. A two-dimensional regular geometry
is based on hexagonal tiling, as shown in Figure 3.3.3-1 (a). Part
(b) of the figure shows a regular two-dimensional tiling for four-port
nodes, and part (c) for six-port nodes. A three-dimensional "tiling"
for six-port nodes is shown in part (d). Note the tighter loops in
(c) than (d). It is easier to isolate a fragment in (c).
The figures in Figure 3.3.3-1 are deficient in that they possess
edge discontinuities, at least as shown here. In order to be truly
regular, the figures must close on themselves in the next-higher dimen-
sion the way a tor0id closes a rectagular sheet, for example. There
are, of course, some regular polyhedra that form closed surfaces. One
of the more interesting of these is the dodecahedron, as sketched in
Figure 3.3.3-2 (a). Exactly twenty nodes of three links each can be
arranged in a regular network this way. The icosahedron in part (b)
of the figure is a complementary structure to the dodecahedron, formed
by placing a face on every node of the dodecahedron and a node on every
face. This leads to a network of twelve five-port nodes. Both of
these patterns are, unfortunately, more interesting than useful.
Another interesting pattern is shown in Figure 3.3.3-3. This
three dimensional array of three-port nodes has loops of length twelve,
as opposed to the hexagons of Figure 3.3.3-1 with loop-length six.
This pattern is not intrinsically closed, and must be folded at the
edges into a "hypertoroid" to close it.
Toroidal patterns afford the means of making regular closed
patterns of more or less arbitrary size. One such pattern is shown in
Figure 3.3.3-4. This pattern can be rotated in either the left-right
or the up-down dimension without altering the perceived pattern. The
toridal array in Figure 3.3.3-5 uses three-port nodes. The tiling is
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Figure 3.3.3-1. Regular Geometries.
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Figure 3.3.3-2. Polyhedral Regular Geometries.
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Figure 3.3.3-3. Three-Dimensional Arra_.
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Figure 3.3.3-4. Regular Toroidal Pattern•
Figure 3.3.3-5. Hexagonal Toroid.
hexagonal, with the vertices constrained to lie in horizontal lines.
Figures 3.3.3-6 and 3.3.3-7 show how local multiple paths can be
accommodated in square and hexagonal regular networks. The (b) parts
of these two figures show how the private channel can be reconfigured
following failure of the dedicated link. The principal channel is
also reconfigured, of course. Some double link faults prevent success-
ful reconfiguration, but most can be tolerated.
3.3.4 Semiregular Geometries
There are two principal reasons why networks that are slightly
irregular are of interest. The first, and most important, is that a
regular net becomes irregular the moment it is injured, i.e. contains
a fault. Multiple faults can increase the degree of irregularity,
even to a point where the connectivity is no longer easy to determine.
Another reason for considering semiregular geometries is that the
regular ones are notnecessarily convenient or practical to implement
in an airplane.
The impact of a faulty link or node on the soundness of a net-
work is primarily local. Each neighbor node is threatened by the loss
of one of its access ports. Additional faults in the vicinity could
isolate one or more nodes. Suppose a three-port node fails in a hexa-
gonally tiled network. Each of three neighbors is reduced to two
ports. The probability of isolating one of these ports is predominant-
ly determined by the probability that two additional faults occur,
presumably in the other neighbor nodes of one of the threatened nodes.
In Figure 3.3.4-1, nodes 7, 9, and 13 are threatened by the failure
of node 8. If nodes 2 and 6 fail, then node 7 will be isolated. The
consequences of this series of mishaps depend on which subscribers
were assigned to the nodes. From the standpoint of network reliability
alone, the loss of "innocent" node 7 in this case is considered to
aggravate the situation already imperiled by the failure of three
nodes. As a practical matter, the loss of the three nodes may already
have been catastrophic. It also may not, depending on how nodes were
assigned to subscribers.
At any rate, the joint probability of such an event occurring,
given that the airplane was dispatched with node 8 failed, is roughly
three times the square of the probability of a single node fault. For
nodes with a 10,000 hour MTBF and a ten hour flight, the joint proba-
bility is of the order of 3x10-6. If the node MTBF is 100,000 hours,
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the joint probability becomes 3x10-8, which is becoming close to an
acceptable value for a catastrophic condition, given that the proba-
bility of having the initial fault is of the order of 10-2 or i0-!.
It may be desirable or necessary to use four-port nodes unless MTBF's
can be made extremely high.
If the network contains two faults at dispatch time, it is
possible that they might both threaten a single innocent node, making
it moderately probable that thenode would be isolated in flight. This
situation is easily avoided as long as the dispatch criterion requires
all functioning nodes to have at least two valid access ports.
Consider, however, the case where nodes 8 and 1 in Figure 3.3.4-1 are
initially failed. Now, if nodes 3 and 6 should also fail, both nodes
2 and 7 will be isolated. The initial faults were distance 3 apart
in this case. Distance 3, therefore is probably insufficient to
establish fault independence in a network of three-port nodes. Distance
4, on the other hand, is probably sufficient. For four-port nodes,
distance 3 is probably sufficient. One can compute approximate proba-
bilities that a network is dispatchable by estimating the joint proba-
bility that successive faults are at a sufficient distance from one
another. This is discussed in Chapter 6.
Some proposed geometries are made semiregular from the start.
One reason has to do with the awkwardness of assigning a toroidal
regular net to an airplane. This can result, for example, in having
tens of links between each wing and the fuselage, which is more than
necessary, and costly. Another possible reason, not considered likely
would be to structure the network along the lines of the desired growth
tree in order to limit the distance of nodes from the controller.
This would be more practical if the network never had failures. When
provisions are made for reconfiguration, much of the desired attribute
is lost.
To illustrate the last point, Figure 3.3.4-2 and 3.3.4-3 illus-
trate the result of applying the grow algorithm to regular networks of
three-port and four-port nodes, respectively. Note the long runs of
non-branching strings in each case. A semi-regular network, shown in
Figure 3.3.4-4 is arranged so that thirty nodes areall within distance
four of the top node using maximal branching. In case of a fault near
the top, however, the longest distance can be as large as eight, follow-
ing a complex reconfiguration. Figure 3.3.4-5 shows a modified version
of the previous structure where provision is made to overcome such
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Figure 3.3.4-2. Growth Pattern From Central Node - Three-Ports.
Figure 3.3.4-3. Growth Pattern From Central Node - Four-Ports.
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Figure 3.3.4-4. SemiregularTree Network
Figure 3.3.4-5. Variant of Semiregular Tree Network.
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problems, losing much of the original advantage.
Semiregular tree structures are actually of minimal interest for
data communication in active control transports. Not only do they not
gracefully fit the airplane, but the attribute of short nodal distances
is of secondary importance for the sizes and types of networks that
would be used.
The most profitable approach for aircraft applications is a
semiregular structure composed of interconnected regular structures.
Thus the fuselage systems might be connected as one tOroid, the wings
another, and the tail another. Boxes in bays might form separate
toroidal groups as well. To connect one toroid to another, certain
mutually distant nodes of one toroid can be replaced by sets of
external ports, as in Figure 3.3.4-6. Four such nodes create twelve
ports in this case, where three-port nodes are used. Figure 3.3.4-7
indicates how toroids might be interconnected, joining the analogous
port clusters in each of four toroids. Obviously, this is only one
example, but it serves to show how regularity can be preserved within
the individual toroids that make up the larger system.
3.4 Subscriber Assignments
Subscriber assignments to network nodes would preferably be a
matter of convenience, presumably to minimize cabling. Two considera-
tions, however, may interfere with assignments that are convenient.
One consideration is reliability. The other is the possibility of
exploiting parallel channels for purposes of masking faults.
Some redundant sensors and effectors are dispersed about the
system (or can be if desired), whereas others are naturally located in
the same vicinity. Examples of the latter are skewed inertial strap-
down instruments and triplex force-voting actuators. _,_enassigning
such localized redundant elements to network nodes, each simplex
entity would have its own node, forming a redundant group. Convenience
would call for choosing these nodes from a continuous fragment of the
network, as in Figure 3.4-1 (b). But if the airplane is dispatched
with the B node failed, then both the A and C nodes are threatened by
possible failure of their neighbor nodes. If the MTBF of the nodes is
not very great, this may present probabilities of losing two or three
channels that are too high for certification of the airplane. If this
is the case, then draping a regular network onto an airplane system as
in Figure 3.4-1 (a) could turn out to be a messy business, with a great
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Figure 3.4-1. Force-Voting Actuator Node Assignments.
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deal of extra linkage required. From this viewpoint as well as the
maintenance viewpoint, it would be preferable, if not necessary, that
the MTBF's of the nodes be of the order of 50,000 hours or higher for
passive faults, and 300,000 hours or higher for active (e.g. hard-over)
faults.
For multi-channel operation, the network needs to be draped so
as to make it easy to grow multiple subtrees to handle separate chan-
nels. Figure 3.4-2 illustrates one possible toroidal net draped on a
group of triple actuator nodes, as might be required in an advanced
aeroelastic wing.
A final note on subscriber assignment: The stated assumption
underlying much of the discussion thus far is that everything is
critical, whereas in fact some subscribers will be non-critical, but
rather present for economic benefit. The non-critical elements can be
assigned for convenience, without any particular regard for the
constraints discussed in this section.
3.5 Issues Concerning Node Architecture
In this section a number of issues are reviewed having to do
with the design of network nodes. The nature of nodes has so far been
described in abstract terms. Nodes contain repeaters, enabling
switches, gateman circuits, and controllers. This much is clear from
a description of the grow algorithm. Numerous variations are possible
as to how these elements are mechanized, and how they interact.
In addition to the latitude available to the designer in
realizing the basic functions of the node, the designer has other
choices to make that affect the architecture of the node. Four such
choices are addressed in this section.
Interface Standardization
Fiber Optics vs. Electrical Conductors
Embedded vs. External Location
Identification Options
3.5.1 Interface Standardization
Mesh networks have almost the same problem of interface stand-
ardization as multiplex buses do. This is to be expected since the
network emulates a multiplex bus. The multiplex bus has interfaces at
controller ports, remote couplers, and between remote couplers and
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Figure 3.4-2 Toroidal Connection of Triplex Subscribers.
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subscriber ports. Mesh networks, meanwhile, have interfaces at con-
troller ports, node ports, and between nodes and subscriber ports.
Standardization is equally important and equally difficult in the two
methodologies.
The preferred approach would be for all nodes to be identical,
although provision must be made for competitive manufacture. Competi-
tive design to form, fit, and function specifications is another
possibility. The interface to the subscriber port can be, and presum-
ably should be, identical to that of a standard multiplex bus, such as
1553. This interface has successfully been implemented to form, fit,
and function by numerous manufacturers. The node port and controller
port interfaces would be essentially identical, and would be similar
to multiplex bus interfaces, and also amenable to form-fit-function
specification. The node control logic is the most complex part of a
node specification, and it remains to be determined whether this kind
of specification is practical for nodes.
A strong incentive exists for making the network compatible
with 1553. The electrical interfaces of 1553 all use a serial
Manchester biphase signal on twisted pair. A growing number of sub-
scriber devices are being developed that are interfaced this way. The
node-to-subscriber interface can be made this way as well. A problem
arises, however, if the Manchester signals are passed through a series
of repeaters like those in a mesh network. Repeaters contain ampli-
fiers, whose rise and fall characteristics are not guaranteed to be
identical. If several in a row have the same bias, pulses will grow
or shrink, thus distorting the wave-form, quite possibly to the point
of incoherence. Figure 3.5.1-1 shows the effect of successive repeat-
ers in which rise time is slower than fall time.
One alternative to Manchester coding is to transmit short
pulses demarcating leading edge positions of the equivalent Manchester
code, as shown in Figure 3.5.1-2. It is possible to reconstruct the
Manchester code from the pulse code using an accurate time counter
circuit, based on the property of Manchester code that it always
changes state at the data strobe instant half way through the bit
period. When the leading edge pulses are repeated, their durations
are ignored at each repetition. As shown in Figure 3.5.1-3, their
separation is preserved despite biased repeater amplifiers.
The pulse code is the recommended standard for all of the node-
port to node-port interfaces in a 1553-iike mesh network. This means
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that the controller interface would either be built for pulse code, or
else would have an external translator interposed, possibly at the first
node. Each node would contain a two-way translator to couple the sub-
scriber to the network.
This can be accomplished, albeit expensively, by using repeater
circuits which retime pulse durations by means of high-speed clocks.
The minimum delay through each repeater is of the same order of magni-
tude as the rise and fall time uncertainty in the transmitter-receiver
pairs. Delays of this order should be tolerable in the kinds of net-
works described here.
3.5.2 Fiber Optics vs. Electrical Conductors
The presence of repeaters in the nodes of a mesh network yields
options for linkage technology not easily available to multiplex bus
technology. Fiber optics is a prime example of such an option. The
fiber optics versions of 1553 multiplex buses reported so far have
strayed quite far from the simplicity and robustness of the electrical
version. The main reason is that the optical energy must necessarily
be divided equally among the subscribers, which eats heavily into
design tolerances when the number of terminals approaches twenty or so.
In mesh networks, each link is actually two half-links in a full-
duplex arrangement, i.e. one half-link in each direction. Each half-
link can be implemented as a fiber optic channel, with one transmitter,
one cable, and one receiver. The cost is having numbers of transmit-
ters and receivers in each node equal to the number of ports per node.
The benefit is the absence of dYnamic range problems and power division
problems, which allows design tolerances to be healthy and broad.
It must always be pointed out, in discussing the potential for
fiber optics, that it is not yet practical to achieve complete elec-
trical isolation using fiber optics, since electrical power must still
be distributed on hard wires to every node in the system. Experimental
circuits have used optical power, but this is not anticipated to
impact avionics for transport airplanes in the foreseeable future.
3.5.3 Embedded vs. External Location of Node's
The nodes in a mesh network perform dual roles, combining the
functions performed by remote couplers and remote interfaces in 1553
multiplex systems. They couple together the various segments of link-
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age to form a coherent network, and they couple complex subscriber
circuits to a simple twisted pair interface. In 1553, the remote
couplers are fixed to the airframe while the remote interfaces are
embedded in the subscribers. In a mesh network, a choice needs to be
made between embedding the node in the subscriber, attaching the node
to the airframe, locating the node in a separate line-replaceable unit
(LRU) from the subscriber, or fragmenting the node into two or more
of the above-mentioned locations.
If the node is embedded in subscriber packages, then the network
is injured whenever the subscriber package is removed. This may or
may not cause a problem, depending largely on whether airplanes would
ever be dispatched with missing boxes. Line maintenance and periodic
maintenance procedures could also be affected, especially when several
boxes are removed while the system is under test.
Another consequence of embedding nodes is the virtual necessity
of using form-fit-function specifications so that any vendor of a
subscriber element can incorporate a node of his own design.
Embedding a node in a subscriber increases the subscriber's
effective failure rate. If the subscriber's original failure rate is
much greater than the node's, then this is of no consequence as far as
flight safety or maintenance are concerned. If the node's failure rate
is greater than the original subscriber's, then the impact on flight
safety and maintenance must be calculated. It has already been
indicated that node MTBF's of several tens of thousands of hours are
apt to be necessary for active-control aircraft applications.
Relatively few subscribers are likely to be more reliable than this.
Mechanical servos today have reliabilities of this order, but they are
not amenable to multiplexing without embedded electronics added, which
could substantially reduce their MTBF's. Servo manufacturers, however,
are constantly exploring the possibility of incorporating electronic
feedback control into hydraulic servos. It would seem that very high
MTBF's would be needed in such devices in order for airlines to find
them acceptable, even if the electronics modules were easily removed
and replaced from the servos, because of the difficulty of accessing
servos during line maintenance, which occurs outdoors in ambient
conditions. At any rate, if the servo designers succeed, an embedded
node must not compromise the servo electronics. This issue, incidental-
ly, exists equally for 1553 interfaces.
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If all or part of a node stays in the airframe when the sub-
scriber is removed, the network injury problem is solved. This could
be of value in certain military aircraft, where different avionics
complements are dispatched for different missions. Another advantage
could accrue if fiber optics links are used, since the optical fiber
connectors would not be mated and unmated as often as the subscriber's
electrical connectors. They could therefore afford to be made more
robust than if they were incorporated in a box's end connector. Again,
the assumption is made that nodes are extremely reliable.
Another option, possibly suitable for use in avionics bays is to
place several nodes in a single LRU package located among the associ-
ated subscriber boxes. This approach could be effective for 1553 bus
subscribers in a mesh network. The nodes would appear to the sub-
scribers as if they were the remote couplers of a 1553 multiplex bus.
3.5.4 Identification Options
One of the intrinsic necessities of multiplex systems is to have
a means whereby the remote terminals, the nodes, and the subscribers
are able to determine which messages are and are not directed at them,
and which times they are and are not eligible to transmit on the
channel. The method used for this purpose almost always involves the
assignment of an identity code to each transmitter, so that it can
either hear itself called or can count slots until its turn to talk.
Only in the case of ring networks is identity unnecessary, since in
that case a specific enable signal arrives at the transmitter whose
turn it is to talk.
An identity code must be known in at least two places, i.e. the
controller and the transmitter, and perhaps secondary controllers.
Codes must moreover be disjoint so that each code designates a unique
transmitter. An otherwise healty transmitter can become a babbler if
its identity code is incorrect.
The method by which identities are assigned impacts performance,
economy, and reliability of the network. If the identification is hard-
wired into the transmitter, then the transmitter is either committed
to a single function for its lifetime, or else the controller must be
notified as to which of several possible functions a given transmit-
ter code represents during this flight. If the code is to be assigned
by the controller writing into an identity register, some means is
needed, like the one that exists in the ring network, to tell a specific
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transmitter than an identity code assignment message is intended for it.
Another possibility is to wire the panel connectors so that the proper
codes are presented to whatever transmitter is plugged in. Still
another is to have coded buttons or plugs available to insert into
transmitter packages.
_atever method is used, it would be reasonable to diminish
the probability that one mistaken identity would map into another.
Some form of redundancy, such as replicated identification code words,
or error detecting or correcting codes should be considered.
3.5.5 Environmental Considerations
When a network or any other digital transmission system is used
to interconnect fully dispersed systems of sensors and effectors, some
of the terminals, nodes, and/or subscribers will be located in places
where it is difficult to provide environmental control. Places like
engines, wings, and hail surfaces experience extremes of heat, cold,
and vibration, unlike the fuselage avionics bays, where a relatively
benign environment is found.
•The impact of a harsh environment on electronics is a reduced
MTBF, which has potential impacts on safety and an absolute impact on
maintainability. Thus the nodes and subscribers that are most apt to
need replacement are those in the more remote spots that are awkward
to reach. It is therefore essential that node design take into
account the environmental extremes of airplane locations if networks or
other multiplex systems are ever fully to displace dedicated passive
linkage.
3.6 Network Design Summary
Rather little experience exists as yet with respect to mesh
network design for aircraft. Three generations of experimental networks
have been designed at the Draper Laboratory, none of which, however,
has exceeded ten nodes in size. The following, therefore, represents
a prediction as opposed to distillation of experience in the methodol-
ogy of network design.
3.6.1 Subscriber and Node Locations
Perhaps the first step in designing a mesh network is to decide
where subscribers and nodes will be located, subject, of course, to
iterations of the design. Environmental issues surface immediately.
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/3.6.2 Embedment of Nodes
The location of nodes with respect to subscribers and the
possible fragmentation of nodes is a major decision. It will be based
on the projected scenarios for operation and maintenance for the air-
plane, as well as on possible utilization of 1553 or ARINC 429 sensors
and effectors with multiplex interfaces already installed.
3.6.3 Link Technology
The option to use fiber optics should be decided upon before
node technology is selected. This is an enormous issue, which can
really be resolved only by future experimentation and experience. Many
problems remain to be solved, including susceptibilities to temper-
ature, vibration, x-rays, and repeated mating and unmating of connec-
tors. If and when all the problems are solved, this will be an
attractive medium because of its electrical isolation and high band-
width capabilities.
3.6.4 Node Design
Node design will eventually reduce to a choice among existing
designs. At first, however, a substantial challenge exists to create
a small, reliable, inexpensive, and capable device.
3.6.5 Multiple Paths
When the channel bandwidth has been determined, any need for
multiple channels will be evaluated.
3.6.6 Network Topology
The number of node ports may have been predetermined by avail-
able node designs, or perhaps this number may be independently
determined at this stage. At any rate, a regular or semi-regular net-
work geometry is to be chosen based on the shape of the airplane,
reliability requirements, and multiple path requirements.
3.6.7 Node Assignments
Subscribers will be assigned according to considerations of
separate trees, clustering of mutually redundant subscribers, and
perhaps distance from the controller.
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3.6.8 Operation Principles and Protocol
Protocol and operation principles may have been predetermined.
If not, they may be chosen relatively late in the cycle.
3.6.9 Performance and Reliability Assessment
Models are needed to evaluate the compatibility of the design
decisions described above. Failure probability, bandwidth, recovery
speed, dispatch probability, and maintenance frequency are the
• principal assessments to be made.
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CHAPTER 4
POWER DISTRIBUTION
In this chapter the role of power transmission in flight-
crucial active control systems is discussed. To begin with, power in
airplanes is presently generated, distributed, and applied in both
electrical and hydraulic forms, which is justified on the basis of
their respective efficiencies for control processing and actuation.
The distinction is not absolute, since, for example, some actuation is
electrical, and some control processing is fluidic.
There is a possibility of achieving efficiencies in electrical
actuation in the coming years such that it may become appropriate to
eliminate hydraulic systems altogether. Much as this would be welcome
from an esthetic viewpoint, it should be recalled that despite its
many nuisances, hydraulic engineering has successfully come to grips
with a full-time flight-crucial availability requirement in some of
the more recent airplanes. This is not to say that active control
technology was achieved, but the application of redundant power trans-
mission elements giving continuity of service despite faults and
damage constitutes an important step. In going from hydraulic to
electric actuation, this achievement would have to be matched in
electrical power transmission.
Unlike the case of signal transmission, multiplexing is not a
significant issue in power transmission. This applies, of course, to
the actual power elements themselves. Multiplexing of power control
signals is an important issue. To some degree, there is a weak analogy
to multiplex signal transmission whenever power is bussed to several
destinations. The important difference is that the loads and the
sources can be passive in the power bus case, although for practical
reasons some form of power interruptor is required to protect the bus
from short circuits or leaks, as the case may be.
There are essentially three basic topological forms to consider
for power transmission. These are dedicated feeders, buses, and mesh
networks. In the first case, power is allocated ot each "subscriber"
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at a central location (e.g. a breaker panel) and routed over dedicated
channels to the point of application. The bus form of distribution
reduces the number of dedicated lines, while requiring that remote
protection be employed. A hybrid approach would route power to several
remote distribution terminals ("substations") from which dedicated
lines would run to nearby subscribers. The mesh network allows power
to be shared over a multiplicity of simultaneous paths. Each node can
both receive and transmit power. Protection is afforded by limiting
the amount of power a node can transmit, or, alternatively, configuring
each node so as to be able to switch off its incident power links on
command.
4.1 Hydraulic Power Distribution
The problems of hydraulic systems primarily stem from slow leaks,
which are difficult to detect if not seen. At least three problems
result from leaks. One is loss of fluid, which is potentially critical.
A second is the dissolution of paint and insulation, and the third is
the fire hazard of a mist of hydraulic fluid, which can be flammable
where the liquid form is not. It would obviously be desirable to
detect slow leaks and suppress them with valves of some sort. As yet,
however, no such detector has been available, at least at an affordable
cost. This seriously limits the degree to which hydraulic transmission
systems can be improved over their present state.
Present systems consist of three or four separate hydraulic
circuits, which draw from separate fluid reservoirs in order to avoid
vulnerability from a single leak. In principle, both dedicated and
bus distribution forms are possible. A mesh network, however, mixes
power from several sources and does not differentiate fluid reservoirs,
which makes its application unlikely.
When a power component fails (which is not a particularly rare
event), it would be undesirable from several points of view to lose a
third or a fourth of the flight control system. This will be, if any-
thing, more true of active control systems. Cross-strapping of power
systems is therefore desirable. For this reason, each separate
hydraulic channel is likely to be powered by more than one source.
Pumps may be geared directly to turbines (engines and APUs), may be
electrically driven, or may even be hydraulically driven. Some
hydraulic-driven pumps of this sort are symmetrical, so that either
channel can power the other. Care must be taken in cross-strapping to
avoid situations where the mechanism that supports power sharinq has a
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failure mode which adversely impacts all of the channels it serves at
one time.
4.2 Electric Power Distribution
Unlike hydraulics, electric power distribution has not yet had
to confront the problem of full-time availability as a flight-crucial
requirement. Autoland requires continuous availability for a brief
period of time, and there are other times when loss of electric power
would be awkward, but none of these are full-time situtations. Today's
airplanes are configured for a five-minute flight period following
power loss.
In addition to being intermittent, today's electric power is
"dirty", with substantial voltage excursions for brief periods and
smaller average excursions. Open circuits are common, and short
• circuits, although relatively rare, do occur. The nominal reaction to
a short circuited power link is that a circuit breaker will open,
usually the one that is intended to open, and more rarely one of the
breakers hierarchically superior to it. The voltages throughout the
system momentarily diminish or vanish, and in some cases require manual
intervention to be restored.
A flight-crucial active control system depends on electric
power that is effectively free from any interruption. Contemporary
practice is to specify every independent "subscriber" to incorporate
power conditioning equipment designed to co-exist with a standard power
quality (MIL-STD-704). This is effective to some degree, but not
wholly so. It is also expensive,•and it results in the extensive
generation of heat, which tends to increase component failure rates.
Two fundamental problems exist. One is to maintain and distri-
bute a raw supply of power, and the other is to defend it against
faults and damage. The first problem is largely solved by having
redundant generators, APUs, ram-air turbines, and emergency batteries.
It would be desirable to have more energy storage than there is at
present, but batteries are hazardous and present a maintenance nuisance.
For the foreseeable future, electric power will be derived much as it
is now, with the exceptions that mechanical constant-speed drives will
probably disappear, and that electronic switching will come into use
both for circuit protection and DC-AC conversions in both directions,
accepting variable-frequency power from alternators and furnishing
either DC or fixed frequency AC at fixed amplitudes to subscriber loads.
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The second problem, i.e. defense against faults and damage,
requires high-speed reactions to malfunctions. This is not so much a "
problem for open-circuit faults, because power can be taken from inde-
pendent sources and merged through passive devices. Short circuits,
however, present problems similar to the problems presented by hard-
over actuators, because the effects of these faults can propagate
throughout the system unless the system possesses the ability to
neutralize them. It is moreover not feasible to vote electric power
analogous to the way that actuators can be force-voted. Consequently,
some means is required to disconnect power from a subscriber. This
means must not be a part of the subscriber itself, in case a damage
event should simultaneously short circuit the subscriber's power and
incapacitate the disconnection element. Moreover, the entire power
system, from its source to its loads, needs protection, and trans-
mission links are vulnerable as well as the subscribers.
The design problem for power disconnect capability is further
compounded by the fact that the system is as much imperiled by erron-
eous disconnections as by short circuits. This threat ranges from a
malfunctioning power control subsystem computer, to a number of circuit
breakers accidently opened by a momentary surge caused by a lightning
strike, to a damaged breaker panel, to a faulty resource management
algorithm. Circuit breakers do not appear to solve the problem
effectively. Individual batteries are not practicable. Relays
located in regional distribution subsystems may be adequate, as long
as each subscriber receives power from at least two such distribution
subsystems, and some means exists for protecting the power system from
damage to the subsystems. In some sense the problem moves from the
subscribers to the distribution subsystems.
4.3 The Substation Approach
A number of contemporary developmental systems have experimented
in the use of computer control for electrical power distribution [6,7].
These systems have each used a number of remote subsystems that act as
electrical substations, receiving power from redundant main buses, and
switching subscriber loads by digital commands from a central control-
ler. Critical subscriber loads can be powered from more than one sub-
station, so that if one substation should fail passive, then each
affected load can be supplied from another substation. With the con-
trol switches located in the substations, the system is protected
against short circuits that take place in subscriber circuits, or in
ii0
the power leads between subscribers and substations. If control :
switches were to be located solely within subscriber circuits, the
power leads would not be protected. However, if the substation were
to be damaged so as to short circuit numerous power leads, the local
switches could protect subscribers against a consequent loss of power.
Similarly, if main buses are shorted at a substation, system survival
would depend on protective switches in the vicinity of the primary
power sources.
Thus the substation approach needs to be augmented by remote
control switches local to subscribers and power sources if it is to
provide coverage for all conceivable failure modes. The management of
such a system by computer control would be a moderately complex task,
comparable to that of managing a mesh data network.
The reliability of a substation-type system can be made quite
high, despite the fact that it is quite a bit more complex than a
conventional breaker system. The redundancy provided by multiple
power sources for critical subscribers is the principal reason. The
failure of individual remote switches can be moderately probable with-
out seriously affecting the system success probability. For example,
in a system of i00 subscribers, each of which receives power from two
substations, the power switches need only have MTBF's on the order of
i0,000 hours for the system to have a failure rate below 10-9 per hour.
4.4 Current Limiting
If most of the switches in a substation-type system were to be
replaced by current limiting devices, a great deal of complexity could
be saved with respect to the software needed to manage the system. It
would be necessary to incorporate only those switches needed to provide
normal power on and off to each subscriber. The attractive feature of
current limiters is their autonomous operation. They are, however,
unusual, complex, and/or expensive devices.
If a subscriber receives power from two or more sources through
current limiters, then if the subscriber becomes short circuited, it
will draw a limited amount of current, which will not overload the
remainder of the power distribution system. If one of the limiters
should be faulty and not limit properly, then one of the main buses
could become unusable. This kind of fault is latent in a system, and
a test would have to be devised to discover it. Otherwise, a full set
of current limiters might all possess the same kind of fault, in which
Iii
case all buses might be brought down.
Not surprisingly, current limiting is much easier to accomplish
for low currents than for high currents. A good example is an
electronic regulator circuit where the control variable is current
rather than voltage. A switching regulator can conveniently be made
to operate this way. It can have a so-called foldback characteristic,
if desired, where the current supply is cut off if the demand exceeds
a set level, and stays off until the demand is reset to zero. Alter-
natively, it can be designed to saturate at a set level. The efficiency
of switching regulators is likely to be on the order of eighty per cent.
This should be quite acceptable for modest size loads. Considering the
fact that these regulators can condition the power's quality well over
that of MIL-STD-704, it should be possible to save more than twenty
per cent by designing the subscriber power supplies to a more benign
input specification.
A second type of current limiter is based on A.C. saturable
reactor principles, and is shown schematically in Figure 4.4-1. The
series impedance windings at the left of the diagram are connected in
series with the load. They normally contribute a negligible impedance
to the circuit, because normally legs 2 and 3 are magnetically satu-
rated by flux from the D.C. bias winding. The shorted turn acts as a
low-pass filter on the flux in leg 1 to maintain this bias at a
constant level. The load current produces alternating fields in legs
2 and 3. An excessive current will produce fields large enough to
alternately cancel the bias fields in legs 2 and 3. When this happens,
the respective legs become unsaturated, and the impedance of the wind-
ings becomes high, placing an upper limit on the load current, assum-
ing constant source voltage. Figure 4.4-2 shows a typical voltage-
current characteristic for a series connection of a resistive load and
a current limiter with variable source voltage, V. I is the load
current.
The saturable reactor current limiter can be large and heavy.
It is made from transformer material, i.e. iron alloys and copper wire.
For a given power level, its size and weight are comparable to the
size and weight of a transformer for the same power level. As a rule
of thumb, 400 Hz transformers will weigh the order of one Kilogram,
and will occupy a volume the order of 15 cm3 (i0 in3) for every i00
watts of power transmitted. Higher frequencies would reduce these
penalties.
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Figure 4.4-1. Saturable-Reactor Current Limiter.
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4.5 Mesh Networks for Power
Networks are used on a continental scale for distributing
electrical power. It is natural, therefore, to seek a power analogy
to the mesh networks for data discussed in Chapter 3. Such an analogy
does exist, although there are some important differences between data
and power networking. The principal transmission concern in power net-
works is quantity, whereas in data networks it is quality. Thus data
is distributed over trees of connected links in order to avoid
problems that would result from multiplex arrivals with different
delays. Power transmission does not suffer from multiple arrivals, but
rather is helped if every available link can share the burden.
Prime power injected at numerous dispersed points in a regular
network is allowed to flow through every link from node to node to meet
load demands. A simplified example is shown in Figure 4.5-1. Assume
that prime power is injected at equal potential at each of the six
shaded nodes, and is consumed at an equal rate at every node. The
arrows indicate direction of current flow. Current flows out of the
shaded nodes on all three links. In twelve nodes current flows in on
all three links, and in the other eighteen it flows in on one link and
out on two.
Thus far, nothing has been said as to how the links are joined
inside a node. If they are simply connected together, then a single
short circuit will short the entire system. An open circuit, however,
would be tolerated by a redistribution of currents. To tolerate short
circuits and other overloads, the nodes are made capable of interrupt-
ing or limiting the current on each link separately. In this way, each
node defends itself against an overly greedy neighbor.
If switches were used to interrupt link current, they would be
controlled from within the node, based on sensed current flow, as
shown in Figure 4.5-2. The controller's job is to prevent excessive
_" outbound current. Current limiters can be used instead of switches,
as shown in Figure 4.5-3. No controller is necessary in this case,
although a switch in the subscriber's power port will be necessary.
The figure assumes bidirectional limiters, such as the saturable
reactor type, which requires alternating current. In this case, the
arrowsoin Figure 4.5-1 show power transfer rather than current.
Figure 4.5-4 shows one-way D.C. current limiters connected to
limit outbound current, but not inbound. This would apply to switching
regulator limiters. Unlike data networks, which use double links,
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Figure 4.5-1. Current Distribution in a Power Network.
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Figure 4.5-2. Switched Links.
Figure 4.5-3. Current-Limited
Links.
Figure 4.5-4. One-Way Current
Limiter Links.
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power networks would use single links.
The performance of current-limited networks in normal operation
as well as in case of short circuits is imperfect. There is voltage
loss from node to node, and power loss in the current limiters with
possible voltage drops from node to node. In normal operation, the
power loss is small in magnetic limiters, being only copper losses,
while it is substantial in electronic limiters due to junction drops.
In case of a short circuit, however, the electronic limiter is better
at containing additional power loss than the magnetic limiter.
As a numerical example, consider the 36-node power network
shown in Figure 4.5-1 using electronic limiters that are 80 per cent
efficient. Neighbor nodes of the power nodes have a 25 per cent over-
head on power they use, and their neighbors have a 56.25 per cent over-
head. Weighting these overheads by the numbers of nodes of each class
yields an average overhead of 31 per cent. Next, one can calculate the
power overhead using magnetic limiters the characteristics of which are
shown in Figure 4.4-2. The results are sensitive to loading parameters,
so several cases were calculated as shown in Table 4.5-1.
To elaborate on the same example, calculations were made for
faulty network cases. Table 4.5-2 shows overheads for a case where
prime power is withdrawn from one of the shaded nodes, and for four
different short circuit cases. The results from Table 4.5-1 are
repeated for comparison. The extreme power overheads for short circuits
are greatest where the normal overheads are least.
In the electronic limiter case, the overhead current for a
shorted node is three times the limit current increased by the normal
power overhead at the nodes supplying them. The limit current can be
set somewhat in excess of normal currents. In a typical case from the
preceding magnetic limiter exercise (case i), the nominal power
delivered from each power node is 50 watts, since it effectively powers
five other nodes. Each of three links from a power node carries 50/3
watts at 30 volts, or 5/9 ampere. Suppose the limit is set at 2
amperes. Then an extra six amperes, approximately, must be supplied
if a node shorts. If the nodes supplying the extra current have power
overhead percentages of 56.25, then the total overhead power is 6
amperes times 1.5625, or 9.375 amperes, times 30 volts, equaling 281
watts. The total nominal power is 350 watts, so the overhead percent-
age in this case is 80 per cent. This is about one forth of the over-
head for the magnetic limiter, and could be made lower still by reducing
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"- TABLE 4.5-1
POWER OVERHEADS WITH MAGNETIC LIMITER
CASE PRIME POWER POWER DELIVERED TO OVERHEAD
VOLTAGE, VOLTS EACH NODE, WATTS
1 30 10 0.85%
2 20 i0 1.95%
3 i0 i0 9.28%
4 30 5 0.42%
5 20 5 0.96%
6 i0 5 4.12%
TABLE 4.5-2
PERCENT OVERHEADS FOR VARIOUS MAGNETIC LIMITER CASES
CASE NORMAL OPEN SHORT SHORT SHORT TWO SHORT
OVERHEAD POWER POWER NEIGHBOR SECOND NODES, DIS-
NODE NODE NODE NEIGHBOR TANCE TWO
APART
1 0.85 1.24 314 330 325 540
2 1.95 2.90 184 192 190 -
3 9.28 15.71 - 85 84 -
4 0.42 0.61 624 658 647 1,077
5 0.96 1.40 358 379 374 620
6 4.12 6.32 140 152 148 243
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the value of the current limit.
In networks using magnetic limiters, the power loss results in _.
voltage drops from one node to the next. In the preceding examples,
the nominal voltage drops are on the order of a volt or less. _en one
node is shorted, some other nodes drop as low as half of the prime
voltage. With two nodes shorted, one node goes below one tenth of the
supply voltage. If conventional subscribers are to be used, the nodes
should contain voltage regulators.
Electronic limiters can be designed so as to incorporate voltage
regulation up to their current limit, thus avoiding large voltage
differences from node to node.
4.6 Power Distribution Summary
Much of this chapter has been devoted to discussions of rela-
tively new and untried power distribution techniques. Such techniques
are sought because of the intrinsic vulnerability of contemporary
techniques to momentary or substantial interruption. Aircraft designers
have a large job on their hands to design an electrical system for an
autoland-equipped airplane. The oUtlook for active control is that the
job will be a great deal more difficult.
Substation approaches will be helpful in this situation. A
great deal of initial research and development has been applied to such
systems, and the results should be available for incorporation into
next-generation airplanes.
Current limiting technology is barely in its infancy, and even
when developed will probably not be universally applicable. The advent
of electrical actuators will mean that some very heavy loads will have
to be handled, which may be beyond the scope of current limiting devices.
They are moreover apt to cause severe line transients.
Far-future aircraft systems may be able to benefit from systems
where moderate critical loads can be handled by substations or mesh
networks employing current limiter technology, while heavy loads are
handled by specialized dedicated power links with the appropriate
levels of redundancy. Much research remains to be done in this area,
however.
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CHAPTER 5
TECHNOLOGY ISSUES
Although component technology evolves rapidly in many respects,
system technology tends to evolve slowly, largely because systems bring
together many technologies which do not necessarily evolve in the same
direction. The advantages of multiplexing have been well-known for
decades, yet multiplexing is just beginning to be used in aircraft
systems. The reasons for not using it earlier include traditional
practices as well as technology issues. This chapter discusses several
important technology issues as they relate to contemporary and advanced
communication systems. Topics covered are:
Integrated circuits
Packaging
Transmission media
Lightning susceptibility
Software
Terminal design
The chapter concludes with a concept of a 1553-compatible network node.
5.1 Integrated Circuits
Except for discrete interfaces, digital channels require substan-
tial amounts of circuitry. Even a simplex serial channel requires
serial-parallel conversion at either end, timing circuits, and sequen-
tial control circuitry. More complicated channels, such as 1553 multi-
plex buses, require this and more. A typical 1553 interface requires
the order of a hundred medium-scale integrated (MSI) devices and
possibly some large-scale (LSI) bit slice devices. This may be a
tolerable Cost if the number of interfaces is few, but communications
for active-control airplanes will require many interfaces. A cost
incentive therefore exists to realize complex interfaces in very-large-
scale integrated circuits (VLSI) form. In commercial data processing,
a serial communication protocol called SDLC is used in very large
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quantities, which has justified the development of a VLSI circuit for
the interface. So far, however, aircraft data interface volume has not
been great enough to justify development of VLSI circuits comparable to
the SDLC circuit. It is reasonable to expect, though, that such
circuits will be available in a few years time.
Given an adequate market for VLSI interface circuits, some
questions emerge concerning environmental tolerance and reliability.
As to the first question, it has been generally true that LSI circuits
can be made to withstand military environments. There is no particular
reason to expect that VLSI can not also be made to do so. Also, by the
1990's, it is possible that new semiconductor materials, notably gallium
arsenide (GaAs) will be available in quantity for VLSI circuits. The
temperature range for GaAs devices is substantially greater than that
for silicon devices.
The second question, concerning reliability, has been the subject
of some debate in the past. The development of VLSI reduces the inter-
connection level, but it has been conjectured that this would be offset
by the fragility of the device itself. MIL HDBK 217C dated May 1980
gives the most recent data for calculating the reliability of LSI
devices. The handbook also contains reliability information on inter-
connections. It is an interest exercise to use this reference to look
at the effects of going to higher complexity microcircuits on relia-
bility. The equation for computing the reliability of LSI devices is:
_p = ZQ [CI_T_v + (C2 + C3) _E] _L
where:
Ap is the device failure rate in F/106 hours
WQ is the quality factor
ZT is the temperature acceleration factor, based on technology
_V is the voltage derating stress factor
HE is the application environment factor
C1 and C2 are device complexity failure rates based upon
gate count
C3 is the package complexity failure rate
_L is the device learning factor
It is assumed for purposes of comparison that there is an option
of doing a particular job with 50xl00-gate circuits or 5xl000-gate
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circuits or ix5000-gate circuit.
Table 5.1-1 gives the values for the constants to be used in
calculating the reliability of the various sized circuits.
In selecting the constants in Table 5.1-1 several assumptions
have been made. Quality level B parts and an air transport environment
have been assumed. It has also been assumed that the parts come from
an established line and process. A maximum junction temperature of
105°C for CMOS technology was selected as realistic. The number of
leads per package was set arbitrarily at 22 for 100 gates, 40 for 1000
gates and 64 for 5000 gates. The calculated failure rate for each of
the three devices is shown at the bottom of Table 5.1-1.
The failure rate for the semiconductor parts of the 3 versions
of realizing the function would be:
50x100 gate devices 50x.240 = 12.000 f/106h
5x1000 gate devices 5x.437 = 2.185
ix5000 gate devices ixl.140 = 1.140
This shows over a tenfold reduction in failure rate simply by
going to more complex LSI devices. If we chose to compare the 5000
gate LSI with a small scale integration SSI and medium scale integra-
tion MSI realization, the gain in reliability would be even more
dramatic. This is not the total story, because to make a fair _compari-
son between the reliability of different degrees of integration we must
also calculate in the reliability of interconnecting the 50-100-gate
packages and the 5x1000 - gate packages.
If we assume that a multilayer board is used to interconnect the
packages in the two less-integrated examples and that the number of
holes in the board is 1.5 times the total pins on the packages inter-
connected, we find that we have an additional failure rate for the 50
package case of 8.25 f/106 hours and for the 5 package case 1.5 f/106
hours.
In addition we must count the failure rates of the solder joints
between the package leads and the multilayer printed circuit card. If
we assume wave soldering this is .319 f/106 hours for the 50 package
version and .058 f/106 hours for the 5 package version.
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TABLE 5.1-1
RELIABILITY EQUATION PARAmeTERS
i00 GATES 1000 GATES 5000 GATES
_Q 1 1 1
C1 .011 .021 .053
_T 21 21 21
_V 1 1 1
C2 .0007 .001 .0017
C3 .008 .015 .025
_E 4 4 4
_L 1 1 1
1 .240 .437 1.140P
The total failure rates for the three realizations of the
function are:
50xi00 gate devices 12.000
50x1650 thru hole M_B 8.250
50xl100 solder joints .319
20.569 f/106 hr.
5x1000 gate devices 2.185
5x300 thru hole _B 1.500
5x200 solder joints .058
3.743 f/106 hr.
ix5000 gate device 1.140
1.140 f/106 hr.
The reliability benefits of going to higher levels of integration are
obvious.
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5.2 Packaging of Dispersed Electronics
There are substantial reasons for centralizing electronics in
aircraft and there are equally impressive reasons for decentralizing
electronics. The electronics packaging engineer looks upon centralized
electronics as a means of easing his burden. A central compartment can
easily be pressurized, cooling can be provided by a central system, the
location can be selected for low ambient vibration, interconnections
between subsystems are short, and power conditioning can be done more
efficiently. Centralization in turn can reduce equipment cost and
maintainance cost and can improve reliability. It can also ease
thermal, vibration, and moisture-related design problems. The Navy
has funded efforts for the past three years to develop a Standard
Aviation Module and the Navy is moving more toward centralization in
its Standard Electronics Module Program where modules are plugged into
large environmentally-controlled cabinets.
System designers, on the other hand, have determined that the
degree of reliability necessary for future flight-crucial systems
dictates that the electronics not be centralized. The electronics
must be distributed so that a damage event which does not render the
airframe unflyable, also does not cause the flight-crucial control
systems to fail. There is also a strong impetus to decentralize
electronics which can reduce the weight of wire in the airplane. It
therefore seems likely that there will be an increase in electronics
decentralization over the next few decades despite the packaging
engineers' abhorrence of this trend. It is likely that much of this
distribution can be done within the confines of multiple electronics
bays where many of the advantages of centralization can be maintained.
However, there are items such as sensors, effectors, and engine
controllers, from which it will become less and less desirable to bring
all the raw data to the bays. Also there is a trend toward replacing
hydraulic and mechanical controllers, sensors, and effectors, which
are by nature distributed, with electrical devices and electronics.
Fault-tolerant data communication systems will also add to the distri-
buted electronics because of the desirability of placing nodes with,
or near, the system's subscribers.
In view of the increasing pressures to decentralize the
electronics, it seems prudent to examine ways in which the penalties
of distributed electronics can be minimized. The most difficult
environmental factor in localized electronics is temperature.
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Electronics which does not see appreciable aerodynamic heating, nor
significant power dissipation in adjacent equipment, can regularly see
temperatures to -55°C and lower. On the other hand, heating from
engines, skin friction, and the sun can create temperatures at which
most electronics components cannot reliably function or cannot function
at all. In general, MOS devices are more temperature-sensitive than
TTL and are often only specified for 0 to 70°C operation. Fiber-optics
devices are also more limited in temperature capability than the
military (-55°C to 125°C) temperature range. In addition, failure
rates increase rapidly at higher temperatures, and failures are also
increased by highly variable temperatures which create mechanical
stresses and fatigue in electronic components and assemblies. Unfort-
unately there is no single solution to this problem. One must select
component technologies which have the best temperature capabilities.
This selection must take into consideration the widely different power
reouirements, and thus self heating, of different semiconductor
technologies. The packaging engineer must minimize thermal excursions
and high temperatures. This will undoubtedly mean some sort of active
thermal control in the form of cooling and/or heating, and may also
require thermal isolation for the electronics. Engine controllers may
be cooled by fuel if the fuel is cool enough itself. Thermoelectric
coolers can also be used as heaters by reversing the current flow, and
they would be an excellent solution to the environment modification
problem if they did not suffer from reduced reliability themselves at
higher temperatures. Other possibilities include the use of condi-
tioned air or the use of air ducted in locally from the outside. One
might also consider liquid flow systems including the hydraulic system
with appropriate heat exchangers or refrigerators as a means of cooling.
Vibration is an easier environment to modify than temperature.
Standard approaches should work well. The solution is to mount the
electronics package so that the vibration of the surface on which it is
mounted is not transmitted through to it. This works well for high
frequencies, but loses effectiveness below 100 Hz. Low frequency
vibrations are not a problem if the electronics package is designed so
there are no resonances below 100 Hz.
Electronics replacement can be facilitated by providing the same
plug-in features found in rack-mounted equipment. Essentially, the act
of placing the equipment and engaging the holddown also engages the
connector or connectors. To achieve this requires all signal and power
wiring and all fiber optics to be terminated to a connector or
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connectors which are in turn mounted to the equipment mounting bracket.
" Although this places an additional burden on the wiring installation,
it will not only ease equipment replacement, it will reduce harness-
wire and fiber-optic breakage. The shock mounts can support the
bracket, and thus the electronics, or they can be placed between the
electronics and bracket, in which case the connectors must be allowed
to float relative to the bracket.
Equipment placed outside the pressurized envelope will require
an environmental seal and must utilize connectors which are environ-
mentally sealed.
In summary, distributed electronics should be in an environ-
mentally sealed package and be mounted on vibration isolators in such
a way that all electrical and optical connections are made in the
mounting operation. In addition, the package should be provided with
a means of thermal control which will keep components in a temperature
range which will not unduly accelerate their failure.
Communication network node packaging can be broken into two
general problems. Nodes which are associated with electronics in
• environmentally controlled bays will benefit from the thermal control
and mechanical isolation that are provided for the electronics. Nodes
which are associated with remote sensors or effectors will be provided
with their own packaging and must survive in the harsher thermal and
mechanical environments of these locations.
In the first case, there is a possible problem with embedding a
node directly in an electronics box. If the box is removed for any
reason, the node is also removed from the network, which puts neighbor-
ing nodes in greater jeopardy of being isolated in the same way that a
failed node would. In military aircraft which change equipment for
different missions, this would be a problem. The solution is to make
the nodes a part of the equipment rack as shown in Figure 5.2-ia
rather than a part of the boxes which plug into the rack. Commercial
passenger aircraft might upgrade equipment during the life of the air-
frame, but these changes take place only occasionally. It is therefore
assumed that the node will be an integral part of the electronics with
which it is associated as shown in Figure 5.2-ib.
When a node is associated with a remote sensor or effector, a
different hack must be taken, particularly if the MTBF of the item with
which it is associated is on the order of, or longer than, the MTBF of
the node. Ease of maintainance requires that the node be separately
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Figure 5.2-1. Rack Mounted Equipment.
128
removable. This can be accomplished by having the node attach and plug
into the sensor or effector as shown in Figure 5.2-2b. If this makes
the node inaccessible, or if it causes the node environment to be too
harsh, the node could be mounted to the airframe near the item which
it services, as shown in Figure 5.2-2c.
In order to consider what the node packaging might consist of,
it is necessary to have some idea of what the node will consist. For
purposes of discussion it is assumed that the node will contain between
five and twenty silicon circuits, and that the total lead count for
these circuits will be between i00 to 400 leads. In addition to the
silicon circuits, there may be a small number of components associated
with decoupling, line termination, lightning protection, and auxiliary
power. It is estimated that there may be five to twenty of these
components with a total lead count of ten to forty.
A network node must be associated with at least three links, and
it is doubtful that it would be connected to mo_e than four. Each link
contains a sending and receiving line, and therefore a node would have
to have connectors for six to eight twisted pairs or six to eight fiber
optic lines. The node must be powered, probably via a power network
dedicated to the communication system. This network will likely use
its own return lines (twisted pair) and therefore there will be six to
eight connector pins devoted to node power connections. There will
also be two or more connector pins devoted to sensor or effector inputs
to the node. The node power is estimated not to exceed five watts and
probably will be much less.
Figure 5.2-3 shows schematically the contents of a node. The
sense which this figure portrays is that a substantial number of con-
nections are required for a small volume of electronics.
Packaging trends are toward the use of chip carriers and hybrid
circuits. Table 5.2-1 shows the advantages, spacewise, of these
approaches over older packaging techniques.
Chip carriers are receiving impetus from many fronts. There are
JEDEC standards for several varieties of carriers. Texas Instruments
has started to sell standard products in chip carriers, and although
the price is now 8 times that of a comparable DIP-product price, TI
projects that the price will be comparable by 1985.
Chip carriers are typically interconnected using planar wiring
structures made from epoxy glass, polyimide, alumina, and so forth.
The truly leadless chip carrier must have a substrate which closely
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5 - 20 Microcircuits
5 - 20 Components for:
Decoupling
Line Termination
Lighting Protection
Power Continuity
Power: 5 Watts Maximum
6-8 Twisted 3-4 Power 2 or More
Pairs or Lines and Sensor
Fiber Optic Associated Leads
Lines Grounds
Figure 5.2-3.Node Contents.
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matches the thermal coefficient Of expansion of the wiring structure
if they are to operate over a large temperature range. If they do not
match, the solder joints between the carrier and wiring structure
fatigues and cracks. The hermetic chip carriers are made with bodies
of alumina, and this implies an alumina wiring board.
TABLE 5.2-1
PACKAGE DENSITITES
Page Type (16 Leads) Number of Packages That Can Be
Interconnected By 6 CM2 or 1 IN2
Of Multilayer Board
Dual In-Line Package (DIP) 2-3
Flatpacks 4-5
Chip Carrier 9-11
There are at least two efforts underway which may change this
picture. One involves a leaded chip carrier which will provide stress
relief and thereby allow alumina chip carriers to be reliably mounted
to other than alumina wiring boards. The other involves the develop-
ment of a chip carrier ceramic material with a higher expansion
coefficient than alumina to more closely match epoxy glass. Even if
these developments are successful, it still may be desirable to use an
alumina wiring board to minimize the thermal drops between the semi-
conductor junctions and the node case.
Hybrid circuit technology is often thought of as an alternative
where space is at a great premium. However, it is also frequently used
to produce standard modules which cannot be made on a single silicon
chip. Hybrids have even become popular for automotive applications
when long life under severe environment is required. By 1990 it is
likely that it will be practical to tool for production quantities of
nodehybrid circuits which will beprice-competitive with ,lodesmade
using chip carriers.
If a node is made using chip carrier technology, the electronics
assembly will be from 10 to 40 CM2, or 1.5 to 6 IN2 by about 0.5 CM, or
0.2 IN thick. If it is made using hybrid circuit technology it would
fit in a flatpack from 3 to i0 CM2, or .5 to 1.5 IN2, by 0.25 CM or
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0.i IN thick. In either case the size of the electronics is small. If
it is integrated into an electronics assembly it will fit into a single
module, or perhaps onto a portion of a module. If it is made as a
separate unit, it will be a simple small box, with a single connector,
and will either be held in place by fasteners or a quick release lock-
ing mechanism.
It is anticipated that such a small package can be made rugged
enough so as not to require mechanical isolation. Furthermore it is
small enough so that heat sinking can reduce the electronics tempera-
ture rise to a minimum, and thereby permit reliable operation without
active cooling.
Active cooling in the form of thermoelectric devices may be
considered, but is apt to be rejected for several reasons. The devices
are expensive. Their reliability is a strong function of heat sink
temperature, decreasing with increasing temperature. Lastly, it is
felt that all nodes can be placed so that their ambient temperatures
will fall within the range of "55°C to 71°C and that the semiconductor
junctions can be maintained below I05°C, which will provide for highly
reliable operation.
5.3 Transmission Media
There are many types of transmission media which may be appli-
cable to designing communication links. These include the following:
Electrically conductive types:
Single wire with common ground
_isted pair
Twisted shielded pair
Twisted double shielded pair
Shielded balanced pair (4 conductors)
Planar parallel
Microstrip
Stripline
Coaxial
Triaxial
Twin-axial
Free space - for radio through optical frequencies
Radio frequency wave guides
Optical wave guides
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In selecting the appropriate transmission medium for the network
links the following characteristics are important:
Signal Transfer Properties
The communication links must be capable of transmitting
digital signals over distances of a few hundred feet at
up to a ten-megabit rate.
EMI Properties
The communication links must provide adequate rejection
for all spurious signals. These include noise from
electrical generating equipment, radios, radars, relays,
and lightning.
Environmental Properties
The links must provide an adequate service life under
diverse environments which may be as benign as a
controlled-temperature equipment bay, or as difficult
as an engine controller.
Reliability
The reliability of the link as a whole (including the
link driver and receiver) must be adequately high. In
many cases the drivers, receivers and connector pins
will have a shorter MTBF than the transmission medium,
and therefore will strongly influence any decision to
use the medium.
Cost
Cost includes the initial cost of the medium, its
installation and maintainence, and the cost of all
necessary interface electronics and connectors.
Size and Weight
Deltas in the size and weight are directly translat-
able into a delta cost of operation for a given
aircraft.
Some of the transmission choices can be quickly disposed of.
Since line-of-sight optical transmissions are impractical in the
complex aircraft structure this is certainly not a practical system.
Radio transmissions inside or outside the aircraft would also be
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highly perturbed by the aircraft structure, and are not practical for
this reason and several others.* The use of RF wave guides is
impractical from weight and cost considerations. Thus we are left
with the electrically conductive transmission lines and with optical
wave guides.
5.3.1 Conductive Media
A study by SCI Electronics, Inc., of transmission systems for
the space shuttle, covered many of the pertinent points in selecting
from among the electrically conductive types of transmission media.
The use of a single wire with a common ground and unshielded
twisted pair would be entirely unsatisfactory from an EMI point of view,
and will not be considered further. The parallel conductor techniques
such as planar parallel, microstrip, and stripline offer particular
advantages when many lines are required from one point to another,
which is not the case in the communications network. If such conduct-
ors were considered seriously for an aircraft environment, the strip-
line would provide the most EMI protection, but then it is also the
most expensive and difficult to terminate of these parallel conductor
techniques.
The SCI report gives information on various tests of twisted
shielded pair, twin axial, co-axial, triaxial, and shielded balanced
pair. In their characterization of electromagnetic interference, three
types were considered: Low-frequency steady-state field generated by
AC power alternators, high-frequency steady-state fields generated by
communication equipment or radar, and impulsive noise caused by relays,
spark ignitors, and the like. No comments were made on the effects of
lightning, which is covered separately in this report. Because of the
large number of relays in the space shuttle, an unsuppressed relay was
selected as a noise source in making a comparison of RG-II0 coaxial,
TRC-75-2 (triaxial), twisted shielded pair #22 AWG, and TWX-124-2 (twin-
axial). This listing is in order of increasing immunity to EMI effects
from a relay with the addition of a 2 MHz filter. The noise on the
twisted pair was reduced four-fold. The recommendations from this
series of tests were:
A balanced transmission line and receivers be used
Radio transmission is considered a viable medium for entertainment
multiplex.
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That the cable be grounded as near receiver ground
as possible
Low-pass filtering should be employed at the receiver.
EMI rejection at low frequencies was shown to be best with
twin axial, next best with twisted shielded pair and worst with coaxial.
The conclusion drawn from this extensive test program is that
the use of "rather inexpensive and light weight twisted shielded pair
#22 appears adequate for EMI considerations ..." For the fault-
tolerant communication network it may be necessary to use extra shield-
ing or to use the more expensive and heavier twin axial cable consist-
ing of two twisted pair conductors and two dielectric spacerswith an
overall shield.
Environmental considerations for a conductive transmission
medium fall mainly into three areas:
i. The ability of the materials to physically survive the
temperature rangeto which they willbe subjected.
2. The change in transmission characteristics with
temperature.
3. The ability of the medium to withstand the mechanical
stresses which cause abrasion and cold flow.
The'high temperature limit for service of copper and silver
plated copper i_ 1200C, while tin plated copper is good to 150°C. The
mechanical and physical properties of insulating materials are shown
in Table 5.3-1. The chemical properties of insulating materials are
shown in Table 5.3-2, and the electrical properties of insulating
materials are shown in Table 5.3-3. Several of these materials are
reasonable candidates for insulation in the communication network link
conductors. The SCI Systems report indicates that changes in attenua-
tion arise mostly from changes in the conductor resistivity. Changes
in phase shift and impedance at high frequencies are proportional to
changes in the square root of the dielectric constant. For example,
the dielectric constant of Kapton changes from 3.5 at 25°C to 3.0 at
200°C which would cause a 9% change in phase shift and impedance. It
is not anticipated that changes of this order will causeproblems.
The selection of an insulating medium for communication link
conductors becomes a matter of determining the minimum cost material
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TABLE 5.3-1
MECHANCIAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF INSULATING MATERIALS
_N TENSILE ELONGA- SPECIFIC- ABRASION CUT- q_b_ERA-
INSULATION DESIGNA- STRENGTH, TION, GRAVITY RESIST. THROUGH TORE
TION PSI % RESIST. RESISTANCE
(  CHAN-
ICAL)
POLYVINYL
CHLORIDE PVC 2,400 260 1.2-1.5 POOR POOR FAIR
PaLYTETRA-
FLUORO-
ETHYLENE TEE 3,000 150 2.15 FAIR FAIR EX_
FLUORINATED
ETHYIZNE FEP 3,000 150 2.15 POOR POOR EX_
MC_OCHLORO-
TRIFLUORO-
KEL-F°+ 5,000 120 2.13 GOOD GOOD G00D
POLYVINYL-
IDINE
FLUORIDE KYNAR* 7,i00 300 i.76 GOCD GOOD FAIR
POL_
FILM Kapton** 18,000 707 i.42 EXCEL. EXCEL. GOOD
POLYS_ - i0,000 50-100 1.24 GOOD GOOD GOOD
POLYIMIDE-
COATEDTFE TFE/ML** 3,000 150 2.2 GOOD GOOD GOOD
PaLYLMIDE-
COA_ZDFEP FEP/ML** 3,000 150 2.2 GOOD GOOD GOCD
*Trademark,PennsaltChemicalsCorp.
**Trademark,E.I. du Pontde Nemours& CO.
+Trademark,3M CO.
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TABLE 5.3-2
CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF INSULATION MATERIALS
PROPERTY
INSUIATION CC_V_3N FLUID FL_,SIA- RADIATION qF_I4PER-_TS
DESIGNATION RESISTs- BILITY RESIS_IANCE,A_I/RE
ANCE RADS RESIS-
GAMMA TANCE
EXPOSURE
POLYVINYL PVC GOOD SI_ TO 106 - i0- -55-105
CHIORIEE self-
exting-
uishing
POLYTETRA- TEE EXCEL. NON- 106 -80-260
FI/JORO- FLAM-
ETHYIXNE MABLE
FLUORINATED FEP EXCEL. NON- 106 -80-200_
FLAM-.
PROPYIZNE _I%BLE
M3NOCHIDRO- KeI-F GOOD NON- 106 -80-200 FLUIDS_END
TRIFI/X)RO- FIAM- TO PERMEA_
E_4YIENE _IABLE @ HI q_MP.
POLYAMIDE _ EXCEL. NON- 109 -80-260
FII/4 FLAM-
_9_BLE
POLYS_ PoLYs_ FAIR SELF- -- -65-150 SOI//BIEIN
EXTIN- CHLORIN_ED
GUISHING HYDRCC_ARBON
IKILYIMIDE- TFE/ML EXCEL. NC_- 106 -80-260
C_ TEE FLAM:-
MABLE
_LYIMIDE- FEP/ML _CEL. NON- 106 -80-260
COA_DFEP FIAM-
_,I%BLE
m
138
TABLE _. 3-3
ELECTRICAL PROPERTIES OF INSULATION MATERIALS
PROPERTY
INSLKA.TION_ DIELECTRIC DIELECTRIC LOSS VOI/3ME
DESI(I_ATICNSTRENGTH, CONSTANT, FACTOR, RESISTIVITY,
VOLTS/MIL 103 Hz 103 Hz O?E4-(IM
POLYVINYL 1014CHI/)RIDE FVC 400 5"7 0.02 2 x
POLYTETRA-
FIJJORO- 1018ETHYIZNE TFE 480 2.1 0.0003
FLUORINATED
ETHYLENE 1018PROPYLENE FEP 500 2.1 0.0003
MONOCHI_RO-
TRIFLLDRO- 1016ETHYLENE KeI-F 431 2.45 0.025 2.5 x
POLYVINYLIDINE 1014FLUORIDE Kynar 1,380 7.7 0.02 2 x(8mils)
POLYIMIDE 1018FILM Kapton 5,400 3.5 0.003
(2mils)
POLY_ - 425 3.13 0.0011 5 x 1016
POLYIMIDE- 1018COATEDTFE _E/ML 480 2.2 0.0003
POLYIMIDE- 1018COATEDFEP FEP/ML 480 2.2 0.0003
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which is adequate for the job. The development of new insulations, and
variations and combinations of old ones continues, and it is a certainty
that a listing of wire insulations in the year 1990 or 2000 will incor-
porate new members worthy of consideration. The fact remains that
there are adequate insulations available now to do the job.
5.3.2 Optical Media
Fiber optics is an emerging technology which offers significant
advantages over metal conductors, especially when applied to telecom-
munication systems.
If one considers the application of fiber optics to the fault-
tolerant fully embedded avionic system for the 1990 to 2000 time frame,
the advantages are not as clearly defined as for telecommunications.
This results from the nature of the application and the constraints
imposed by the environment. New components could greatly modify this
picture by 1990, however.
Fiber optics has gained acceptance because of its ability to
transmit information along a glass fiber over long distances with
little attenuation. Cable losses of less than 1 dB/km have been
reported with new records for long distance transmission being
announced virtually daily. The low attenuation figure means that
information can be transmitted using far fewer repeaters than are
presently required by copper cables. In communication, the trend has
been toward very fine single fibers to minimize dispersion.
Wide bandwidth is another important advantage of fiber optics.
Bandwidth up to one gigahertz is possible with 50 to 3000 megahertz
being a more common range. Injection laser emitters and avalanche
photo diode detectors are usually employed to achieve these high band-
widths. Laser emitters provide a high optical power output, a fast
response time (typically less than 1 nsec) and a spectral width less
than 1 nanometer. Their high optical power output allows transmission
of a signal through a long fiber. A narrow spectral width reduces
pulse spreading.
Light-emitting diodes (LED's) which are also commonly used as
emitters, have lower optical power output, a slower response time
(typically 20 to 30 nsec) and a spectral width of about 50 nm. LEDs
can operate with a maximum bandwidth of about 20 megahertz.
Another important advantage of fiber optics is its immunity to
electromagnetic interference (EMI), electromagnetic pulses (EMP), and
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lightning. The fiber optics cable is immune to these radiation sources
and does not radiate to other fibers or to copper wire in the area.
Therefore there will be no crosstalk between adjacent fibers or cables.
These same characteristics also make it difficult to tap the line, and
therefore fiber optics provides better security than wire cables.
Telecommunication fiber optics with its small fibers (in the
order of 100 um dia.) and high bandwidth also provides low cost and
weight. A small fiber optics cable can replace a large copper wire
cable. The lower cable weight and size makes it easier to handle. It
also costs less based on its data handling capability.
A fault-tolerant embedded avionic system will have different
requirements for the application of fiber optics from those of the
communication industry. These requirement changes are imposed by the
environmental constraints and differences in the application. In
remote sections of the aircraft, temperatures can extend from -55 to
100°C and can cycle between the extremes during normal operation.
Atmospheric pressure and humidity vary over significant ranges.
Mechanical stress can be imposed on the cables by shock and vibration
, when located near the engines, auxiliary power unit, landing gear,
etc., as well as during installation. A fully embedded avionics com-
munication system has design constraints imposed by branching and
routing the cable through the structure, requirements for many con-
nectors, and constraints imposed by maintenance procedures.
For a long telecommunication line, attenuation is of extreme
importance because it affects the number of repeaters that will be
required to span a given distance. In the aircraft environment, the
longest data transmission lines will be typically 30 meters with a
maximum of i00 meters. With a line of i00 meters, line attenuation is
not particularly important. However, coupling efficiencies to the
detectors, emitters and multiple connectors are still important. In-
stead of a very small single mode fiber that would be ideal for land-
based communication, an avionic application may be better served by a
multifiber cable with a large numerical aperture. The multifiber
produces redundancy, so that one broken fiber has little effect on
transmission, and the large numerical aperture.increases the coupling
efficiency.
The problem of fiber termination on board an aircraft must be
solved. The fiber is usually terminated by mounting its end in a
fixture and polishing it to a fine surface finish. There are also
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techniques to scribe and break single fibers with special tools. The
connector attenuation is strongly affected by the technique used. In
addition, when connectors are disconnected, their ends must be protect-
ed from dirt and scratches. Since dirt, scratches and misalignment
can increase connector attenuation, point-to-point attenuation checks
may be required to assure that a fiber optics link has retained
sufficient margin to operate over temperature.
It is important that the reliability of the communication links
in an avionic system be high both for safety and for minimizing main-
tenance costs. The avionic thermal environment has a great effect on
fiber optic emitters and detectors. Even though lasers have high
optical power output, very small beam width dispersion and very high
response time, they areextremely temperature-dependent and have short
life times. Development is going on to increase life times and to
decrease temperature dependence.
Light emitting diodes, LED's, are the next best thing, but they
still have a limited temperature range of about 0 to 70°C which is not
adequate for all applications in all sec%ions of the aircraft.
LED's also exhibit a few basic properties that could be a
problem to a high reliability system. One is that the optical output
of an LED decreases with increasing temperature. As one drives the LED
harder it is possible to have little optical power increase due to the
increase of temperature caused by increased dissipation. Second, high
temperatures decrease the life of the LED. Third, LED light output
decreases with time. For a fault-tolerant avionic system this means
that a pre-flight margin check on emitter light output may be required
to determine whether a link will operate over temperature or if the
link has technically failed.
Avalanche photodiode detectors are almost as bad as lasers, as
regards temperature effects. At the present time the PIN diode
matches the LED in performance and has a 0 to 70°C temperature range.
The LED/PIN combination seems to be the best match. With these
devices a bandwidth up to about 20 megahertz is possible. New develop-
ments will likely improve this temperature range.
Fiber optic cables are not completely immune from the aircraft
environment. Some reports indicate that fiber attenuation does change
under temperature and that stress corrosion, which is the propagation
of micro-cracks in glass, can result in failures.
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A recent development in fiber optics is the transmission of
power optically. This technique is presently being proposed for
control systems in hazardous environments and is also being tested for
lower power applications. Power efficiencies of 33.4% using GaAs
diodes receiving 820 nm wavelength have been measured by Sandia Labora-
tories. This techniques could help solve the E_ and lightning problem
in aircraft by providing electrical isolation in the power lines.
Fiber optics can be designed to survive lightning and EMP. In
addition, fiber optics provides data lines that are electrically
decoupled from other subsystems. With a properly designed power dis-
tribution network, i.e. one that also provides D.C. electrical isola-
tion, the subsystem can be completely electrically isolated from other
systems. Without a current path through the subsystem box, the
lightning current can be constrained to the outer surface of the air-
craft. This single feature could be the impetus that propels the use
of fiber optics in aircraft in the 1990 to 2000 time frame. A necessary
prerequisite will be optical component improvements which will make
their use in the aircraft environment practical.
5.4 Lightning Effects and Countermeasures
Material in this section concerning lightning effects was
derived primarily from Reference 9. It is instructive to quote some
of the preface of this reference as an introduction to the subject.
"The impetus for writing this ... springs from two sources
the increased use of nonmetallic materials in the structure of aircraft
and the constant control and navigation functions. Nonmetallic
structures are inherently more likely to be damaged by a lightning
strike than are metallic structures. Nonmetallic structures also
provide less shielding against the intense electromagnetic fields of
lightning than do metallic structures. These fields have demonstrated
an ability to damage or cause upset of electronic equipment."
"The persons who can best use aircraft protection from lightning
are the aircraft designers and operators, but generally they are not
among those who produced this information. Moreover they are often
unaware of its existence, and they seldom havethe background to
distill from it the important factsthat should be applied to achieve
safer designs."
"Even though much has now been learned about lightning effects
on aircraft and how to design protection, there are still some lightning
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effects which are not fully understood. Examples of these are (i) the
mechanism by which lightning currents diffuse into interior structural
members and conducting parts together with the extent to which this
happens and (2) the effects of electromagnetic radiation from the
lightning arc upon aircraft electrical and electronic systems."
Lightning strikes commercial transport aircraft on the average
of once every 3000 hours. The damage caused ranges from none to
serious. In addition to structural damage, lightning can be disruptive
to the power system and to electronics either by causing an intermit-
tent malfunction or by causing permanent damage.
It is possible for lightning to couple directly into the plane's
electrical system by striking through a non-conductive structure or by
striking navigation lights. More often indirect effects are caused by
voltages induced on wiring through electromagnetic field changes inside
the plane and resistive voltage drops in the structure. A record of
214 strikes between 1971 and 1974 reported by a group of U.S. Airlines
shows that malfunctions occurred in the electronics 20% of the time and
half of these malfunctions were permanent in nature.
A communications network which reaches the total avionics
complement is obviously a candidate for similar malfunctions, unless
adequate measures are taken in the design of the network. A lightning
stroke can last a significant part of a second, so it is important to
minimize, if not eliminate, transient malfunctions. Indeed, this may
prove to be more important than permanent damage to a small portion of
the network. _ A diagrammatic representation of a lightning model is
shown in Figure 5.4-i. This shows that the highest rate of change of
current occurs during the first two microseconds of the primary and
return strokes. This raises the prospect that•transient malfunctions,i
which occur over only a short interval of the most severe strokes, may
be handled by the system without adverse effects to the aircraft.
Transients are considered to be produced by three types of
coupling to the interior of the airframe. First is the IR drop
associated with the huge currents passing along the airframe. Second
are•magnetic fields drawn through•apertures and through the skin, which
is not a complete magnetic shield, and third are electric fields which
enter entirely through apertures because the conductive skin provides
excellent shielding against electric fields. The degree to which
these effects occur varies greatly with location in the aircraft. The
use of composites, which is expected to increase, will aggravate this
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Figure 5.4-i. (From Ref. 9).
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coupling problem.
Considerable shielding advantage can be gained by preferential
routing of electrical conductors. In general, they should be laid as
close as possible to continuously conducting skin or structure. They
should avoid areas of small skin radii such as the leading edge of a
wing. Routing in conduits is only beneficial if the conduits are
continuously conducting, well grounded to structure and have all access
holes conductively covered.
Because the airframe does not provide adequate shielding for
lightning effects, it is necessary that the transmission system in a
network contain supplemental shielding which will provide adequate
protection. The primary (outside) cable shield should be highly
conductive, be grounded at least at both ends, and have a minimum of
holes and discontinuities. A solid shield is best. Tape wound shields
are not recommended. A woven shield has enough small holes to allow
significant coupling. However, it has been found that double layer
woven shield can approach a solid shield in quality.
It is very important that the outer shield be continuous through
the connector. The conductive connector shell should electrically
contact the shield around its total circumference. It may be desirable
to use an inner shield to provide even more protection. The intuitive
reaction of many designers would be to ground this shield only at one
end for best control of low frequency, low level interference. Some
experiments have shown that in many cases it is better to ground both
ends of the inner shield too for best protection from lightning.
Until more definitive experimental work is done for an actual
application, the conservative approach would be to use double-shielded
transmission line. In some high interference locations, the outer
shield should be a double layer of braid. Extreme care should be taken
in the design and execution of the shield terminations to minimize
leakage apertures. _ether the inner conductor should be grounded at
one or both ends will depend upon the length of the cable, location in
the ground plane, other noise sources, and the details of the terminat-
ing circuitry for the conductor being protected.
Magnetically induced voltages may appear between wires of a two
wire circuit, or between either wire and the airframe. The former
voltages are referred to as line-to-line voltages and the latter as
common-mode voltages.
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The noise produced by lightning has a broad frequency spectrum.
The energy collected by a receptor increases with increasing pass band.
Unfortunately, digital circuits are by nature broad band, and therefore
other techniques than limiting bandwidth must be used to minimize noise
effects.
In designing a network signal link several things can be done
to minimize transient and permanent damage. First, the structure
should not be used as a ground path as shown in Figure 5.4-2a. Second
the use of twisted-pair transmission line, Figure 5.4-2b,does not pre-
clude the appearance of common mode voltages unless differential
transmission and reception devices are utilized as shown in Figure
5.4-2c. The use of resistors in series with semiconductor junctions,
Figure 5.4-2d, will greatly increase the chances of transistor survival
during transients. Transmission through balanced transmisson lines
and transformers coupled with transistor input protection, Figure
5.4-2e, provides even more protection.
Certainly the power lines which power the nodes must also
receive attention to minimize the noise they carry into the receiving
and transmitting electronics of the node. The use of shielded twisted
pair for power will offer the same advantages as for signal.
An assessment of the probability of lightning causing damaging
transients in an actual application using the foregoing design princi-
ples must be made to determine the desirability of using transient
protection devices. There are two basic types of transient protective
devices capable of protecting against lightning produced transients.
The first type is represented by Zener diodes and varistors, which by
virtue of their non-linear current to voltage relation will shunt
currents produced by overvoltages. Spark gaps, the second type,
switch to a highly conductive state upon the application of an over-
voltage and will not shut off until the voltage falls to a low level,
which may require the removal of normal 3ine voltage, depending on its
level, to occur.
Direct lightning damage to wiring and avionics has occurred in
numerous instances. Externally mounted hardware which offers a point
of entry for lightning includes navigation lights, antennas, windshield
heaters, and pitot tube heaters. One incident to a general aviation
aircraft will serve to indicate the degree of damage which can be
caused by such a strike. Lightning struck a navigation light which was
mounted on a fiber-glass wing tip and which was not adequately grounded
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to conductive structure. The lightning vaporized the housing ground
wire and shattered the lamp globe and bulb which allowed it to enter
the power wires. The resulting damage included all the navigation
light switches and all the lights, several instrument lights, two fuel
tank quantity indicators, and a VHF communication set. Also 75% of the
circuit breakers popped and only half of them could be reset.
Adequate grounding measures and inclusion of conductors in
otherwise non-conductive structure can greatly lessen the change of
this sort of damage. However, the consequences of lightning directly
entering the power wiring of an active-control aircraft are potentially
so serious that measures must be taken to limit the possible damage
caused by such an event. This might be done by isolating the power for
the communication system from power lines-which are vulnerable to
direct effects and/or by adding over-voltage protective devices to the
communication network power lines.
5.5 Sof_4are
In all forms other than the dedicated link form of data communi-
cation, the medium is multiplexed. This means that it is shared among
functional and structural components of the system. System controllers
are almost always digital computers, and subscribers and nodes often
have embedded computation elements. The sharing of the medium is there-
fore largely software-dependent. If the software fails, the entire
medium, and hence the airplane system, can fail. Good software engine-
ering practice is therefore necessary.
The software relating to node control is special, in that it is
actually a form of firmware. The normal task to be accomplished is
relatively simple and testable. The code is brief, and it cycles
continuously in the node. It is hence reasonable to expect that the
node control software will be made correct for normal operation. The
problem is with respect to error recovery. Even though most failure
modes can be covered rather easily, it will always be difficult Or
impossible to prove that node software is correct in response to errors,
since the variety of sequential errors due to probable faults will most
likely be too large to enumerate.
In order to meet the safety requirements for active control, the
coverage of faults must be high enough so that the product of a fault's
probability times its non-coverage probability is small enough to be
negligible. High coverage can be provided by arming the system with
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vthe capability of intervening in cases where one or more nodes mis-
behave. In mesh networks, nodes can be isolated from misbehaving
neighbors. In addition, gateman circuits can be designed to reset and
restart the computer in a node. In multiplex buses, watchdog timers
and subscriber power control may be used for software fault defense as
well as hardware fault defense.
5.6 Terminal Redundancy Design
The word "terminal" is used here to denote any node or
subscriber that interacts with the data communication medium. In a
system with redundant sensors, redundant effectors, and redundant con-
trollers, the nature of the communications among these elements largely
determines the system's ability to tolerate faulty elements. Systems
that are organized into separate strings have the simplest communica_
tion structures, but have the drawback that a single element failure
can render a quarter, a third, or half of the total equipment useless.
Systems that are more integrated than string systems require
communications that allow more general associations among elements.
Sensors will be able to be interrogated by redundant controllers,
effectors will be able to be commanded by redundant controllers, and
any controller may be called upon to read the sensors and command the
effectors. The impact on communications is to require many or all 4
terminals to be multiported. This is not as simple as joining wires,
because a short circuit at one terminal could kill the signal for all
of its destinations. It is standard practice, therefore, to use a
separate buffer for each port.
Multiport sensors are easily arranged for analog and broadcast
digital transmission. For command-response protocols, however, the
complete interface must be replicated in order to allow independent
access. Multiport effectors are more difficult. The terminal must
decide which port, or what aggregation of signals, to follow; and
provision has to be made for reconfiguration and testing. Mesh net-
works simplify sensor and effector interfaces by using multiport nodes.
Multiport controllers have no difficulty as far as design is
concerned, but the number of interface circuits can be greatly inflated
if the communications are all dedicated on a per-signal basis. The
situation is somewhat better when broadcast buses or dedicated per box
links are used, but the number of ports will still be in the hundreds.
With multiplex buses, the controllers interface with each redundant
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copy of the bus, which make them equivalent to sensors and effectors
in this regard. With mesh networks, the controller can have an arbi-
trary number of ports.
5.7 A 1553-Compatible Network Node
The 1553 multiplex bus standard has no provision for network
forms, and a mesh network would not be able to meet the standard. It
is possible, however, to design a network that interfaces with standard
1553 remote terminal equipped subscribers. The concept of a node for
such a network is shown in Figure 5.7-1. As explained in Chapter 3,
the signals between nodes would be in a pulse code form derived from
the Manchester biphase code. The reason for using pulse code is to
allow instantaneous repetition of the signals at each node. If Man-
chester code is amplified and repeated many times, the signal is apt
to be distorted out of tolerance.
At the upper left side of the figure are three full-duplex link
interfaces, where the R's are receivers and the T's transmitters.
Received signals are repeated and retimed in boxes labeled RP. Just to
the right of the RP boxes is the link switching matrix, where switches
labeled A through F selectively connect repeated signals to transmit-
ters on other links. These switches are operated by the node control
microprocessor at the extreme right of the figure. To the right of the
link switching matrix are conversion circuits between pulse code and
Manchester signal forms. Manchester signals from the receivers are
selectively gated to the 1553 subscriber interface, and signals from
the 1553 subscriber are selectively gated to converters that lead to
the transmitters. Selections are again made by the node control micro-
processor via outputs G through M. In order to prevent feedback of
Manchester signals, the pairs of pulse code to Manchester and Manchester
to pulse code converters are mutually inhibitory.
The ungated received signals, after conversion to Manchester
are converted to parallel format at the right of the figure, where they
are accessible via the parallel bus to the node controller. The node
controller scans all received signals looking for gateman commands.
Status replies are sent via the parallel to Manchester converter at the
lower right corner of the figure.
Node power is shown to be supplied by a mesh network with
current limiters at the power interfaces. The limiters limit outbound
current, not inbound. Depending on thenature of the subscriber and
the available technology, the node may supply subscriber power as well.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS AND MODELING DISCUSSIONS
In attempting to make quantitative judgements about communication
and/or power systems, one is often able to use broad generalizations and
approximations to arrive at useful "ballpark" estimates. In some
instances, however, approximations are not obviously trustworthy, and
in other instances approximations are not practicable at all. This
chapter treats various approaches developed and/or used in this project
to support the generation of trade-off data as well as qualitative con-
clusions.
Subjects treated here are the following:
Network reliability
Network connectivity
Network dispatch probability
Bus reliability and dispatch probability
Remote power control reliability
Power networking with current limiters
Reliability analysis tool
6.1 Network Reliability
A network can fail in several ways. There are correlatable
failures such as those caused by power failure, lightning, and damage
events. There are random failures which occur as a natural consequence
of the finite lifetime of the components of the system. It is the
random failures and their effect on a network communication or power
system which will be investigated here. There are two objectives to
this study. One is to determine how the reliability of the network
will vary with design variations. The other is to develop methods of
analysis for networks which will provide a basis for predicting their
reliability.
There are several ways of looking at the reliability of a net-
work. If we consider the subscriber's point of view, the network has
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failed if either the subscriber's node has failed or if this node has
been cut off from the rest of the network by other failures. From the
overall system view, a subscriber failure, a subscriber node failure,
or an inability to communicate with an operational subscriber and its
node, all amount to the same thing; the subscriber is lost to the
system. It is this latter view which is the more germane and will be
used in this analysis.
The node belonging to a subscriber has the effect of virtually
reducing the reliability of the subscriber, because we are now
interested in the failure rate of the node subscriber pair rather than
the subscriber itself. There are two obvious ways of improving this
situation. One is to improve the reliability of the nodes. A second
method, which may be justified for every important subscriber, is to
assign it two or more redundant nodes. There is little doubt that a
system containing a fault-tolerant computer will require such a
multinode interface to the computer.
It is appropriate at this point to consider what would be
reasonable realibility numbers for a data communication node based on
its electronic complexity. Figure 6.1-1 schematically shows a node
with three links attached. Referral to MIL HDBK 217C along with some
estimates of complexity suggest that the following lifetimes for the
node might reasonably be expected.
Subscriber Interface MBTF 80,000 Hr
Routing & Protocol Electronics MBTF 40,000 Hr
Link MBTF 120,000 Hr
Link, Routing & Protocol Combined _TF 30,000 Hr
The reasons for listing the lifetime for the combination of routing
and protocol electronics plus one link will become apparent as we get
deeper into the probabilities of losing communications to a node
through no fault of the node itself.
Figure 6.1-2a shows a small network made of 3-port nodes. The
circled node, which we will call an innocent node because it has not
failed, can be isolated by failures of the three links attached to it
or by failure of the protocol and routing electronics of the three next
nearest nodes. Figure 3b shows a network with the same number of
nodes which has been connected up in such an unfortunate manner that
the failure of two links can cut the network in half. Obviously this
type of network isto be avoided. Not quite so obvious is the fact
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that both networks a and b have been cut into two pieces. The serious-
- ness of the cut can be measured in terms of the number of nodes isolat-
ed. In a, it is one, and in b, eight. Further examination of a shows
that three nodes can be isolated by three link breaks and four nodes
can be isolated by four link breaks. If this network were hooked up in
a regular fashion as in Figure 6.1-3 it would require four link breaks
minimum to isolate two nodes, five link breaks minimum to isolate
three nodes and six link breaks minimum to isolate four nodes, which
obviously is a more reliable situation. We can conclude that regular
networks minimize the chances for node isolation.
Figure 6.1-3b shows a network boundary and the fact that the
irregularity caused by the boundary again creates a situation where
three nodes can be isolated by three link failures. If a network
could be designed without boundaries this problem would also disappear.
Such a network that is easily to visualize is a cube with nodes at the
corners and links along the edges. Also 20 3-port nodes can be placed
at the corners of a dodecahedron with the same effect. _e have termed
such networks regular and closed.
In general, networks of either 3-port or 4-port nodes can be
made regular and closed by interconnecting the nodes as shown in
Figure 6.1-4. Networks connected in this way can be visualized as
being evenly spread on the surface of a torus. This type of network
has the desirable property that the relationship of one node to all its
neighbors is the same as the relationship of any other node to all its
neighbors. Such a network is much simpler to analyze, and the rest
of this work will concern itself only with regular closed networks.
Probability of Isolating Innocent Nodes
If we have a network of 3-port nodes which is closed and regular
and reasonably large, it is possible to derive the first terms of an
expression for the probability of isolating an innocent node. If the
probability of failure of a link or node is suitably small the higher
order terms of this expression become negligible.
The probability that exactly x failures will occur out of a
group of £ devices is approximately equal to
£! x £-x
x! (£-x)! (it) (l-lt)
*Here we have assumed that It is .01 or less so that the reliability,
-lt
e , can be approximated by 1 - It.
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where I is the failure rate and t is the time interval of interest. If
the number of failures of nodes or links in our network is 3 or more,
an unfailed node may be isolated from the rest of the network. Figure
6.1-5 shows how three link breaks can isolate such a node. For a net-
work of n nodes there are n ways in which a node can be isolated by
three link breaks. The probability of having exactly three link fail-
ures in a network of n nodes (£ links where £ = 3/2 n) is:
£! 3 £-3
3!(£-3)! (It) (l-lt)
Since we know that there are n sets of exactly three failures which can
isolate an innocent node, then the fraction of all sets of three
failures which can isolate an innocent node is
n
£!
3!(£-3)!
If we multiply the probability for having exactly three failures times
the fraction of three failure sets which will isolate an innocent node,
we get the probability that three failures will isolate an innocent
node.
Pi3 = n (_t)3 (l-_t)(£-3)
It is instructive to look at this problem a little differently. If we
focus on a particular innocent node, then the chance of having a random
link failure help to isolate the node is 3/£. A second failure must
strike one of the two remaining good links to the node under question
which has a 2/£-1 chance of happening. The third failure must strike
the remaining good link which will happen with 1/£-2 probability. Then
the chance of hiving exactly three random failures isolate the innocent
node under question is
. 2__ 1 _ 3!(£-3)!
£ £-i £-2 £!
The chance of having three failures isolate any of the n innocent
nodes is
3!(£-3)!
n £!
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The chance of having exactly three failures is
£! 3 (£-3)
3! (£-3) ! (It) (l-lt)
The product of these last two expressions is the chance of having
exactly three failures isolate an innocent node
PI = n (It)3 (l-lt)(£-3)3
which agrees with the previous analysis.
Now if there are four failures, two nodes can be isolated as
shown in Figure 6.1-6. Also, there is the possibility of isolating a
single node with three breaks as in the previous analysis and having
the fourth break appear harmlessly elsewhere in the network. The
probability of having one or more nodes isolated with exactly four
link breaks is
£ £! 4 £-4
PI4 = ( £! ) 4!(£-4)! (It) (l-lt)41 (£-4)!
+ n ( £ £! 4 £-4£.' ) 4! (£-4)! (It) (1-1t)
4! (£-4)!
The rationale for the first term in the equation is as follows.
There are £ ways of isolating an innocent node using all four link
breaks. To see this, note that each such isolation event is uniquely
representable by a closed curve containing one entire link.
Simplifying the above expression, we have
pi4 3 (It)4 £-4= n(£- _) (1-1t)
Therefore with five link breaks there are several possibilities.
Three of the breaks can isolate one node. Four breaks can isolate two
nodes. Five breaks can isolate three nodes or they can isolate two
nodes as shown in Figure 6.1-7. (Figure 6.1-8 shows the six-break case
for interest.)
The number of ways the three-break isolation can occur is found
by focusing on a single node isolated by three link breaks. The two
other link breaks occur harmlessly elsewhere and they can occur in
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ways among the remaining £-3 links The total number of such patterns
which can cause isolation is then the number of nodes, n, times the
number of combinations of two link breaks out of the remaining good
links.
n
(£-3)(£-4).
The number of ways the four break isolation can occur is found by
3
multiplying the number of links £, or _ n, times the number of ways a
single break can occur out of the remaining (£-4) links,
3
n (£-4).
The number of ways the five break isolation can occur is a little more
difficult to visualize. One way is to realize that there are nine
patterns that can isolate a given node along with two others. This
suggests that there are a total of 3n combinations for this type of
isolation. It is perhaps easier to look at Figure 6.1-7 and note that
the cut pattern can be stepped one node at a time in three possible
directions which gives rise to the 3n term.
At this point it should be noted that although we have been
assuming link failures, the same equations would result if we had °
assumed node failures for the three-and-four-failure cases. In both
cases the failure rate would be that for the node routing electronics
plus one whole link including the driver & receiver electronics at
both ends. For the five failure case which isolates two adjacent
nodes and also breaks the link between the nodes, (see Figure 6.1-7),
the interchangeability of node and link failures begins to break down.
The probability of isolating one or more innocent nodes is
PI5 = n [(£-3)(£-4) + 32 _ (£-4) + 3] (It)5 (i-It)£-5
£2
= n [2 - 2£ + 3] (It)5 (i - lt)£-5
The total probability for isolation by 0 through 5 failures is:
3 -i £2
Pi0_5 = n [i+(£- _)It (l-lt) + (2 - 2£ + 3) (lt)2 (l-lt)-2]
3 £-5(It) (i-lt)
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For £ > 100 and At > 10-3 , this can be simplified to
1 2] 3 £-3P = [i + £1t + _ (£1t) n (It) (l-lt)
I0-5
It is apparent that if £At is substantially less than i, that the terms
of this series will become small rapidly, and that the series has a
limit because there are fewer than £ terms. It would therefore appear
that rules of thumb can be developed to relate network size, node
failure rates, flight hours between repairs and requirements for not
isolating an innocent node. For example we might say that
1£At < --
i0
and
PI < 2 x 10-7
-3
This would suggest that At be kept less than 10 for £ of about 100,
which represents reasonable numbers for a system which commences
operation with no failures.
For a regular closed network made up of 4-port nodes as shown
in Figure 6.1-9, the minimum number of failures which can isolate an
innocent node is four. The probability of this occurring is
PI4 = n (At)4 (l-At)(£-4)
For five failures - Figure 6.1-10
PI5 = n (£-4) (At)5 (1-At)(£-5)
For six failures - Figure 6.1-11
PI6 = [2n + n (£-4)(£-5)] (At)6 (1-At)£-6
Therefore the probability of up to six failures isolating one or two
nodes is
£2
PI0_6 = [i + (£-4)lt(1-1t)-I + (_ _ -2-9£+12)(It) 2(l,lt)-2]
4 £-4
n (At) (l-lt)
which simplifies to
1 2 4 £-4
PI0_6 = [i + £lt + _ (£At) ] n (At) (1-At)
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Figure 6.1-9
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Figure 6.1-10
Isolation Of An Innocent Node By
Five Link Breaks
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Figure 6.1-11 .
Isolation Of An Innocent Node By
Six Link Breaks
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If this is compared with the equation for 3-port nodes it is apparent
that the probability of isolating an innocent node is lower by a factor
of almost It when 4-port nodes are used instead of 3-port nodes.
A practical question at this juncture is, what is the probability
of isolating an innocent node if one or more nodes have already failed.
For the 3-port node case, if there is a single link failure then the
chance of two more link failures joining with the single link failure
to isolate a node is
2
PII+2 = 2 (It)
The chance of isolating a node in a 4-port node network after one link
failure with hhree more link failures is
PII+3 = 2 (It)3
It is obvious that the chance of isolating an innocent node in a
network which contains a failure is significantly lower in a network
made of 4-port nodes.
To argue this question further we must ask what the effects of
i!_ two or more failures are. Obviously if these failures are too close to
one another in the network the chance of isolating an innocent node
increases greatly. For example if two links to an innocent node are
broken, only one more needs to be broken in a 3-port node network to
isolate an innocent node. The chances for isolation become much less
if a rule is adopted which limits the closeness of failures to remain
unrepaired in a flightworthy system.
Figure 6..1-12shows a 4-port node network. If we do not permit
node failures to be closer to another node failure than the third node
away, thenat least three more failures are required to isolate an
innocent node. Likewise two failed links must have at least one good
link between them (except of course for the correlated link failures
which occur when a node fails). The same rules are good for a 3-port
node network except that now only two more failures may isolate an
innocent node. This is limited by the number of ports on the node and
cannot be improved by increasing the spacing between failures which
may be tolerated in a flightworthy system.
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Additional Network Reliability Equations
Here we will develop some approximate expressions for comparing
the reliability of regular closed networks made from 3-port and 4-port
nodes. The equations are only approximate for the following reasons.
i. Reliability, e-It, is approximated by 1 - It. This is a very
good approximation for It < .01.
2. The chance of isolating an innocent node or nodes is based on
the approximate number of link break patterns which will cause
isolation relative to the exact number of link break patterns
of x broken links out of £ that are possible. The number of
link break patterns which will cause isolation is approximate
because of double counting of patterns in some instances. See
Figure 6.1-7. Also it is possible for two isolation patterns
to occur in a single network. Offsetting these approximations
is the fact that the number of broken links in one isolation
pattern has been limited to six in a 3-port node network and
eight in a 4-port node network.
- 3. The assumption that link and node failures are equivalent
breaks down for large numbers of node failures.
It is possible to bound the errors to some degree by different
methods of calculation. It is also possible to look at double counting
and overlapping patterns directly for the simpler cases and assess
their effect. A Monte Carlo test can also be made by computer to
provide further verification.
There are some interesting questions that can be asked about
network failures which will be addressed here
i. What is the probability that a particular innocent node will
be isolated, given x link breaks in a network of £ links and
n nodes?
2. What is the probability that one or more innocent nodes will
be isolated given x link breaks in the network?
3. What is the likely number of link breaks which will cause one
or more innocent nodes to be isolated in a network?
4. What is the probability that x link breaks will occur in a
network and isolate one or more innocent nodes?
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We will call the probability that x link breaks will isolate a
particular innocent node PI. Tables 6.1-1 and 6.1-2 list the ratios of
x
the number of possible isolating patterns of x breaks around the object
node to the total number of patterns possible with x breaks out of £
links.
In Table 6.1-1, the coefficients 1,3,9 and 31 are the numbers of
link break isolation patterns possible around a particular node for 3,
4, 5, and 6 link breaks. The coefficients i, 4, and 18 were
found the same way for Table 6.1-2. Figure 6.1-13 shows the possible
8-1ink break patterns around a given node. The chance of isolating a
given node is
_ x! (£-3) £! (£-4)' £x! (£-5)!
PI (x-3)! £! + 3 (x-4)! £! " + 9 (x-5)! £!
x
x! (£-6)!+ 31 (x-6!) £!
3-port nodes
_ x_ (£-4)' x! (£-6)' x! (£-8)!
PI (x-4)! £! " + 4 (x-6)! £! " + 18 (x-8)! £!
x
4-port nodes
The chance of isolating some node in the network is just n times the
above expressions. It is noted that these expressions are good for
small x but for x larger than £/5 for the 3-port node equation and
£/4 for the 4-port node equation, the errors become significant.
Another way of looking at the problem is to consider the probability
of not isolating a particular node
1 - PI
x
The probability that no innocent nodes in the network are isolated
equals
PONI = (i - PI )n
x
This expression has the advantage that it provides reasonable answers
for larger values of x. The probability that one node is isolated is
_ n!
PINI (n-l)! PI (l_pI )n-i
x x
and the probability that y nodes are isolated is
_ n! y n-v
PYNI (n-y)! PI (l-PI) -x x
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TABLE 6.1-1
PROBABILITY OF GETTING SPECIFIC ISOLATION
PATTERNS AROUND A PARTICULAR NODE IN
A 3-PORT NODE NETWORK
NIIMBEROF 3-LINKBREAK 4-LINKBREAK 5-LINKBREAK 6 LINK BREAK
BROKENLINKS ISOLATION I_ION ISOLATION ISCL_TION
P_ PA_ PATYERN PATTERN
1
3 £!
3:(£3)1
(£-3) 3
4 £! £!
4!(£-4)! 4 ! (£-4)!
(£-3)(£-4)
5 2! 3(£-4) 9
£1 £1 £!
5:(£-5)' 5_.(£-5)' 5!(g-S)!
3(£-4)(£-5)
6 etc. 2! 9 (£-5) 31
£1 £! £!
6! (£-6)! 6! (£-6)!
9(£-5)(£-6)
7 etc. 2! 31 (£-6)
£! £1
7!(i-7)I 7!(£-7)!
31(£-6)(£-7)
8 etc. 2!
£1
8'(L-B)!
x x! (£-3)1 3 xI (£-4)! 9 x! (£-5)! 31x! _£-6)1
[_L-_)! £1 (x-4)! £1 (x-5)! £1 (x-6)I £1
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TABLE 6.1-2
PROBABILITY OF GETTING SPECIFIC ISOLATION
PATTERNS AROUND A PARTICULAR NODE IN
A 4-PORT NODE NETWORK
NUMBEROF 4-LINKBREAK 6-LINKBREAK 8-LINKBREAK
BROKENLINKS ISOLATION ISOLATION ISOLATION
PATIERN ....PATI_ERN PATI'ERN
1
3 4!
4! (£-4)!
(4-4)
4 4!
5,(_-5),
(£-4)(4-5) "
6 2! .... 4
4! 4!
6! (4-6)! 6! (£-6)l
4 (4-6)
7 etc. 4!
7! (£-7)!
4 (£-6)(£-7)
8 2! 18
£1 - 41
8'(£-8)! 81(£-8)!
x.' (4-4)'. 4 x! (£-6)! 18x! (£-8).'
x (x-4)' 4.' _ 4! (x-8)! 4,
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Figure 6.1-13
All Purpose 8'LinkBreak.Patterns
Which Will Isolatea Given Node
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The probable number of link breaks to isolate a node in a network can
be found by setting PONI equal to 0.5 and solving for the number of
link breaks.
Some feeling for the likely number of link breaks to cause
isolation can be gained by realizing that a network can remain in one
piece under ideal circumstances with one fewer link than there are
nodes. The next link break will cause isolation. Also we know that
no isolation will occur in a 3-port node network with only two link
breaks. Therefore the likely number of link breaks to cause isolation
n
will be more than 2 and less than _ + 2 for a 3-port node network and
more than 3 and less than n + 2 for a 4-port node network.
A third way of looking at the problemof the likely number of
link breaks that will isolate an innocent node is to calculate the
probabilities that various types of break batterns will not occur in
the probability that there are no isolating patterns. For example the
probability of having a particular 3-1ink isolation pattern appear in
a 3-port node network is
x! (£-3)1
(x-3)! £!
There are n possible 3-1ink isolation patterns in the network so the
chance of not having any patterns of this type is
x! (£-3)! n
(i (x-3)! £----.F--)
The chance of having a 3-1ink isolation pattern is
x! (£-3)' n
1 - (i (x-3)! £! ")
Similar terms can be written for 4, 5 and6 break isolation patterns.
If these terms were independent they could be multiplied times each
other to give the probability that none of these isolation patterns
appear. Actually if one of the isolation patterns does appear, it is
considerably less likely that a second pattern will appear in the
same network. However, we will add these terms, to be conservative,
and to tend to cancel the error introduced by truncating the size of
the break pattern considered. The expressions for the isolation of
one or more nodes are then
= 4 - [i £x! (£-3)' n x! (-4) f 3n
PII-6 nodes (x-3)! £! "] - [i (x-4)! ! "] 2
3 ports
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x! (£-5)! 3n x! (£-6)' 15n
- [i (x-5)! £! "] - [i (x-6).' £.'"] 2
n 2n
x! (£-4), x, (£-6),
PIi-3 nodes = 3- [i (x-4)! £! "] - [i (x-6)"! £! "]
4 ports 6n
- [i x: (£-8),]
(x-8)., £.,
Figures 6.1-14 and 6.1-15 show plots of probabilities for innocent node
isolation as a function of link failures for regular closed 36 node
networks made with 3-port and 4-port nodes. In addition to plots of
the three equations derived for isolation of innocent nodes, simulation
results are shown, and a straight line plot is made between the known
end point for no isolation and for certain isolation.
It is quite obvious from the plots for innocent node isolation
that the fourth port on a node does a great deal for improving the
reliability of the network from the point of view of innocent node
isolation.
The probability that x link breaks will occur and isolate a
particular innocent node is the probability that x link breaks will
cause isolation times the probability that x link breaks will occur
£! (1-It)£-x
PI" Px = PI x !(£-x)! (It)x
x x
Any of the isolation probability expressions can be used for PI in the
above equation as long as x is not too large, x
Figures 6.1-14 and 6.1-15 include results of a Monte Carlo
simulation based on the flowchart shown in Figure 6.1-16. The flow-
chart assumes that failures can be assigned to subscribers, nodes, and
links. For Figures 6.1"14 and 6.1-15, however, only link failures
were allowed. To illustrate the significance of link failures vs.
node failures, Figure 6.1-17 shows a comparison of probability
densities for a three-port network of 36 nodes. The node curve rises
more steeply, because each node failure eliminates three links. How-
ever, since each node failure eliminates a potential innocent victim,
the node curve approaches unity gradually, whereas the link curve stops
suddenly when less than one link for each node remains.
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Figure 6.1-14. Probability for Innocent Node Isolation
for a 36 3-Port Node Network.
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6.2 Network Dispatch Probability
To approximate the probability that network faults will prevent
dispatch, we must first identify the dispatch criteria. For a simple
criterion, such as "dispatch is allowed unless x or more faults exist,"
the non-dispatch probability is simply the probability that x or more
faults exist. If only nodes could fail, for example, and the node
failure rates were all equal to In , then the leading term in the
probability expression for nondispatch would be
N! (_nt)x (l-Xnt)N-x
P(x) = x! (N-x)! (6.2-1)
where t is the elapsed time of concern, such as an operational day, and
N is the number of nodes. If X t is small, this term is a sufficientlyn
close approximation to the desired value. Moreover, the factor
N-x
(i - Int)
may be set equal to unity. Thus if one fault is permitted (x = 2), and
a hundred node network operates twenty hours (N = 100, t = 20) and the
failure rate per node is 10-4 per hour, then the non-dispatch proba-
bility is approximately
P(2) = i00! (20 x 10-4)2 _ 0.02
2! 98!
Next, consider a more elaborate, more permissive criterion,
where anynumber of faults may exist so long as they are mutually
distant. (It must also be true that these faults do not violate the
minimum equipment criterion for the subscribers, but this is not the
present concern.) Let a buffer zone be defined surrounding each faulty
node or link. The dispatch criterion may be stated as "no fault lies
in the buffer zone of another fault." The size of the buffer zone may
be chosen arbitrarily. Figure 6.2-1 shows three examples.
The probability of having exactly x node faults is given by
eq. (6.2-1). _en x equals zero or one, the system is dispatchable.
I,_enx = 2, there is a chance that the faults are too close. This is
given approximately by B . N-l, where B is the number of nodes in the
buffer zone, and N is again the total number of nodes. N is assumed
to be large, and link failures improbable for this example. If there
are two faults, then, the conditional probability that the system is
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Figure 6.2-1. Buffer Zones.
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dispatchable is 1 N-I" If a third fault arrives, it must clear two
buffer zones, and the conditional probability for dispatch becomes
(i - N__) (i 2BN_2) For succeeding faults, this conditional probabil-
ity expression is of the form
Pc(X) = (i B ) 2_B2 N3__B3 (x-l)B)N-I (i )(i - ) ... (i N-x+l '
truncated and set equal to zero if negative. The dispatch probability
expression is as follows.
PD = P(o) + P(1) + P(2) (i N-IB) + P(3) (i N_I)B (i N2__B2)
+ ... P(x) Pc(X) + ...
Figure 6.2-2 shows representative values of 1 - PD as functions
of N and I t for the three-port node buffer zone in Figure 6.2-1. Ifn
In = 10-4' t = 20, and N = 100, the probability of nondispatch, 1 - PD'
-3is about 2 x i0
6.3 Network Connectivity
As aircraft communication and power distribution systems become
more complex, and the level of flight criticality of such systems
demands higher and higher reliability performance, designers will be
faced with the complex problem of determining whether or not a proposed
design provides adequate connectivity. In an effort to provide
several alternative pathways of communication and power delivery to
critical systems, the designer must be assured that all elements in the
system which require multiple pathways for extreme reliability are
covered in the final design. For systems with very large numbers of
elements and communication links, the problem of determining the level
of connectivity is very complex. The problem becomes even more severe
when a design is characterized as an irregular network.
As has been described in the earlier sections of this report,
there are levels of criticality of particular elements in the total
system structure. Some elements are flight critical and require the
highest reliability performance. Other subsystems are not as critical.
Thus, designers are very likely to create irregular networks of
elements in which certain parts of the network require more pathways of
connection than others in order to ensure performance. The entire
system may be made up of regions of regular networks which are inter-
connected in an irregular way to reach the necessary design objectives.
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As part of our study of aircraft communication systems, a com-
puter program has been developed which provides to the designer an
analysis tool for determining the level of connectivity of large net-
works and to assist him in identifying regions of proposed designs which
are weak from this standpoint and therefore require improvements. The
remaining part of this section describes this particular effort.
6.3.1 Problem Description
The problem which needs to be solved is the following: What is
the minimum number of failures in a network which will isolate an
innocent node or nodes from a particular node? This special node repre-
sents the location of the fault-tolerant multiprocessor which is assumed
to be an element in the total system design. The designer wants to
ensure that this minimum number is large enough for his design. There
are additional pieces of information which are also useful to the
designer. For example, he may like to know what combination of
failures caused the isolation, and which nodes were isolated. He may
also have requirements, as alluded to earlier, that certain regions of
the system have a higher minimum number of failures which can cause
node isolation.
The algorithm described below provides an engineering solution
to these questions.
6,3.2 Algorithm Description
There are several general approaches to the problem of determin-
ing connectivity, and these are well-documented in the literature. For
large networks, all of the available analysis methods consume a great
deal of computer time. Thus, we have attempted to take advantage of
certain problem-dependent features to design a program which, most of
the time, will run efficiently. This dependence on the particular net-
work being analyzed means that there are networks which can be con-
structed which will take extremely large amounts of computer time for
solution. But in the development of a design tool, we are not
interested in program performance for worst cases, but wish to take
advantage of features unique to this aircraft network problem.
Figure 6.3.2-1 is a flow chart of the entire connectivity
algorithm. The central element in the process is an algorithm which
determines whether or not a path exists between a node and the special
node. This determination is made numerous times for each network
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Figure 6.3.2-1. Network Failure Program.
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design, on a setof modified "networks" which are generated by the
program by varying the length of pathways considered, the number of
failures in the failure sets, and the particular nodes which are con-
sidered to have failed. The failure set generation algorithm and the
general structure of the path existence determination process are
designed to take advantage of network structure, and the program can
provide flexibility of parameters controlling these elements which
allows the user to modify program performance depending on the partic-
ular networks being analyzed.
Figures 6.3.2-2 and 6.3.2-3 are examples to illustrate the
process described below.
Networks are represented by sets of nodes and links, and the
input required by the program consists of numbered nodes and an indica-
tion of whether or not a link exists between any two nodes in the net-
work. This information is contained in the connectivity table. A
particular terminal node or destination is chosen. From the connect-
ivity table, the program generates a level table consisting of a set
of lists, the first of which consists of the special, or reference
node. The second consists of all of the nodes which can be reached
from the reference node by traversing one link. The third list con-
tains all of the nodes which are a distance of two links away from the
origin. This level table is constructed in a similar manner until the
list is of maximum length. The maximum length is governed by the net-
work structure and can never be more than N-I long, where N is the
number of nodes in the network, since it is impossible to form a path
longer than this length without passing through the reference or
terminal nodes more than once. The maximum length is actually shorter
than N-I when nodes which are not on any paths between reference and
terminal nodes are removed from the network. These irrelevant nodes
consist of nodes with only one link connection or entire clumps of
nodes which form isolated areas of the networks linked to the remainder
of the network by a single connecting link.
For a given terminal node, a start level table and an end level
table are formed. The end level table is constructed in the same man-
ner as the start level table described above, with the roles of the
reference node and terminal node reversed. The tables are of maximum
length, also described above, with the irrelevant nodes being deter-
mined during the formation of the level tables. The process of form-
ing the level tables will
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NETWORK
CONNECTIVITY
TABLE
1 2,3
2 1,4
3 1,5,6
4 2,6
5 3,7
6 3, 4, 8
7 5,8
8 6, 7
START LEVEL TABLE END LEVEL TABLE
LEVEL NODES LEVEL NODES
Lo 0 1 Eo 0 8
L1 1 2, 3 E1 1 6, 7
L2 2 4, 5, 6 E2 2 3, 4, 5
L3 3 2,3,4,6,7,8 E3 3 1,2,3,5,6,7
L4 4 2,3,4,5,6,8 E4 4 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
L5 5 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 E5 5 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
L6 6 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 E6 6 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
Figure 6.3.2-2. Connectivity and Level Tables.
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MOVE TABLE
LENGTH = N-1
ALGORITHMNODES
Mo 1 Mo = LoA(E6UE5UE4UE3UE2UE1UE o)
M 1 2,3 M1 = LIA(E5UE4UE3UE2UE1UE 0)
M2 4,5,6 M2 = L2N(E4UE3UE2UE1U£ 0) "
M3 2,3,4,6,7,8 M3 = L3A(E3UE2UE1UE 0)
M4 3,4,5,6,8 M4 = L4N(E2UE1UEo)
M5 6,7,8 M5 = L5A(E1UE0)
M6 8 M6 = L6A(E0)
Figure 6.3.2-3. Move Table.
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automatically eliminate irrelevant nodes which are connected directly
to the reference and terminal nodes, but the identification of irrele-
vant nodes in other parts of the network is ignored because of the
added complexity and time penalty associated with such searching.
The next step in the process of determining path existence is
the creation of move tables. (See Figures 6.3.2-2 and 6.3.2-3 again.)
Move tables are of particular length X and are formed by the logical
intersection of the first X lists of the start and end level tables, as
demonstrated in the example. If S. is the set of nodes contained in
th l
the i list of the start level table and E. is the set of nodes3
contained in the jth list of the end level table, then the ith set of
the move table, M. is:1
X-i
Mi = Si(_ (j_--0Ej) for O ! i ! X.
Therefore, the resulting move table presents information about paths
of length X or less between the reference and terminal nodes.
The program generates a move table of maximum length to be
utilized at various stages throughout the process. The program then
generates move tables of variable length beginning with the minimum
length necessary for a path to exist between reference and terminal
nodes. The length of this move table is increased, as the process
progresses, in order to determine whether longer paths exist which
restore connections caused by particular failures simulated by the
algorithm.
The stage is now set for determining path existence for a
particular terminal node with the reference node. The process proceeds
as follows:
i. The failure set generation algorithm produces a set of nodes
to be failed. (This process will be described later.)
2. The nodes which are failed cause changes to connectivity and
to the move table, which starts out to be of minimum length.
To determine if there are any paths remaining in the network,
the connections between nodes in adjacent lists of the move
table are checked by using the failure-modified connectivity
table. When a node is no longer connected, it is deleted
from the move table. If an empty list in the move table is
Produced, then the terminal node is isolated from the reference
193
node, but only by this particular length of path.
3. Another failure set is generated and path existence is tested
as in 2. All failure sets which cause isolation are stored.
4. If all failure set candidates have been tested and no isolation
has been caused, the entire process is restarted with a new node
as the terminal node.
5. The maximum length move table is used to see if any of the
stored failure sets cause isolation in the complete network.
If any sets are found to cause isolation and this stage, much
computer time has been saved.
6. If some stored failure sets do not cause isolation in the
maximum length move table, the length of the move table is
increased. The increase shown in Figure 6.3.2-1 is one unit but
the designer can use his judgement in selecting this number.
Experience has shown the increase of one unit performs well.
The added computation time due to increased-length move tables
more than counter-balances the extra time cost of checking some
failure sets several times as the move tables are increased by -
only one unit at a time. This is due to the fact that for long
move tables, many more possible paths exist.
7. The procedure continues until all nodes but the reference node
have been terminal nodes. Upon completion the user knows the
minimum number of node failures which will isolate an innocent
node and also what nodes are contained in failure sets causing
such isolation. The nodes which have been isolated by the
failure sets can also be identified.
6.3.3 Failure Generation
Little has been said thus far about the selection of the failure
sets. It is in this aspect of the problem that the most significant
gains have been made in reducing program running time for certain
network structures. If one simply wants to determine the number of
failures which will isolate an innocent node, then prudent choice of
the order in which failed nodes are simulated can have a great effect
on how"early" this minimum number iS found. If, however, a more
complete presentation of information is requested by the designer, this
program running time can be quite a bit longer.
Q
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The user selects the maximum number of nodes which can be
failed at one time for which he wishes to check a particular network.
The failure generation algorithm, based on a set of design principles,
produces failure sets according to a system of priorities. These
principles are as follows:
i. Of course, single failures are tested first, then double
failures, etc.
2. Only relevant nodes need to be selected.
3. Nodes which are linked directly to the reference and terminal
nodes are given priority. These nodes are elements of the
cutsets of the reference and terminal nodes and with higher
probability will be entries of failure sets which cause iso-
lation of innocent nodes.
4. In a way similar to 3, nodes closer to the end points are
given higher priority.
5. If a failure set is found to cause isolation, then all failure
b
sets which include that set as a subset need not be considered
further, unless particular design information is sought.
6. If a failure set causes isolation, increasing the length of
the move table may restore a path.
7. If a failure set causes isolation at maximum length, no path
exists between the reference and terminal nodes.
8. If a failure set does not cause isolation, one more node is
added on to this failure set to create a new failure set.
This is repeated until the maximum number of failed nodes
per set, selected by the user, is reached.
6.3.4 Performance
The performance of this design tool has not been evaluated
extensively. However, the sensitivity of the length of running time
to such heuristic changes as described in the principles used for
failure set ordering is important, and significant performance
increases have been made by implementation of these principles.
Further program development would undoubtedly bring about still better
° performance.
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Figures 6.3.4-1 and 6.3.4-2 are two examples used to assess
program performance. The first is a regular, hexagonal network of 96 P
nodes each with three links. An Amdahl 470/V8 took 11.5 minutes to
verify that this network can survive any two failed nodes at one time.
The second example is a 66-node network which took only 4.25 minutes
to check.
6.4 Bus Reliability and Dispatch Probability
Bus reliability modeling is fairly straightforward compared to
network reliability modeling. Network hazards include complex topolog-
ical factors absent from bus hazards. When network terminals fail
passively, they do not disturb the bus. When a terminal port creates
a short circuit, it is tolerated if the bus is a 1553 data bus, but
not if it is an unprotected bus such as a local parallel bus, and not
if the bus is a power bus. Two or more short circuits bring down one
or all copies of a redundant bus. An open circuit fault in a bus makes
it partly or totally useless.
It is difficult to estimate the failure rates associated with
the hazards listed above. Passive, short-circuit, and active faults
depend on the technologies and designs of the terminals. Bus faults
depend on routing and environmental factors. Once these rates are
known, bus reliability can be expressed combinatorially using a failure
modes and effects analysis (FMEA). An examples of a top-level FMEA
is given in Table 6.4-2 for a 1553 bus system.
The dispatch criterion for a redundant bus system must be to
have at least two unfailed copies. Thus a dual bus system may not be
dispatched if either bus is faulty. One terminal on each may be short
circuited, and fewer than K terminals may have passive faults. For
redundancies greater than dual, obviously, a greater variety and
extent of failures is permissible. As before, calculation of dispatch
probability involves simple combinatorics once the failure rates are
estimated.
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TABLE 6.4-1
FMEA OF 1553 BUS
Loss of Communication Can Result from:
i. Active fault on all copies of bus or
2. Loss of all copies of bus, where
Loss of one copy can result from
a. Open or short bus fault or
b. Active terminal fault on one copy of bus or
c. Two short terminal faults or
d. K passive terminal faults, where
K is determined by relationship of specific
fault set to minimum equipment criterion of
subscribers.
6.5 Remote Power Control Reliability
Remote power control has the advantages of substituting buses
for dedicated links, and removing a single-point system damage vulnera-
bility. The potential hazard of a remote system is the failure of
remote switches or limiters, or of the communications that support them.
It is desired to determine the necessary levels of switch reliability,
as well as reliability of other elements, to support flight safety.
Figure 6.5-1 shows one possible model of a power distribution
system. Four prime power sources, A, are protected by breakers, B.
These breakers may be remote or dispersed in the cockpit. Buses, C,
distribute power to remote switches, D, serving subscribers, E. The
remote switches are controlled by communication, F, with redundant
controllers, not shown.
The failure modes are as follows. First, both buses fail. The
failure of a single bus can happen from loss of two generators A or two
breakers B or a combination of the two, or an open or short fault of
the bus C, or a short fault of any subscriber with a switch stuck o__nn.
The second failure mode is where too many subscribers become unpowered.
Say that K subscribers have both switches stuck open. The third
failure mode is a combination of the first two.
The failure probability can be approximated in terms of the
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Figure 6.5-1. Remote Power Distribution Model.
respective falure probabilities of the elements, as listed below.
A = probability of generator failure
B = probability of breaker failure
C = probability of bus open or short
D0 = probability of an open switch
D1 = probability of a switch stuck o__nn
E1 = probability of a shorted subscriber
F0 = probability of a switch command failure causing
all switches to open
F1 = Drobability of a switch command failure causing
all switches to close.
Let N be the number of subscribers. Now the probability of one
failed bus is approximately as follows:
2
P1 = (A+B) + C + NE1 (D1 + FI)
The probability of K subscribers not able to be powered from a single
bus is approximately:
P2 = (_) D0K + F0
The probability of K subscribers unable to receive power from either
bus is approximately:
P3= D02+ F0+F02
The probability of having two failed buses is approximately:
P4 = NEI (DI+FI)2 + 2 NE1 (DI+FI) [(A+B)2+C] + [(A+B)2 + C]2
P3 and P4 roughly resemble the squares of P2 and PI' respectively.
They differ from the squares because subscribers are common to both
buses.
The overall failure probability is given approximately by:
P = P4 + P3 + P1 P2
Table 6.5-1 contains some sample evaluations of the model.
Case 1 lists parameter values chosen at random, and the resultant
• values 0f P1 through P4 and P. Case 1 values were chosen well on the
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TABLE 6.5-i
REMOTE POWER MODEL EVALUATIONS
PARAMETER CASE
1 2 3 4 5 6
K 3
N i00
A 10-3
-3B i0
C 10-4 10-4 10-4 10-5 10-5 10-5
DO 10-3 10-3 10-4 10-4 10-4 10-4
D1 10-3
E1 10-4 10-4 10-4 10-5 10-5 10-6
F0 10-3 10-4 10-4 10-4 10-5 10-5
F1 i0-3
P1 i"2x10-4 1"2x10-4 1"2x10-4 1"6x10-5 1"6x10-5 1"4x10-5
P2 1.2x10-3 2.7x10-4 10-4 10-4 10-5 10-5
P3 1.2x10-6 2.7x10-8 10-8 10-8 10-10 i0-I0
P4 5-5x10-8 5.5x10-8 5.5x10-8 4.3x10-9 4.3x10-9 6.1x10-10
P 1.4x10-6 1.2x10-7 7.7x10-8 1.6x10-8 4.5xi0-9 8.5xi0-I0
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pessimistic side. Succeeding cases changed one or two parameters at a
time. The value of any parameter for any case is either shown explicit-
-9
ly or is the same as for case i. Case 6 results in P being below i0
To reach this value, E1, the subscriber power short probability was put
at 10-6 to reduce the first term of P4 without having to assume anything
more stringent than 10-3 for D1 and FI. Meanwhile, D0 and F0 are
assumed to be 10-5. This corresponds to switches and controllers
being designed to be biased to fail in the on position rather than off.
6.6 •PowerNetwork Using Current Limiters
Data for Tables 4.5-1 and 4.5-2 was obtained by numerical
solutions of a mathematical model of the network in Figure 4.5-1 with
the piecewise linear approximation of a limiter characteristic shown
in Figure 4.4-2. Thirty nonlinear nodal equations were solved by
relaxation.
6.7 Reliability Analysis Tool
This section describes the reliability analysis tool used in
Volume 2 to compare the reliabilities of the various communication
structure alternatives. This analysis tool is an interactive computer
program which provides a convenient technique for constructing the
combinatorial reliability equations for complex, highly interconnected
systems. The equations are constructed and presented in the form of a
diagram. This diagram facilitates system analysis by clearly showing
the constituent terms that make up the probability of failure of the
total system. The diagram makes it easy to identify the most critical
failure modes and provides a means for evaluating, quantitatively, the
relative contributions to the unreliability of the system made by the
different parts of the system and by the different failure modes.
The basic concept for this analysis method was developed during
a reliability analysis study of the NASA F-8 Digital Fly-by-Wire :
system [8]. Its development was motivated by a perceived inadequacy
and/or inconvenience of most of the existing reliability analysis
techniques. The technique proved to be valuable in the F-8 DFBW study.
It allowed the equations describing the unreliability of the total
system to be developed and displayed as a diagram which clearly showed
the interrrelationships and relative importance of the various system
elements. For example, it was easy to identify the most critical
failuremodes and show what modifications could be made in the design
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to improve reliability and what this improvementwould be quantitatively.
During this present study, the technique was developed further
to provide a more general user interface. The original F-8 DFBW program
was written just for that system. The modified programallows the
definition of the element failure models and the generation of the
reliability equation diagram by successive interactive computer
terminal sessions.
This section first gives the mathematical foundations for this
technique. A description is then given of the operation of the
program which is then illustrated by an example.
6.7.1 Mathematical Basis for the Analysis Technique
The mathematical basis for this technique is the repeated
application of the basic Conditional probability equation. This
equation can be written in the form
Q(S) = Q(S/A) P(A) + Q(S/B) P(B) + Q(S/C) P(C) + ...
where
Q(S) = unreliability of the system
Q(S/A) = unreliability of the system given event A
A,B,C,... = events describing the state of a particular
system element
P(A) = probability of event A
and the following conditions must be met for the events
P(A) + P(B) + P(C) + ... = 1 (exhaustive)
P(AB) + P(AC) + P(BC) + ... = 0 (mutually exclusive).
This equation can be represented graphically as shown in Figure 6.7-1.
It should be noted that the equation is written for unreliability
instead of reliability in order to avoid the necessity of multiplying
reliability terms that are almost equal to unity.
The reliability of the total system is found by successively
applying this equation, consideringeach basic system element until all
of the conditional probabilities are defined and the point is reached
where the probability of failure of the total system can be defined as
either one or zero. The process of applying this technique can be
described by the following five steps:
Step i: Partition the System into Basic Elements.
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WHERE
P(A)+ P(B)4 PIC| +... - 1
PL,_BI- P|AC) - P(BCl - ... - 0
Figure 6.711.Graphicalequivalentof basic equation.
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The system must be divided into a number of basic elements. The
number of elements should be kept as small as possible as long as the
total system is accurately represented. The elements are defined by
random failure containment boundaries that are made as large as pos-
sible subject to the constraint that any failure within the element
prevents any other part of the element from being used.
Step 2: Identify Events that Define the State
of Each Element
The events Which describe the operational state of each element
must be described and must meet the requirements of the basic relia-
bility equation: they must form an exhaustive and mutually exclusive
set. For simple elements, theremay only be two events: the element is
good or the element is bad. In other cases, it is necessary to
distinguish failure modes. For example, an element such as an actuator
may fail passively or fail hardover. In other cases, it may be
necessary to distinguishwhether the failure of the element was
covered or not, i.e., whether the failure was detected by the system
and the effects of the failure were automatically accounted for.
In many cases, the analysis can be simplified by grouping
elements together as, for example, all three channels of a triplex
actuator or three redundant electrical power supplies. If the elements
are grouped, the events must include all combinations of failures, such
as all channels good, one failed and the others good, etc. The
important consideration is the identification of all events that have
significance in defining the state of the other elements in the system.
In some cases, it may be useful to use a Markov process to define the
states of an element. Along with defining the events, it is also
necessary to calculate the probability of each event. In most cases,
these probabilities will be functions of the reliability of the
elements calculated by an F_A or similar technique.
Step 3: Select an Order for the Application of
the Equations
An order must be selected w_ereby the reliability equations will
be applied to the basic system elements. The order in many cases can
be arbitrary, but the analysis can be simplified with a prudent choice
of order. The primary factor determining order is dependency.
Elements on which other elements depend for proper operation, such as
power supplies, are placed first. The states of these elements must be
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determined before it is known how to analyze the elements that depend
on them. The Order will normally follow the signal flow through the
system. The best order, however, will be based on practical experience
with the system combined with trial and error.
Step 4: Construct a Diagram of the Equations
The equation giving the probability of failure for the total
system is now generated by interconnecting the diagram segments repre-
senting all of the basic elements of the system. The diagram for the
first element is constructed first. The inputs to this diagram come
from the diagrams for the next element, and so forth, until the success
or failure of the system can be defined. When enough elements are
defined as goed to guarantee the success of the system independent of
the state of the other elements, the input to the diagram will be an
unreliability of zero. In other words, the conditional unreliability
of the system given that sufficient elements are good is zero. On the
other hand, if enough elements have failed such that the system fails,
independent of the state of any of the other elements in the system,
the unreliability is one. The unreliability of the system isthus
determined by interconnected diagram segmentswhich define the state
of the system and eventually have inputs of ones or zeros.
The inputs to the diagram segments are the unreliabilities of
the system due to failures in all following elements. The unrelia-
bility of the system due to these following elements is based on the
state of the system as defined by the previous elements. The diagram
grows geometrically with one diagram for the first element followed by
a diagram for the second element for each event used to define the
first element. The total diagram for a real system with a reasonably
large number of elements could become completely unmanageable if it
were not for the fact that many of the system states are equivalent
and do not have to be repeated. For example, if communication fails
to a device by one path but can be re-established by another, the
unreliability of the rest of the system is likely to be equivalent.
Step 5: Compute the System Unreliability
The final step is to insert the values for the probabilities of
the events for each element and then perform the required arithmetic
operations. The equations must be solved from the bottom up. For
simple systems, the entire process can be done by hand with a calcu-
lator. For more realistic systems, a computer program is useful. An
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interactive program was developed that aids in the construction of the
diagram and computes the resulting unreliabilities.
6.7.2 Operation of the Computer Program
A program was written as a part of this effort that greatly
simplifies the process of constructing the equation diagram. This
program is not a fully developed software product, but it has served
very well during this study as a tool for determining the reliability
of the various communications structure options. The operation of the
program is described briefly in the following paragraphs. This
description is not intended to be a users guide but only to provide a
background for the analysis presented in Volume 2.
The program is intended for interactive use at a terminal. It
is presumed that any reasonably sized system would not be analyzed in
one session. The program is thus designed to be interrupted at any
time and started again where left off.
Inputs are entered into the program in response to its request
for a command. Commands to the program start with the letter 'z' The
first step is to establish the definition, failure states, and failure
probabilities of the basic elements into which the system has been
partitioned. The command for establishing this model for the basic
system elements is 'zm'. The program then asks whether you want a
previously stored model, to modify the stored model, or create a new
model. For a new model t-heprogram first asks for the time parameter
that is to be used with the failure rates that are to be specified. It
then asks for the name of the first element. The order in which
elements are entered is arbitrary. The first three letters of the name
of the element is used as the identifier for that element. The program
then asks for two letter codes to identify the failure states of that
element and the associated failure rate for that state. The program
assumesthat the first state for each element is the good state and
automatically computes the probabilityas one minus the probability of
the failure states.
After the model is entered the process of constructing the
equation diagram begins. In response to the request for a command the
analyst enters the three letter code for the first element in the order
determined in Step 3. The program responds with the current state of
the system. At this point the only term will be that this first
element is good. The failed states for each element are automatically
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entered by the program into a push-down list to be considered later.
The analyst then enters the next element in the sequence. The program
responds with the new state which is these first two elements good.
The process of adding elements continues until it can be determined
that the probability of system failure is zero regardless of the state
of any remaining elements that have not yet been considered. At this
point a 'q0' is entered as a command. This tells the program that the
system in the currently defined state has a unreliability of zero. The
program then responds with a new current state of the system. This
new state is determined by taking from the push-down list the first
failure state for the last element entered. The analyst then enters
commands to tell the program the implications of the new state. If
additional resources are available in the form of other elements,
which is normally the situation in a redundant fault-tolerant system,
the analyst enters the codes for these additional elements as before
until a state is reached where the system unreliability is zero.
Eventually a point will be reached where the system probability of
failure is equal to one, independent of the state of any remaining
elements. At this point the analyst enters 'ql' to indicate that the
• unreliability is one. This process continues until all system states
have been accounted for.
The program automatically computes the unreliabilities for the
various subparts of the system as it has sufficient information to make
those computations. The form of the equation diagram is stored as
matrices which contain the alphanumeric names which identify the
elements and their associated states. These identifiers are arranged
in the matrix in a way that reflects the form of the equation diagram.
The computed unreliability numbers are arranged in matrices of the
same form. These matrices can be viewed at the terminal or printed on
a printer. The equation diagram for any realistic system is, of course,
too big to be viewed all at once on a terminal. If a command 'zdnn,nn'
is given, the terminal displays the part of the diagram starting at
the upper left hand corner with the row and column defined by 'nn,nn'
The command 'zp' causes the diagram to be printed. If the diagram is
too big for one page, it is printed on multiple pages and can be
assembled later.
As was discussed in Step 4 above, the size of the diagram for
any realistic system would getcompletely unmanageable if it were not
for the fact that many of the different system states are equivalent
and do not have to be reconstructed or recomputed. This is handled by
4
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the program by referring to the matrix location of the point at which
the diagram is equivalent. The command 'q(nn,nn)' is typed, which means
that the unreliability of the system with the current state is the same
as that at the point defined by 'nn,nn' that has already been computed.
A particular terminal session can be terminated at any time by
entering the command 'zz' The analysis process can be continued by
reinstating the stored element model (or modifying the model if
desired) and entering 'zx' which regenerates the previously entered
diagram. This process is also used to evaluate the effects of changes
in failure rates or system design.
6.7.3 Example Illustrating the Equation Diagram
Analysis Technique
This analysis method can best be illustrated with an example
that is typical of the systems that it will be used to analyze in
Volume 2. This example is a simplified version of a flight control
system which uses a small communications network to connect a fault-
tolerant computer system to two dual actuators. A schematic diagram
of the system is shown in Figure 6.7-2. A diagram showing the inter-
connections in the communication network is shown in Figure 6.7-3.
The links into the computer are designated by the points A and B. The
function of the system is assumed to be the control of split aero- °
dynamic controlsurfaces, one by each of the dual actuators. The
flight control function is assumed to be performed if either actuator
is operating. Each of the channels in the dual actuators has two
failure modes; a passive one and a hard-over failure. If one channel
fails passive and the other is good, the actuator can still perform
its function. However if either channel fails hard-over, that
actuator fails. If both actuators fail, the system fails.
There is a node of the communication network attached to each
actuator channel. Each node has three communication links that go to
other nodes or to the computer. Communications fail to an actuator
channel if there is no operational path of good links and nodes
between the computer and the channel.
The first step in applying this analysis technique is to
partition the system into basic elements. The system is divided into
three different types of elements: actuator channels, communication
nodes, and communication links. The actuator includes the hydraulic
channel itself, the servo electronics, and all of the interface
210
FTC__ 4
1314_
Figure 6.7-2. Schematic Diagram of the Example System.
Figure 6.7-3. Network Interconnections.
electronics and wiring that is unique to that channel. The link
includes all parts of the communication equipment that are unique to
that path between nodes or between a node and the computer. Included
are the wires, connectors, and the interface electronics at each end.
The node element includes all parts of the communication terminal that
are common to all paths. This partitioning of the elements is shown
in Figure 6.7-4. The fault tolerant computer itself is assumed to be
much more reliable than the other parts of the system. Also there are
no complex interactions between computer failure modes and the rest of
the system. The unique electronics in the computer for each link is
included in the link element. If the computer is working it is assumed
to be able to service all links. If it fails, the whole system fails
and this unreliability can be simply added to that resulting from the
rest of the system.
The next step is the identification of the states of each of the \
elements. The nodes and links can be adequately described by two
states: good and failed. The actuators are described by three states:
good, failed passive (soft), or failed active (hard). For this
example it is assumed that the probability of being in a failure
state as a function of time is given simply by a failure rate times
time. More complex descriptions can be accommodated by the model if
necessary. The numbers assumed by this example are:
node failure rate 2.0 x 10-4
link failure rate 1.0 x 10-5
actuator channel failure rate
soft 3.0 x 10-4
hard 3.0 x 10-6
Step three in this analysis process is to determine the order
in which the equations are to be constructed. The order for this
example is chosen by selecting the minimum set of elements that is
necessary to communicate with one actuator channel plus assure that
the system can operate. A node must be good before any of the links
through it can be used. Then a link must be established to the
computer. Next the actuator channel itself must be good. Finally it
must be assured that the other channel of that dual set has not failed
hard. If it has not, the unreliability of the system is zero indepen-
dentof the state of any of the other elements. If it has failed
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Figure 6.7-4. Partitioning of System Elements.
hard, a path must be established to the other actuator and it must be
determined if it is good or failed. This process is continued until
all states are accounted for.
The equation diagram is then constructed with the aid of the
computer program. Several stages in the construction of the diagram
are shown in figures starting with Figure 6.7-5. The elements and
their states are defined by the alpha-numeric symbols. Typical
definitions are:
nodl G node 1 good
nodl fl node 1 failed
inkAl G link from computer port A to node 1 good
inkAl fl same link failed
actl G actuator 1 good
actl sf actuator 1 failed soft
actl hd actuator 1 failed hard
The diagram is read from the top left corner. Lines have been
added to the computer print-out to show the relationship between
elements. The first state considered is 'node 1 good' followed by
'link from the computer to node 1 good', 'actuator channel 1 good', and
'actuator channel 2 good'. At this point 'q0' is entered to indicat_
that the unreliability of the system is zero. The next system state °
that is automatically considered by the program keeps the first three
elements the same (good) and adds 'actuator 2 failed soft' This
system state also has reliability of zero since channel 1 is still
good. The next state changes actuator 2 to failed hard and at this
point the first dual actuator has failed. It is now necessary to
consider other elements to determine the state of the other actuator.
Node 3, link from A to 3, actuator 3, and actuator 4 are then
considered in a similar way as before in next state in the development
of the diagram as shown in Figure 6.7-6. Again for the states contain-
ing actuator 4 good and failed soft, the unreliability of the system
is zero. For the state including actuator 4 hard failed, however, the
system unreliability is one since the other dual dual actuator has
already been determined to be failed.
At this point in the example there is enough information for
the program to start computing numbers as shown in Figure 6.7-7. The
numbers below the alpha-numeric labels are the products of the prob-
ability of the state of the element times the appropriate conditional
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Figure 6.7-5 Equation Diagram Stage i.
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Figure 6.7-7 Equation Diagram Stage 3.
unreliability. This conditional unreliability is the unreliability of
the system given the states of the elements that have already been
established. Its value is dependent on the states that have not yet
been considered, based on that particular system state. In general
this conditional unreliability will depend on further development of
the equation diagram. At this point in this example, however, these
conditional unreliabilities are known to be 0, 0, and 1 respectively
independent of the state of any other system elements, so the appropri-
ate products can be computed as shown. The number above the 'act4 g'
is the sum of the three act4 terms below and is the conditional
unreliability for that substate of the system and serves as the input
to the next level.
The next state that is drawn automatically by the program from
its push-down list adds 'actuator 3 failed soft' with all previous
elements in the same state. Now it must be determined not only that
actuator 4 is good but that it is in communication with the computer.
Thus node 4, link from B to 4, and actuator 4 are added to the diagram.
If the actuator is good the system unreliability is 0, but if it has
failed soft or hard, the unreliability is i. The added diagram and
numbers is shown in Figure 6.7-8.
The next state considered ends with the link from B to 4 failed.
An alternate link from 3 to 4 can be used. (The fact that node 3 and
link B to 3 are good is already established by the system state.) If
this link is good, an equivalent system state exists to the one where
link B to 4 is good thus the previously computed conditional unrelia-
bility can be transferred by entering its coordinates '(11,6)' as shown
in Figure 6.7-9. If the link from 3 to 4 fails, the link from 1 to 4
can be used. If this link fails, the system fails due to the failure
of communication to actuator channel 4, the soft failure of actuator
channel 3 and the hard failure of actuator channel 2.
The same process is continued until all system states are
considered. The entire diagram is shown in Figure 6.7-10. This
diagram does not model all failure modes exactly. Certain approxima-
tions have been made to simplify the analysis wherever it can be shown
that the effects of the approximation on the analysis are completely
insignificant. These points are marked by appending the letter 'X' to
the alphanumeric designator to remind the analyst that an approximation
has been made.
218
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1
2
nodl G--nod1 fl •
+l
Inl_l G-------.InkAl fl
,1
actl G--actl sf-------_ct_ hd
actZ G_ctZ sf--------actZ IxI
I
6 QO qO I
nod3 G--nod3 fl
_ 7
I A3 G--InkA3 f!
o I
act3 G--act3 sf-------act3 hd
, ,10+o+I
act¢ G---_-act; sf-------ec%_ hd nod_ G--nod; fl
O.O00E+O0 O.O00E*O0 3.000E-06 -/
qO QO Q1 JIO I B; G--InkB_ fl
11 3.J30E-O_
act_ G--act_ sf--act4 hd
O.O00E+O0 3.O00E-Oq 3.000E-06
QO Q1 Q1
12
1 Z 3 q 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Figure 6.7-8 Equation Diagram Stage 4,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1
Z
nod1 G nod! f!
InkAl G--------InkAlf
actl G ¢ctl sf--actl hd
oJ .ac 2 G-----------act2 sf act2 hd
QO Q0
6
not3 G--_nod3 fl
_o 7
k} In':_,3G InkA3 fl
o
8 6,150E-06
act3 G act3 sf---------act3 hd
2.9.99£-06 1.509E-07 3.000E-06
°I I9 3. 00E-06 5.0_29E-04
act4 G_ct4 sf _ct4 hd nod4 G nod4 fl
0.000F.00 0.000£.00 3.000E-06 3.029E-04 _.000E-04
QO QO ql | ql3.030E-_410
InkB4 G InkB4 fl
3.030E-04 3.0130E-08
11 3. 0130=-04 3.030E-04
act4 G--act4 sf---------ect4 hd I{_k3_ G Ink3 _, fl
0.000E+00 3.000E-04 3.000E-06 3.03_=--04 4.C_OE-08
q0 Q1 ql 11,6 I
12 4.030F.-04
1:7'.-_!4O--_nkl4 fl
3.030E-04 I.O00E-G4
11,6 qZ
13
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I0 ii
Figure 6.7-9 Equation Diagram Stage 5.
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6.534E-I0 I.Z6_E-13L 2._99E-06 3.000E-04 3.000E-06 3.060E-OF I.O00E-O4
I 10,C0 ql
ql/ ql
11 .6.5 4E-10 1.268E-09 3.000E-06
Ink3_ G Ink34 _IX In!<D3 G--------InRB3 fl act4 G act4 sf---------ect4 hd
3.643E-11 6.150E-10 6.534E-10 6.150E-10 O.OOOE+O0 O.O00E+O0 3.000E-06
4,1 8,3 11,_4 8,3 QO QO ql12
13
23 24 _5 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Figure 6.7-I0 Concluded
The ability to make these approximations with a high degree of
confidence illustrates one of the strengths of this analysis technique.
This strength is the easy ability to judge quantitatively the signifi-
cance of changes in thesystem configuration. The ability to make
these judgements and use them to make simplifying assumptions can be
illustrated by the process used to construct the upper left part of
the equation diagram as shown in Figure 6.7-10.
The diagram in the upper left deals with the case where node 1
is failed. The first step in this analysis is to consider actuator I.
If it is good or failed soft, node 2, link 2, and actuator 2 are added.
If they are good the system is good. If there is a failure of any of
these elements, this dual actuator can not be used and the state of the
other dual actuator must be considered to determine system unreliabil-
ity. A very similar process was done earlier in the analysis as shown
by the diagram starting at the point '6,3'. There is one difference
in the state of the system, however. This earlier analysis was based
on the fact that node 1 was good. The new analysis should be based on
the fact that node 1 is failed. The significance of this difference
can be determined by tracing through the diagram starting at the point
'6,3' to see where the state of node lis significant. The only time
node 1 was used is where communication links have failed and the link
1 to 4 is used. These points are at '12, i0' and '11,13'. With node 1
failed this link would be useless and a 'ql' should be entered instead.
The significance of this change can be estimated by looking at the
appropriate numbers. If a 'ql' had been entered at 'ii,i0' the
associated number would have been 1.0E-04, the failure rate of a link.
The resulting (upper) number at point '11,9' would now be 4.03E-04
which feeds into the point '10,7' which becomes 4.03E-08. It can now
be seen that this change has no significance since the resulting number
at '10,6' would not change at all in the four significant numbers shown.
A similar process can be used at the other point that link 1 to 4 is
used which will also show that the loss of node 1 is insignificant.
Thus it is possible to transfer the result from point '6,3' to the
points where it is needed in the upper right of the diagram and avoid
having to reproduce this whole diagram for the minor change that would
not have changed the numbers.
The process described in the previous paragraphs has illustrated
some of the strengths of this analysis technique. Other advantages can
be seen by reviewing the numbers shown in Figure 6.7-10. It can be
seen, starting with the first line, that very little of the final
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unreliability of the system is contributed by system states that
include the failure of node i. The number added by the failure of
node 1 is almost two orders of magnitude smaller. On the next line it
can be seen that the contribution of link A to 1 failed is even less
(almost four orders of magnitude less than the state which includes
the failure of that link). On the other hand, lines three and four
show that almost all of the system unreliability comes from failure
modes that include hard failure of one or the other of the actuator
channels. This analysis thus shows that the unreliability of this
sample system is dominated by the actuators. The richness of inter-
connections in the communication structure makes it very reliable and
thus an insignificant contributer to the system unreliability.
This analysis technique has several other features that have
proven to be useful. The unreliability of the system as a function of
time can be evaluated by entering different times in the element model.
The sensitivity of the unreliability to change in the elements failure
rates can easily be determined by modifying the model and rerunning
the program using the stored data defining the diagram. Changes in
the design of the system can be evaluated in a similar way. Many times
the effects of changes in failure rates or the design can be estimated
by manually tracing the appropriate paths in the diagram without
needing to rerun the analysis.
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